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Low agricultural productivity is a persistent challenge in developing economies.
In the first chapter of the dissertation, I study the concurrent but independently
implemented expansion of rural roads and extension in Ethiopia to examine how
access to markets and technologies affect agricultural productivity. Using geo-
spatial data combined with large surveys and exploiting the staggered roll-out of
the two programs, I show that there are strong complementarities between roads
and extension. While ineffective in isolation, access to both a road and extension
increases productivity. I find that roads and extension improve productivity by
facilitating the take up of agricultural advice and modern inputs. Furthermore,
households adjust crop choices and shift across occupations in response to their
changing comparative advantages in access to markets and technologies.
In the second chapter of the dissertation, co-authored with Samuel Bazzi and
Martin Fiszbein, we study the long-run implications of the American frontier expe-
rience for culture and politics. We track the frontier throughout the 1790–1890 pe-
riod and construct a novel, county-level measure of total frontier experience (TFE).
Historically, frontier locations had distinctive demographics and greater individu-
alism. Long after the closing of the frontier, counties with greater TFE exhibit more
pervasive individualism and opposition to redistribution. We provide suggestive
vi
evidence on the roots of frontier culture: selective migration, an adaptive advan-
tage of self-reliance, and perceived opportunities for upward mobility through ef-
fort. Overall, our findings shed new light on the frontiers persistent legacy of
rugged individualism.
In the third chapter of the dissertation, I use plant level census data to examine
the effects of two policies designed to support prioritized sub-sectors and regions
on the productivity of the Ethiopian manufacturing sector. The first policy, imple-
mented during 1996-2002, was an activist industrial policy favoring import substi-
tution while the second policy, active during 2003-2012, emphasized export pro-
motion. I find that there is severe misallocation in Ethiopian manufacturing sector,
but it has subsided over the studied period. The results suggest that the priority
sector support policies have exacerbated the misallocation, and the within-sector
variations of the policies largely account for the dispersion in revenue productiv-
ity.
vii
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Chapter 1
Rural Roads, Agricultural Extension, and
Productivity
1.1 Introduction
Improving agricultural productivity is a policy concern in developing countries.
In 2017, while 60% of the population in the least developed economies were en-
gaged in agriculture, the sector accounted for only 24% of the GDP. Expansions
in the rural road network and agricultural extension have been considered as so-
lutions to raise productivity. The evidence on the effectiveness of extension and
road programs, in isolation, is mixed (Asher and Novosad, 2018; Anderson and
Feder, 2007; BenYishay and Mobarak, 2018; Dercon et al., 2009; Krishnan and Pat-
nam, 2013; Van de Walle, 2009). However, there could be important interactions
between access to extension and roads. Extension provides farmers with the tech-
nologies and inputs that enable them to capitalize on market access. Rural roads
facilitate the provision of extension and increase access to market opportunities
that incentivize the take up of technologies recommended by extension. This pa-
per shows that it is critical to consider roads and extension simultaneously due
to the strong complementarities between the two factors that can modulate their
efficacies in different contexts.
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I investigate the complementarities between access to markets and technolo-
gies by considering the simultaneous but independently implemented expansion
of extension and rural roads in Ethiopia. In the first program, the government ex-
panded access to extension, starting in 2004, with a goal to provide every village
with a farmer training center and three extension agents that advise farmers and
facilitate access to modern inputs. Since 2004, the share of farmers who received
advisory services increased from 25% to 74%, and it continues to expand. The
second program, the Universal Rural Road Access Program (URRAP), was com-
menced in 2011 to connect every village with an all-weather road. By 2017, URRAP
has doubled the share of villages with an all-weather road to over 76%. Since 2004,
the Ethiopian GDP has increased by 262% and value added per worker in agricul-
ture has increased by 94% (WBG, 2018). The massive scale, concurrent timing and
uncoordinated expansions of these two programs and Ethiopia’s striking growth
over the same period present an ideal context to study the role of access to markets
and technologies at the early stages of structural transformation.
Combining administrative geo-spatial data with large surveys and exploiting
the staggered roll out of the roads and extension, I find that, while ineffective in
isolation, extension and roads have strong complementary effects on agricultural
productivity. I show that in villages with access to both extension and roads, farm-
ers are more likely to use agricultural advice, credit and modern inputs. In addi-
tion, farmers specialize in crops and trade across villages in line with their relative
advantages with respect to access to markets and technologies. In the villages that
get a road without the technologies provided under extension, households reduce
total area cultivated and are more likely to shift to non-farm occupations. While
extension and roads increase farm income on average, the improvements are con-
centrated in the villages that have access to both factors. However, comparing con-
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sumption and living standards across villages, the effects of the changes in farm
income are mitigated by labor reallocation across sectors.
Access to a road and extension can have strong complementarities because
poor connectivity or unavailability of technologies constrain the other factor’s ef-
ficacy. Improvements in the road network may increase agricultural productivity
by changing farmers’ access to markets and public services such as extension. Ac-
cess to roads may also decrease productivity if non-farm opportunities reduce the
effort put into farm work or select the more skilled individuals out of agriculture.
On the other hand, extension can improve productivity by advising farmers on
best technologies, facilitating access to inputs, mobilizing the community to ad-
dress common problems, and helping households deal with shocks. However,
farmers may not benefit from market access without the relevant know-how and
support provided under extension. Poor roads limit the ability of extension agents
to reach farmers. Farmers may not undertake costly investments in technologies
without profitable market opportunities. Hence, extension and road together have
a stronger effect on productivity because they relax two interdependent rural con-
straints, access to markets and technologies, simultaneously.
Until 2004, the provision of extension in Ethiopia was very limited. The cur-
rent regime, which has been in power since 1995, considers the agriculture sector
central in its overall development strategy and has adopted extension as a key in-
strument to improve productivity. A farmer training center equipped with three
development agents is the focal point for the delivery of extension in a village.
Since 2004, over 15,000 farmer training centers have been built and 72,000 agents
have been staffed. Cereals which are the main staple crops, receive the lion’s share
of the extension coverage. While cereals account for 67% of the cultivated area,
they constitute more than 84% of the area under extension. The expansion of ex-
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tension is implemented by the regional bureau of agricultural and rural develop-
ment. The main factors that determined the roll out of extension across villages are
remoteness, agro-climatic suitability and the regional budget constraints.
In addition to expanding extension, the government has invested over $2 bil-
lion in the road network under URRAP. While there are national guidelines regard-
ing the implementation of URRAP, there is no single formula for determining the
prioritization of roads across villages. In each region, the district road authority
identifies a potential road project, and for each road, the regional administration
hires engineering consultants to design a cost-effective route given the topography
(mainly gradient and rivers) and the national road design standards. When possi-
ble, the route selection circumvents river crossings and builds along flat slopes to
reduce costly bridge construction and improve stability. The length of roads to be
built in each region was set in the five year URRAP plan at baseline and relatively
fixed across years. The timing of which roads are built is determined by the re-
gional authorities considering the remoteness of each village, cost of construction
and the regional budget.
I link annual agricultural sample surveys from the Central Statistical Agency
with a novel administrative road network data from the Ethiopian Road Author-
ity. I supplement the network data with road level information using the work
progress reports I compiled from the regional authorities. The final sample is a
balanced panel comprising of 1670 villages with over 30,000 farmers in each year
for 2010-16. The main outcomes are three alternative measures of productivity:
production value per hectare, value added per hectare and TFP calculated follow-
ing Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). I also use surveys on consumption and employ-
ment from the 2010/11 and 2015/16 waves of the Household Consumption and
Expenditure Surveys and Welfare Monitoring Surveys.
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The critical challenge to identify the effects of expansions in roads and exten-
sion is the potential endogenous placement of the programs since policymakers
may consider economic and political factors. In my setting, the roll out of each pro-
gram is mainly determined by baseline remoteness, topography and the regional
budget constraints. Furthermore, the two programs are implemented indepen-
dently by two separate government agencies. The timing of which village gets a
road, extension or both is often beyond the purview of the village. I provide causal
estimates on the impact of access to rural road and extension by employing gen-
eralized difference-in-difference (GDD) and instrumental variable (IV) strategies
that leverage the constrained but staggered roll-out of both programs.
In the GDD design, I exploit the variation in the timing of a village’s access to a
road or extension. In every specification, I include village, year and the interaction
between remoteness (distance to baseline network) and year fixed effects. Village
fixed effects control for any characteristics, such as natural productivity potentials,
that may influence the timing of access to extension and road. Year fixed effects
flexibly control for any trends. Given the roll out of roads and extension from the
nearest to the most remote, the remoteness by year fixed effects control for any fac-
tors that also change over time by remoteness. Hence, the identification strategy
compares two villages that are identical in time invariant characteristics and simi-
larly affected by remoteness, but one of them gets access to the road, extension or
both while the other does not due to factors - topography and regional budgets -
exogenous to the villages. Using an event study specification, I provide evidence
for the identifying assumption that there are no differential pre-trends by timing
of treatment.
I adopt two approaches to measure road access. The first approach uses a bi-
nary indicator on whether the village is intersected by a URRAP road. URRAP is
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the main source of variation in road access during my study period, and the binary
variable provides estimates on the direct impact of the expansion under URRAP. In
the second approach, I use a market access measure which considers the full road
network and distribution of economic potential at baseline to construct a continu-
ous measure of connectivity. The market access approach has two key advantages
over the binary measure: it allows for continuous treatment intensity and accounts
for potential increases in market access from indirect connections.
To allay concerns about omitted variables, I use a second identification strategy
that combines the GDD design with an IV based on the predicted optimal road
network. To construct the IV, first, I predict the least cost path that connects every
village to the baseline network or the nearest connected village accounting for the
construction costs implied by land gradient and rivers. Second, I take the regional
road authority’s perspective and determine the network in each year by building
the roads closest to the baseline network until the regional annual budget is ex-
hausted. Using the predicted network, I calculate the market access which serves
as an IV for the actual market access. The main advantage of the IV is that it iso-
lates the variation in road access due to only the factors that are exogenous to the
village.
The finding that is consistent across the different approaches is that road and
extension have strong complementary effects on productivity. While ineffective in
isolation, in villages that gain access to both a road and extension, productivity
increases by 10-12%. Furthermore, I show that both the OLS and IV results are
robust to a battery of controls that account for differential trends by region, agro-
climatic suitabilities and baseline proximity to over 45 rural services and facilities
which could affect both productivity and timing of access to extension and road.
The novel contribution of this paper is that I study a unique natural experi-
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ment considering two concurrent and uncoordinated national programs to pro-
vide causal estimates on the complementarities between access to extension and
road. Using model calibrations, Gollin and Rogerson (2014) show that a simulta-
neous 10% increase in agricultural TFP and 10% reduction in transport costs can
lead to 62% improvements in consumption. Furthermore, the studies on take up
of technologies and the mixed evidence on the efficacy of roads and extension,
in isolation, suggest that it may be valuable to consider the two factors together
(Asher and Novosad, 2018; Shamdasani, 2018; Suri, 2011; Michler et al., 2018). For
instance, Asher and Novosad (2018) find that expansion of rural roads India has no
impact on agricultural outcomes, and conclude that ”rural growth is constrained
by more than the poor state of transportation infrastructure.” In this paper, I show
that while road access is ineffective in isolation, it improves productivity when
complemented with extension.
In its objective to understand the determinants of agricultural productivity, this
paper relates to literature on two puzzles about the developing world: the produc-
tivity gap between the agriculture and non-agriculture sector and the low take
up of productive technologies. Gollin et al. (2013) document that value added
per worker is much higher in the nonagricultural sector, suggesting severe mis-
allocation of labor. Despite poor agricultural productivity, a related strand of the
literature has documented another puzzle - low take up of productivity enhanc-
ing technologies (Suri, 2011; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010; Conley and Udry, 2010;
Duflo et al., 2008). Suri (2011) shows that farmers do not adopt technologies that
could dramatically increase their productivity because of heterogeneous net bene-
fits to the technology. Michler et al. (2018) find that chickpea farmers in Ethiopia
adopt improved seeds because it improves economic returns despite its lack of ef-
fect on physical yield. In both studies, poor access to markets is a hindrance to the
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adoption of modern technologies. This paper provides further evidence that there
are heterogeneous benefits to technologies based on access to markets.
The paper also contributes to the literature on how rural road expansions affect
agricultural production.1 Jacoby (2000) shows that rural access to markets confers
substantial benefits to poor households, but may not be sufficient to reduce in-
come inequality. Aggarwal (2018a) finds that in districts with greater paved road
construction, households benefit from cheaper non-local goods, higher consump-
tion variety and increased use of agricultural technologies. Shamdasani (2018)
shows that farmers in remote villages that get new roads switch to market oriented
farming, increase hiring of farm labor, and invest more in complementary mod-
ern inputs. Shrestha (2017) finds similar effects considering highway expansion in
Nepal. On the other hand, Asher and Novosad (2018) show that while access to
new rural feeder roads result in labor reallocation to non-farm work, they find no
effects on agricultural outcomes. My paper contributes to the literature by provid-
ing additional evidence in a new context. Furthermore, a village’s access to a road
has general equilibrium (GE) effects since it changes the comparative advantage of
the other villages in the network and thus affects the patterns of specialization and
trade across villages. I add to the existing studies by exploiting the geo-spatial data
and distribution of population across all villages to provide a measure of market
access that accounts for variations in treatment intensity and indirect connections
to capture the GE effects.
While there are studies that have examined the effect of access to roads on rural
welfare in Ethiopia, this paper is the first to provide causal estimates of the impact
of road expansions under URRAP. Dercon et al. (2012) find that access to a good
1Given the focus of this paper, I limit my discussion of the literature to the studies on rural roads.
See Redding and Turner (2015) for a detailed survey of the literature on different types of transport
infrastructure, including rails, colonial roads and recent highway expansions.
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road reduces the likelihood of chronic poverty by 36%, and Stifel et al. (2016) show
that gravel roads have internal rates of return of 12 - 35%. My paper complements
these studies in three key dimensions. First, I hone in on the impact of access to all-
weather roads on agricultural productivity and crop choice to assess the channels
by which road access affects rural welfare. Second, while the two papers study
road access in the pre-URRAP period, I consider a time period over which the
share of villages that had all-weather roads in Ethiopia doubled to 76%. Third,
both papers study areas with limited scope: Dercon et al. (2012) use a longitudinal
sample of 15 villages while Stifel et al. (2016) consider a sample of 850 households
in one district. In this paper, I use the full road network and large surveys that
allow me to examine the impact of changes in access to all-weather roads with a
panel of over thousands of villages across Ethiopia from 2010-2016.
Finally, this paper relates to the literature on the efficacy of agricultural exten-
sion. Several of these studies have found weak or no evidence for the effect of
extension on agricultural production across different settings (BenYishay and Mo-
barak, 2018; Birkhaeuser et al., 1991; Evenson, 2001; Owens et al., 2003; Anderson
and Feder, 2007; Feder et al., 2010; Larsen and Lilleør, 2014; Udry et al., 2010). In
the Ethiopian context, there have been several studies that have examined the rel-
evance of extension for rural welfare. Dercon et al. (2009) use longitudinal data
from 15 villages over 1994-2004 and finds that receiving at least one extension visit
during the last cropping season reduces headcount poverty by 9.8%. Bachewe
et al. (2018) show that extension agent visit is associated with increased adoption
of improved seeds and fertilizer for the main cereals. On the other hand, Krishnan
and Patnam (2013) find that while extension agents had initial effect on the use of
modern inputs, adoption mainly takes place through social learning in the latter
periods. Furthermore, Buehren et al. (2017) study households in 85 villages in 2010
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and 2012, find that while access to a farmer training center increases cultivation of
marketable crops, it has no effects on productivity, use of fertilizer or income.
My paper adds to the existing studies on the role of extension by providing
detailed evidence on its impact using a panel dataset of 1670 villages during a pe-
riod of massive expansion in extension services in Ethiopia and showing how the
effectiveness of the program is modulated by access to markets. Consistent with
Buehren et al. (2017), I find that access to extension, in isolation, has no effect on
overall productivity. However, I show that access to extension increases cereal pro-
ductivity, which had been the focus of the program. Furthermore, while ineffective
in isolation, extension does increase overall productivity and farm income when
combined with improved market access.
The rest of this paper proceeds as following: Section 2 provides the policy back-
ground on the road and extension programs, Section 3 offers a simple conceptual
framework to understand how roads and extension affect agricultural production,
Section 4 discusses the data, Section 5 presents the empirical strategy, Section 6 dis-
cusses the results and robustness checks, Section 7 explores the mechanisms that
explain the main findings, and Section 8 concludes with the key lessons from the
main findings.
1.2 Policy Background
In this section, I provide a brief overview of institutional context on the expansion
of the rural roads and extension services.
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1.2.1 Policy Background: The Universal Rural Road Program
Over 80% of Ethiopia’s 105 million population live in the rural areas with season-
ally and spatially variable climate and rugged topography. However, in 2010, close
to 48 million people lived more than 2 kilometers way from the nearest all-weather
road (ERA, 2010a). While the government has heavily invested in the road sector,
the focus was on federal trunk and link roads until 2010.
The government commenced the Universal Rural Road Access Program (UR-
RAP) in 2010 with the mission to connect every village by an all-weather road
that would provide the community year round access to public, economic and so-
cial services. The first implementation phase of the program (2010-2015) aimed
to build 71,523 km of all-weather roads throughout the country at an estimated
cost of over $1 billion . As Figure 1·9 shows that while the lion share of the ex-
penditure on roads were initially dedicated to federal roads, the government has
heavily shifted resources towards investing in rural roads through URRAP. Con-
sistent with the expenditure patterns, Figure 1·1 demonstrates that the roads built
under URRAP account for a significant share of the recent expansion in the to-
tal road network length. Figures 1·10 shows the expansion of the road network
since the commencement of URRAP. This study focuses on access to URRAP roads
precisely because URRAP is the main driver of the recent increase in the network
density and the most relevant road type for the rural population.
The implementation of URRAP is decentralized by design. Ethiopia is orga-
nized as a federal system, and the constitution grants each of the eleven regions
extensive autonomies to conduct their internal affairs. Furthermore, each region is
further decentralized into districts (weredas) in a similar fashion. In line with the
federal structure, while the full cost of URRAP is borne by the federal government,
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the implementation of the program is left to the discretion of the regional and sub-
sequently wereda (district) administrations. The program has been implemented
in all the regions except in Afar and Somali regions which had opted out of the
program.
While there are national priorities and guidelines that inform the implementa-
tion of URRAP, there is no single formula for determining the targeting of URRAP
across villages. Table 1.1 presents the plans for the length of kilometers to be built
under URRAP in each region and year as established in the official planning doc-
uments. As annual work plan shows, across regions and overtime, there is no
strategic allocation of the length of roads to built. Rather, the planning reflects the
fact that a total number of road length has to be constructed in each region and
the timing of how many kilometers is built in a given year is a function of budget
constraints. The district level road authorities in each region are tasked with the
selection and implementation of URRAP projects. For each potential URRAP road,
the regional administration hires engineering consultants that undertake feasibil-
ity studies in order to produce the most cost effective routes taking the topographi-
cal constraints and national design standards into account. Then, the regional level
road authorities are responsible for the approval, coordination and monitoring of
the selected projects factoring in the ease of implementation, cost of construction
and budget constraints.
To meet the challenges of seasonal weather variability and diverse topography,
the federal standards for URRAP specify that the road design has to account for
the influence of local climate, hydrology, terrain and available materials in a man-
ner that is cost effective to construct and maintain. Under the program, new all-
weather roads are constructed or existing dry weather roads are upgraded. With
few exceptions, the vast majority of roads built under URRAP are unpaved gravel
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roads with appropriate drainage structure and a capacity of 25-75 annual average
daily traffic (ERA, 2011).
Typically, the roads built under URRAP are low-volume feeder roads, with an
average length of 10 kilometers, that connect village centers to the nearest major
regional and federal road or the nearest town which is often placed along the major
road. In few instances, URRAP roads can be as long as 80 kilometers, transversing
multiple villages. Figure 1·3 (a)-(d) demonstrates the gradual roll out of URRAP
from the villages that are closest to the baseline network to the most remote. I ex-
ploit these features of the program roll out in the baseline identification strategy as
well as to construct an instrumental variable based on least cost path that connect
every village to the baseline network.
1.2.2 Policy Background: The Expansion of Agricultural Extension
The provision of agricultural extension in Ethiopia dates back to 1953 with the es-
tablishment of the Imperial Ethiopian College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts.
In this section, I present a brief overview of the policy background on extension
services with a focus on the recent expansion across the country. Berhane et al.
(2018) provide a detailed account of the history of extension programs in Ethiopia.
While agricultural extension has gone through various changes since 1953, the
scope of the program was limited to areas with high agricultural potential that
were also easily accessible until 1995. The recent expansion of extension across
Ethiopia is driven by two factors. First, the current government, which has been
in power since 1991, adopted an overall development strategy known as Agricul-
ture Development Led Industrialization that emphasized improvements in small-
holder agricultural productivity as the key to transform the economy. Accordingly,
the government has invested heavily in the rural sector, and expansion of public
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agricultural extension services is a significant component of the investment.
Second, a pilot extension program undertaken by nongovernmental organiza-
tion, Sasakawa Africa Association and Global 2000 (SG-2000) in collaboration with
the Ministry of Agriculture, demonstrated the potential for dramatic improve-
ments in productivity under an extension program. In particular, the pilot study
showed that under a program that provided farmers with best farming technolo-
gies, subsidized inputs and close supervision, farmers could more than double
their yields for maize and wheat (Davis et al., 2010). Following the pilot study, in
1995, the government adopted the packages tried under SG-2000 into a national ex-
tension services program called Participatory Demonstration and Training System
(PADETES), and expanded the availability across the country.
While the extension program has gone through several iterations since 1995, the
main components are still the same. Using trained development agents (DAs), the
program aims to improve agricultural productivity through the transfer of knowl-
edge on best farming practices, provision of subsided inputs and credit, and com-
munity mobilization. The delivery of extension can vary from the simplest provi-
sion of advising services to the most comprehensive packages where farmers set
aside a plot of land (0.25 to 0.50 hectares) and apply prescribed inputs and prac-
tices.
After the assessment of PADETES revealed severe human capital bottlenecks in
the extension system, the government implemented a policy to increase the num-
ber of development agents through Agricultural Technical and Vocational Edu-
cation and Training (ATVETs) starting in 2004. In addition, the government put
forth a policy to establish a farmer training center in every village equipped with
three development agents that would serve as a focal point for the delivery of ex-
tension. The farmer training centers, which are equipped with classrooms and
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trial plots, serve as central locations for farmers to receive advice and learn from
demonstrations on trial plots. Starting in 2006, through the Rural Capacity Build-
ing Project, the government further strengthened the extension programs by in-
vesting in the technical, physical, and managerial capacity of the extension system
(Berhane et al., 2018).
The massive investment in the extension program is reflected both in the ex-
pansion of access and take up of extension. The number of development agents
increased from 2,500 in 1995 to 15,000 in 2002, and to over 72,000 in 2016. Since
2004, more than 15,000 farmer training centers have been built across the country.
Figure 1·4 maps the location of farmer training centers and development agents of-
fice in 2007 and 2014, and demonstrates the enormous expansion in the availability
of extension over the period.
Similarly, the use of extension has also increased significantly over this period.
Figure 1·12 (a) shows that the share of area covered under extension package has
doubled between 2010 and 2016. However, as Figure 1·12 (b) demonstrates, most
of the increase in the use of extension is concentrated in cereals, which are the main
staple crops. In 2016, over 36% of of the area under cereals is covered by extension
while only 13% of the non-cereal area is under extension package. As Figure 1·12
(c) shows, despite cereals accounting for only 67% of total cultivated area, they
account for over 80% of the area under extension. Thus, access to extension may
have heterogeneous effects on agricultural production across crop groups.
1.3 Conceptual Framework
In this section, taking the existing literature and the Ethiopian context into account,
I outline a simple conceptual framework to explain how changes in rural road
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network and access to extension may affect agricultural production, and highlight
the potential complementarities between the two factors.
1.3.1 Rural Roads and Agricultural Productivity
The expansions in the rural road network may affect productivity and crop choice
by changing farmers’ access to input markets, agricultural output markets, non-
farm opportunities and public services.
Improvements in rural road network provide farmers with easier, and perhaps
cheaper, access to markets for inputs as well as private services such as credit that
are often available only in neighboring towns. Rashid et al. (2013) study the dis-
tribution of fertilizers in Ethiopia, and find that the final subsidized retail prices of
fertilizers are 15-20% higher than the prices at the port of entry and transport costs
alone account for 64-80% of the differences. Hence, better transport infrastruc-
ture can boost productivity by facilitating access to cheaper modern inputs such as
chemical fertilizers and improved seeds.
The literature on the economic impact of remoteness has highlighted that rural
isolation hampers development by limiting the access to critical public and social
services (Bryceson et al., 2008; Linard et al., 2012; Porter, 2002; WBG, 2004). Im-
provements in the road network can affect agricultural productivity by facilitating
the transfer of technological know-how through extension. Furthermore, increased
rural connectivity can affect agricultural productivity indirectly by improving ac-
cess to public services such as health care, education and safety net programs. Ag-
garwal (2018b) shows that road construction under PMSGY results in higher rates
of institutional antenatal-care and deliveries that improve maternal health. To the
extent that improvements in health affect workers efforts and time allocation, in-
creased rural road access can have indirect effects on agricultural productivity.
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Even with improved access to knowledge and inputs, farmers may not un-
dertake costly investments in modern inputs and practices unless they also have
access to output markets that would make such investments profitable (Suri, 2011;
Michler et al., 2018). This may be particularly important for crops that perish un-
less sold within reasonable time or cash crops that are not as needed for subsis-
tence. Improved market access also enables farmers to get better producer prices
by allowing them to arbitrage across connected output markets. Hence, increased
market access can improve productivity by providing farmers with profitable op-
portunities that could incentivize costly productivity enhancing investments.
In contexts where subsistence consumption does not justify the production of
commercial crops, improvements in market access may incentivize farmers to cul-
tivate profitable crops, such as cash crops and oils, that are predominantly utilized
for the sale. Increased rural connectivity may also affect market participation even
for crops, such as cereals, that are often produced for own consumption. Further-
more, access to markets may increase the profitability of producing using marginal
fallow lands or those previously used for suboptimal purposes such as grazing. In
combination, better rural connectivity can increase total land cultivated and en-
courage production of commercial crops.
In addition, given the seasonality and riskiness of agricultural production, im-
proved rural connectivity can affect agricultural production by providing oppor-
tunities for non-farm work that could mitigate the effects of seasonality or shocks.
For instance, Asher and Novosad (2018) find that new paved roads result in the
reallocation of labor to non-farm sector by facilitating the access of rural labor to
external employment. To the extent that households can supplement their income
through non agricultural work, they may have the requisite resources needed to
invest in costly productivity improving investments such as purchasing chemical
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fertilizers and improved seeds.
Nonetheless, taking the general equilibrium effects into account, it is possi-
ble that expansion of the rural road network can reduce agricultural productivity.
A substantial reallocation of labor to non-farm secondary employment could ad-
versely affect productivity if farmers are not investing as much time and other
resources in productivity improving practices on the farm. Labor reallocation may
also negatively affect productivity if the more skilled and able farmers switch to the
non-farm sector. In addition, in the long run, market incentivized over-cultivation
or use of less productive marginal lands may also result in reduction in agricul-
tural productivity. For instance, Asher et al. (2018) show that while expansion in
rural road network did not affect deforestation, the highway upgrades programs
resulted in substantial forest losses that could have long term detrimental effects
on agricultural productivity.
Due to the network structure, a village’s road access may be best considered
in relation to the other villages. First, the change in connectivity when a village
gets a new road is a function of the characteristics (such as population or level
of development) of the new potential destinations. A village that gets connected
to a set of more developed villages and towns would have a bigger change in its
access to markets than one that gets connected to an isolated and less developed
cluster. Second, a village’s access to a new road has spatial spillovers since it also
alters the connectedness of all the other villages in the same network. The relative
connectivity of a given village, and thus its evolving comparative advantage with
respect to access to markets or extension, determines changes in the patterns of
specialization and trade. To account for these two features of expansion of the
road network, in the empirical analysis, I show that the results are robust to using
the market access approach that accounts for the variations in treatment intensity
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and the increases in access due to indirect connections.
1.3.2 Access to Extension and Agricultural Productivity
Extension services can affect agricultural production by providing farmers with
best technologies, facilitating their access to inputs, and helping them deal with
shocks.
Extension agents are the liaisons between agricultural research and practice.
Figure 1·15 presents the average development agent’s allocation of time during a
typical work week. More than 35% of the agent’s time is dedicated to advising and
training farmers either through field visits to farmers’ homes or using demonstra-
tions at the farmer training centers. The main channel through which extension
can affect agricultural productivity is by improving farmers knowledge of best
farming technologies .
Extension agents are also in charge of facilitating farmers access to modern in-
puts such as improved seeds and chemical fertilizers. Development agents spend
over 10% of their work week to bring inputs from the source, inform farmers
about their availability and distribute them to farmers. Furthermore, development
agents are tasked with administering loans to farmers who buy the government
subsidized inputs on credit. Hence, access to extension can affect agricultural pro-
ductivity by facilitating knowledge and take up of credit and productivity enhanc-
ing modern inputs.
In addition, extension workers play a role in mobilizing the community to ad-
dress issues that require coordinated effort such as watershed management or ad-
dress shocks such as pest infestations. As Figure 1·15 shows, DAs spend over 15%
on community mobilization and data collection. Development agents also play
a role in collecting agricultural data and discussing pertinent issues with other
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stakeholders, such village officials, who may not be directly engaged in agricul-
tural related issues. Thus, access to extension can affect agricultural production
by helping farmers mobilize, assist them to cope with adverse shocks and serve as
liaisons to different stakeholders at the village and district level.
1.3.3 Complementarities Between Access to Roads and Extension
As the discussions of the mechanism by which improved access to roads and exten-
sion separately affect agricultural production demonstrate, there could be strong
complementarities between the two factors.
An in depth review of the public extension service in Ethiopia found that the
poor rural road network was one of the main constraints that limited the provision
of agricultural extension services to farmers (Davis et al., 2010). As Figure 1·15,
extension agents spend significant amount of their time visiting farmers, bringing
in inputs and mobilizing the village community. A recent study on the state of
extension also found that the poor transport infrastructure limits the ability of DAs
to contact a large number of farmers within a given area (Berhane et al., 2018).
Hence, access to an all-weather road complements the provision of extension by
facilitating DA’s ability to visit farmers fields, mobilize the community and bring
in the requisite inputs into villages, particularly during the rainy seasons.
In addition, the adoption of modern technologies may not be a profitable if
farmers can not take their produce to the market. In particular, with crops that
are perishable or difficult to transport under poor road conditions, but potentially
profitable given local agro-climatic similarities, farmers may not be willing to culti-
vate such crops or invest in the requisite modern inputs. The improvements in ac-
cess to output markets complement extension services by providing farmers with
additional incentives to take up the productivity enhancing advices and inputs
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recommended by the development agents.
Access to a new road on its own may not be beneficial to farmers unless they
have the know-how, access to inputs and market information they need to capital-
ize on new opportunities. Extension complements improved market access by fa-
cilitating farmers’ knowledge of best farming technologies and subsidized inputs.
Furthermore, integration of villages into the larger network could expose farmers
to potential import competitions from producers in connected village. Access to
extension services can enable farmers in villages that gain road access to position
themselves, through choice of crop varieties or targeting of particular markets, in
order to cope with the potentially negative effects of import competition. Hence,
access to extension complements improvements in the road network by enabling
farmers to capitalize on the economic benefits and mitigate the potential adverse
effects of economic integration.
Overall, while access to extension may increase agricultural productivity on its
own, its efficacy may be limited in the absence of good transport infrastructure.
Even if improvements in rural road network provide farmers with increased ac-
cess to markets that incentivize productive investments, farmers may not benefit
from the improved access without access to the relevant know-how and access to
inputs and credit that are provided under the extension program. The presence of
both extension services and an all-weather road in a village relaxes the two main
constraints on agricultural production, access to markets and technologies, simul-
taneously. Hence, there may be strong complementaries between the expansion
of extension and rural road network under URRAP in transforming agricultural
productivity.
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1.4 Data
In order to examine the impact of village level access to an all-weather road or
extension, I combine administrative data on the road network with various survey
datasets that have information on variables of interest pertaining to availability of
extension, agricultural production, employment, consumption and other welfare
measures. In this section, I provide details on the three main data sources.
1.4.1 Road Network
I use a novel and previously unused geo-spatial data on the road network that was
complied by the Ethiopian Road Authority (ERA) in 2016. The GIS data covers
all roads in Ethiopia and the corresponding attribute table provides detailed road
level information, including road class, ownership, surface type and construction
year. The data on construction commencement and completion year is not avail-
able for all the roads in the GIS data. Hence, I supplement the network data with
road level information using the work progress reports I compiled from the four
main regional road authorities (Amhara, Oromia, SNNP and Tigray). As the Fig-
ure 1·1 and 1·10 show, the rural roads constructed under URRAP account for the
lions share of the recent expansion in the road network recently.
Almost all of the URRAP roads were commenced between 2011 and 2014. Fig-
ure 1·2 provides the number of villages where road construction was commenced
for each year. Since the data on the completion year of URRAP roads is not com-
prehensive, I use the construction commencement year compiled from the regional
progress reports to construct the road access measure. For the roads where both
the construction start and completion year is available, the average length of the
project is around 2 years.
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Therefore, in the analyses, I impute a village to have access to a URRAP road
two years after the commencement of a road in that village. The calculation of
road access using the construction commencement year is advantageous since the
completion year maybe correlated with endogenous factors, such as changes in
district capacity, that can also affect agricultural production. Furthermore, using
an instrumental variable strategy, I show that measurement error is not important
in driving the results.
1.4.2 Annual Agricultural Sample Surveys
The main source of data on outcomes of interest is the Annual Agricultural Sample
Survey (AgSS) for main growing season (Meher) that is undertaken by the Central
Statistical Agency (CSA). The AgSS is a large survey covering more than 40,000
private peasant holders engaged in growing crops or raising livestock in private or
in combination with others. The survey covers the entire rural part of the country
except for select zones comprising of the non-sedentary population in Afar and
Somali regions.
The CSA follows a stratified two-stage cluster design to determine the AgSS
sample. In the first step, a random sample of about 2000 enumeration areas (EAs),
which are sub-village level geographical units consisting of 150-200 households are
selected, and in the second stage, around 20 agricultural households are selected
from each EA. On average, CSA subdivides each village in to around 4 EAs and
often only one EA is surveyed within each village. For each agricultural holder,
the AgSS provides holder level data on demographics, field level data on crop
cultivated, area and use of inputs and services like extension. While the AgSS also
provides field level production data, the quantity is imputed based on EA level
crop yield that is calculated using a selection of three to five crop cuts in the EA.
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Starting in 2010, the same set of EAs are covered in each wave of the AgSS but
households are re-sampled every year. Hence, the AgSS allows for the construction
of a balanced panel at the EA level and a repeated cross section at the holder level.
I aggregate all the variables on production to the EA level and I take that to be
representative of village level variables so as to construct a balanced panel over
2010-2016. Hence, in the following sections, I use the term enumeration area and
village interchangeably.
In addition, for all the analyses, I consider the data from the four main regions
(Amhara, Oromia, SNNP and Tigray) which comprise of more than 90% agricul-
tural holders in the full sample. Figure 1·16 shows that there is significant spatial
variation in distribution of the EAs in the balanced panel sample. The wide cover-
age and representativeness of the sample is critical in the empirical strategy given
the large diversity in agro-clamatic suitability across locations in Ethiopia.
I impute that a village has extension if there is at least one holder with a field
under an extension package. While it would have been ideal to have data on the
exact year a village gets access, the data is not available. However, while the im-
putation may introduce measurement error, the approach also has several advan-
tages. First, in the AgSS, households are randomly selected within each village and
thus there is no systemic bias in terms of selection into the sample by extension use.
Second, the fact that the imputation uses a criteria of at least one extension user in
a village helps avoid potential endogenous issues related to the share of holders in
the village that use extension. Finally, this study focuses on access to extension and
the binary measure is a good proxy for the availability of extension in a village.
24
1.4.3 Welfare Monitoring Surveys & Household Consumption and Expendi-
ture Surveys
For the outcomes on household level employment, consumption, asset ownership
and other measures of welfare, I use two complementary household level surveys
– the Welfare Monitoring Surveys (WMS) and Household Consumption and Ex-
penditure Survey (HCES) undertaken by the CSA in 2010/11 and 2015/16. The
WMS and HCES are household level surveys covering all rural and urban areas of
the country except select non-sedentary zones in Afar and Somali regions. Similar
to the AgSS, the WMS and HCEs use a two-stage stratified cluster design where
EAs are randomly selected in the first stage and then household are randomly se-
lected within the households.
Each survey covers around 30,000 households in each wave. The two surveys
are designed to complement each other to provide socioeconomic data. While the
WMS provides data on employment, ownership of assets, living standards, use
of public facilities, shocks, cultural practices and other measures of socioeconomic
wellbeing and the HCES provides data on consumption and expenditure of house-
holds.
Figure 1·17 shows the distribution of enumeration areas from the WMS rural
sample from the four main regions. As the figure shows the WMS has a wide
spatial coverage across the four regions.
1.4.4 Additional Data Sources
I supplement the administrative and survey data with census data on village level
population in from the 2007 census. Furthermore, I use novel geo-spatial data on
village boundaries, the centroid of enumeration areas, and the location of rural
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facilities and services (farmer training centers, village office, markets, banks etc) in
2007 and 2014 that were compiled by the CSA in preparation for the 2007 census
and the upcoming 2020 census, respectively.
In addition, I construct village level rainfall measures, averages and deviation
from the long run mean, for annual and growing season rainfall using monthly
rainfall data from Climate Hazards Infrared Precipitation (CHIRPS) dataset. Funk
et al. (2015) demonstrate that the CHIRPS dataset performs well for drought mon-
itoring in Ethiopia. For the robustness analyses, I also construct village level agro-
climatic suitability measures for over 20 crops using the FAO GAEZ v3.0 dataset
on crop specific attainable yields calculated assuming intermediate input use and
rainfed cultivation (IIASA/FAO, 2012).
1.5 Empirical Strategy
The identification of the causal impact of transport infrastructure or access to ex-
tension on economic development are challenging for various reasons. First, the
timing and placement of a road or an extension service is often non-random be-
cause the decision on when and where to build a road or a farmer training center
may be strategic. Given the high costs of constructing roads or establishing farmer
training centers, policymakers may target places that have higher economic poten-
tial. In contexts where political, ethnic or other forms of favoritism are salient, pol-
icymakers may build roads or expand extension in areas already benefiting from
other, perhaps unobserved, advantages. On the other hand, pro-poor policymak-
ers may also build roads or farmer training centers in locations that are under
performing. In addition, placed-based policies, such as roads and extension, in de-
veloping contexts often come in packages and make it difficult to disentangle one
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policy from the other.
I address these identification challenges by considering the plausibly exoge-
nous variation in access to markets and technologies from the concurrent and inde-
pendent expansion of agricultural extension and rural road network. In particular,
while there is no unique formula that dictated prioritization of road construction or
expansion of extension, the main factors that determined which villages received
the roads or extension earlier are the ease of implementation and the budget con-
straints at the regional levels that are beyond the purview of the villages.
In the case of the road expansion program, as Table 1.1 shows, there are spe-
cific regional annual work plans, set before the commencement of URRAP, that
established the total length of road to be built in each region and year. The annual
work plans show that, at least at the regional level, there is no strategic alloca-
tion of where and when to build roads. The annual plans are based on the total
length of roads to be built to connect every village in each region divided roughly
equally across the five year period. The roll out of URRAP roads across villages in
a region is mainly determined by three factors: baseline proximity of a village to
the existing road network, costs of road construction implied by geographical fac-
tors (mainly land gradient and location of rivers), and the annual regional budget
limits.
District road authorities are tasked with identifying potential URRAP projects.
For each road, the regional road authority hires engineering consultants to design
a cost-effective route given the local topography and the nationally determined
road design standards. The road design manual emphasizes that the route selec-
tion should take ease of topography, particularly slope stability, as a critical factor
in the design process (Ethiopian Road Authority, 2011). For instance, in the project
inception report by the consultants for the URRAP road from Sandabo to Ejersa
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Mecha, the feasibility study states that the route selection is undertaken consid-
ering ”length, terrain type, number of major crossing, intermediate villages, and
availability of construction materials” (ORA, 2016). The regional road authori-
ties are responsible for the approval, coordination and monitoring of the selected
projects factoring in the ease of implementation, cost of construction and budget
constraints.
Figure 1·3 (a)-(d) show that the villages that are closest to the baseline network
are connected first and the road network is gradually expanded to the most remote
villages through sequential roll out. In addition, Figure 1·8 (a) demonstrates that
the route selection of URRAP roads is limited by rivers and the land gradient of
the terrain. Topography is strong constraint in the construction process because
the planners aim to circumvent river crossings as that would require costly bridge
construction and build roads along a flat slope so as to improve stability and avoid
costly construction in rugged areas.
I provide causal estimates on the impact of access to rural roads and extension
by employing a generalized difference-in-difference (GDD) design with OLS and
in combination with an instrumental variable (IV) that leverages the constrained
and staggered roll out of URRAP. I provide evidence on the identifying assumption
that there are no differences in trends by treatment status. In the robustness checks,
I also test the stability of the OLS and IV the findings to additional controls for
potential confounders.
1.5.1 Generalized Difference-in-Difference: OLS
The first empirical specification is a generalized difference-in-difference design
that exploits the variation in the year that a village gets access to a URRAP road or
an extension. I focus on URRAP roads because it is the main source of variation in
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rural access to an all-weather roads during my study period. To examine the effect
of village level access to a URRAP road, extension or both, I consider the following
specification:
Yvt = αRoadvt + βExtensionvt + γRoadvtXExtensionvt + δt + ηv + ΦXvt + vt (1.1)
where Yv,t is an outcome variable such as log value added per hectare, Roadvt
and Extensionvt are indicators on whether the a village v has a URRAP road or
extension by year t, respectively. ηv is village FE and δt is year FE, X include time
varying village level controls such as growing season season rainfall.
Access to a road may be correlated within a district because new URRAP roads
sometimes transverse multiple villages within a district. In addition, all the sur-
vey datasets used in this study use a two stage clustered sampling design, where
the primary sampling unit is the enumeration area (sub-village units). Following
Abadie et al. (2017), the standard errors are clustered at the district level to account
both for the sampling design and the correlation in treatment within district.
In equation 1.1, α captures the effect of access to only a URRAP road, β captures
the effect of access to only extension, and γ captures the effect of having access
to both a URRAP road and extension. A positive γ indicates complementarities
between access to a road and extension.
The empirical strategy addresses several of the main identification concerns.
Given that the strategy exploits variation in the timing of treatment, one may be
concerned that early treated villages may be different from late-treated. Village
fixed effects account for any time-invariant characteristics, such as underlying pro-
ductivity potentials, that affect both the timing of access and the outcomes of in-
terest. Given the roll out of road program and extension from nearest to remote
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areas, the interaction of baseline distance to the network with year fixed effects
accounts for any potential confounders that are correlated with remoteness. Year
fixed effects flexibly control for any trends. In addition, I control for annual and
growing season rainfall that can affect both the provision of roads, extension and
agricultural outcomes.
Hence, the main identification strategy essentially compares two villages that
are identical in observable characteristics and face similar trends by remoteness but
differ in their access to a URRAP road or extension as a results of the exogenous
budget constraints that determined which village obtained a road or extension in
a given year. The remaining identifying assumption is that there are no differential
pre-trends between early and late treated villages.
To examine the lack of pre-trends as well as assess the dynamic response to
road access, I consider an event study specification of the following form:
Yvt =
5∑
j=−3,j 6=−1
βj1(years since URRAP Construction Started = j)+δt+ηv+ΦXvt+vt
(1.2)
where the j indicates the number of years since or before access to URRAP. I
consider a similar specification for access to extension or both a road and extension.
The absence of pre-trends, i.e. all the pre-treatment coefficients (βj) are zero, would
provide supportive evidence for the identifying assumption that the there are no
differential trends by timing of treatment.
1.5.2 The Market Access Approach
In the baseline specification, I consider a measure of a village’s road access using
a binary indicator on whether the village is intersected by a URRAP road. During
30
my study period, URRAP is the main source of variation in the rural road access.
While helpful to obtain an easily interpretable estimate on the impact of access
to a URRAP road and carry out the event study specification to test the identify-
ing assumption, the binary variable has two main shortcomings. First, it assigns
every connection the same weight. However, given the geospatial distribution of
the road network, a village that gets connected to a sparse network may not have
the same level of increase in market access as one that is close to a more devel-
oped and populated network. Second, the binary measure treats all villages that
are not intersected by a road as untreated. Nonetheless, a given village’s level of
connectivity can increase through indirect connections. If there are strong connec-
tion spillovers, the binary measure can lead to an underestimation of the treatment
effects as indirectly treated villages are considered as controls.
To address these concerns, I use the market access approach that measures a
village’s connectivity taking the full network and population distribution into ac-
count. In particular, following Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016), I use the reduced-
form expression for market access derived from general equilibrium trade theory:
MarketAccessv =
∑
d
τ−θvd Populationd (1.3)
where τvd is the transport cost from village v to d, and θ is trade elasticity. Hence,
the market access measure is the sum of the population of all potential destina-
tion that the village is connected to (directly and indirectly) weighted by the trade
elasticity.
I calculate the cost of transport from each village to all possible destinations
using standard tools in ArcGIS in the following four steps. First, I construct the
road network for each year based on all the roads that have been constructed by
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that year. Second, for each year, I construct a link from every village centroid to
the nearest road that is within 2km. I adopt the 2km cutoff to be in line with other
studies such as the World Bank’s Road Access Index WBG (2016). However, the
results are robust to relaxing the cuttoff to 5km. Third, I assign each road in the
network a national level per kilometer cost of transport, from 2001, based on the
road type and quality. This achieves two objectives: it accounts for the fact that it
is costly to transport goods on rural gravel roads compared to highway asphalts
and it avoids the potential endogenous evolution of transport costs as the network
expands. Fourth, given the full road network in each year and the per km cost of
transport for each road, I calculate the cheapest cost of traveling from each village
to all the villages it is connected to by the network.
Following equation 1.3, I generate the market access measure for each village
by summing the population of all reachable destinations where each destination is
weighted by the transport cost from the village to that destination and the trade
elasticity. In the calculation of the market access, I take the population distribution
of all populated villages in Ethiopia except for Somali region (≈ 15,600 villages)
from the 2007 census. I consider the pre-URRAP population data since the popu-
lation distribution can be endogenous to changes in the road network. Following
Allen and Atkin (2016), I set the trade elasticity (θ = 1.5) based on the average
gravity coefficient for developing country sample in Head and Mayer (2014). In
the robustness checks, I show that the results are robust to varying θ from 1 to
26.83 considered in the literature (Donaldson, 2018; Head and Mayer, 2014).
Figure 1·7 shows the market access measure in 2012 for a select area, where the
darker red villages indicate higher market access. As the figure illustrates, the key
advantages of the market access approach is that it allows for continuous measure
of treatment intensity and accounts for changes in overall connectivity through
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indirect connections.
1.5.3 Instrumental Variable Strategy: Least Cost Network Predicted By Topog-
raphy
To allay any concerns regarding omitted variables, in this section, I provide an IV
strategy that isolates the variation in village road access determined solely by con-
straints that are exogenous to the village. In the absence of data on the exact criteria
followed in the roll out of extension, the IV strategy focuses on the instrument for
the expansion of rural roads. In the robustness section, I show that both the OLS
and IV results are robust to controlling for differential trends by village characteris-
tics, such as agro-climatic suitability and proximity to rural services and facilities,
that may confound the effect of extension.
The main idea behind the IV strategy is that it captures the variation in road ac-
cess using only factors predetermined at baseline (geography and annual plans) to
avoid the fact that some of the variation in the actual road network may be affected
by endogenous unobservable factors. I take the perspective of a cost minimizing
planner in each regional road authority and construct the optimal road network
based on remoteness of villages, topography and the annual budget.
I predict the optimal road network using tools in ArcGIS that allow for con-
struction of least cost paths between locations. First, for each of the 15,600 villages,
I use data on land gradient and location of all river streams in Ethiopia to create a
cost raster that assigns each pixel with the cost that would be accumulated for any
path originating from the given village. I sort the villages into four groups based
on their proximity to the baseline road network. The first group comprises of vil-
lages that are transversed by the baseline road network, the second group consist
of the villages that share a border with the first group, the third group share a
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boarder with the second group and so on.
Starting with the first group, I construct the least cost path from each village’s
administration office, a central location from which most URRAP roads originate,
to the nearest baseline network. Figure 1·8 (b) shows the first set of roads predicted.
I then consider the second set of villages and generate the least cost path from each
village to the baseline network or the roads constructed in the earlier step. Figure
1·8 (c) shows the roads predicted starting from the first and second set of villages. I
apply the same procedure to connect the third and fourth group of villages. Figure
1·8 (d) shows the full predicted network.
To generate the temporal variation in the predicted road network, I follow the
regional budget constraints set forth before the commencement of URRAP by the
national road authorities. Table 1.1, taken from a national planning document,
presents the annual work plans in terms of kilometers of roads to be built under
URRAP in each region and year. For each region and year, I rank the predicted
roads yet to be built based on their proximity to the baseline network. Then, I
construct all the roads from the closest to the most remote until the cumulative
length exhausts the regional annual budget. This process of construction aims to
capture the fact that the URRAP roads are rolled out gradually from the easiest to
the most remote villages. Finally, using the predicted road network for each year,
I construct market access IV using the procedures outlined in Section 1.5.2.
The four key factors considered in the construction of the instrument - rivers,
gradient, baseline remoteness and the regional work plans - may affect agricul-
tural outcomes on their own. The presence of a river and flat land gradient may be
correlated with agricultural suitability. Baseline remoteness and the regional work
plans may also be correlated with village or regional characteristics that affect pro-
ductivity. However, all of these factors are fixed at baseline and exogenous to the
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village, and their relevance would be washed out by the village, year and remote-
ness by year fixed effects used in all the regressions. I also show that the results are
robust to controlling for differential trends by region, agro-climatic suitability and
proximity to rural services and facilities.
As Figure 1·8 (d) shows, the road network predicted using only predetermined
topographical and budget constraints is very similar to the actual road network.
This is formally shown in the first stage regression of actual market access on pre-
dicted market access in Table 1.15- the instrument has a strong first stage. The
striking similarity between the predicted and actual road network provides fur-
ther evidence that the roll out URRAP is mainly determined by factors exogenous
with respect to each village and corroborates the baseline identification strategy.
1.6 Results
In this section, I present the results on the effects of access to extension and road on
agricultural productivity considering the three sets of empirical strategies. First, I
discuss the findings using the generalized difference-in-difference strategy where
I exploit the variation in the timing of access to a road or extension using a binary
measure of road access. Second, I provide results on the same set of outcomes
where I measure rural connectivity using the market access approach. Third, I
present another set of evidence on the main findings using an instrumental vari-
able strategy that isolates the variation in market access due to factors, topogra-
phy and regional budget constraints, that are exogenous to the villages. Finally,
for each of the identification strategies, I provide evidence on the robustness of the
results to a demanding set of controls on potential confounders.
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1.6.1 Results Using the Binary Measure of Road Access
Table 1.2 presents the estimates on the effects of roads and extension on produc-
tivity aggregating across the main crops (cereals, pulses and oils) and considering
three alternative measures of productivity. The first outcome, log production value
per hectare, is the log of total value of production of main crops, calculated using
national crop prices, divided by the cultivated area for main crops. For a single
crop, log production value per hectare is analogous to physical yield. Similarly,
log value added per hectare is the log of total production value after subtracting
costs of fertilizers and seeds divided by the total area of main crops. Log TFP is
calculated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach using the same set of
revenue and cost variables along with additional controls for rainfall. The variable
of interest, road, is an indicator that takes 1 if a village is intersected by a URRAP
road in that year. I focus on access to a URRAP road because, as shown in Figure
1·1, URRAP is the sole driver of the variation in the rural road network since 2010
and I exploit the variation in the timing of road access for identification.
Across the three different measures of productivity, access to a road on average
increase productivity by 4-5%. Columns 2, 5, and 6 show that while access to ex-
tension on average increases yield by 2%, the effects considering log value added
per hectare and log TFP are not significant. The key result that is consistent across
the three measures of productivity is that there are strong complementarities be-
tween access to roads and extension. In villages that have access to an all-weather
road and extension, farmers are more productive by about 6%. Columns 3, 6, and 9
show that the gains in productivity from increased connectivity and extension are
concentrated in the villages that have access to both – access to a road or extension
in isolation has no significant effect on agricultural productivity.
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The results in Table 1.2 show that extension in isolation increases production
value per hectare, but it has no significant effect on value added per hectare. The
differences in these results suggest that while the extension program improves
physical yield (as captured by production per hectare), in isolation, extension may
not have a significant effect on the profitability of overall production. As I show
in Section 1.7.3, farmers in villages with extension invest in modern inputs such as
chemical fertilizers and improved seeds. While such modern inputs may increase
physical productivity, they are costly investments, especially in the villages with-
out road access, and may turn out to be economically unprofitable if the gains in
productivity do not outweigh the costs of investments.
Checking for Pre-Trends Using Event Study Specification
The identifying assumption for the estimated effects in Table 1.2 to be causal is
that there are no differential pre-trends. In this section, I discuss the evidence
on the lack of differences in pre-trends by treatment status using the event study
specification defined in equation 1.2. In addition, access to a road or extension
may have dynamic effects on productivity since it would take time for farmers to
adjust their crop choice and farming practices to changes in access to markets and
technologies. The event study analysis provides evidence on the timing of when
the programs have significant effects on the outcomes of interest.
Figure 1·5 plots the coefficients from the regression of log value added per
hectare on a set of dummy variables indicating the number of years since road
construction started in the village. Similarly, Figure 1·6 plots the coefficients from
the regression of log value added per hectare on a set of dummy variables indicat-
ing the number of years since a village had access to both a road and extension.
First, Figures 1·5 and 1·6 demonstrate that there are no differential pre-trends
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with respect to access to a road or access to both a road and extension. The event
study results provide further evidence that the estimated effects of access to a road
and extension are causal. Second, both figures show that the effects of access to
road and extension on productivity are dynamic. There is no immediate effect on
productivity following access to a road or extension, but there is a gradual and
persistent positive effect. The event study results are consistent with the fact that
it would take time for farmers to make use of access to technologies and markets
since they need to experiment, learn and adjust their farming practices to make
use of new opportunities.
1.6.2 Results Using the Market Access Approach
While the binary road access approach is useful to get a reduced form estimate
of the effect of a village’s direct access to a URRAP road, the approach does not
allow for treatment heterogeneity and spillover effects. The binary measure of
road access can underestimate the effect a new road since villages whose connec-
tivity increases via indirect connections are considered untreated. In this section, I
present the results using the market access approach discussed in Section 1.5.2 that
takes the full road network and distribution of economic potential at baseline (as
proxied by village population in the 2007 census) to construct a continuous mea-
sure of market access that accounts for the intensity of treatment and changes in
market access through indirect connections.
Panel A of Table 1.3 reports the main results where a village’s connectivity is
measured using the market access approach. The market access variable is nor-
malized so as to capture the fact that it is the relative change in a given village’s
connectivity that matters for production and trade across villages. The measure
captures a given village’s comparative advantage with respect to its integration
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into the larger network. Hence, in Panel A of Table 1.3, the coefficients on the mar-
ket access variable indicate the percent change in in productivity estimated for one
standard deviation increase in market access.
Comparing the estimates in Panel A of Table 1.3 with the baseline results in Ta-
ble 1.2, the main findings are robust to the use of the market access approach. One
standard deviation in market access improves productivity by 2-3%. Column 5 and
6 show that there are strong complementarities between market access and exten-
sion. While changes in market access or extension on their own have no effects
on overall productivity in isolation, in villages with extension service, a one stan-
dard deviation increase in market access improves productivity by 3-5%. Hence,
the gains in productivity due to changes in access to markets and technologies are
concentrated in the villages with access to both a road and extension.
In Tables 1.16 and 1.17, I show that these results are robust to changing cutoff
at which I consider a village connected to the network from 2km to 5km and to
varying the trade elasticity θ from 1 to 26.83 used in the literature (Donaldson,
2018; Head and Mayer, 2014).
While the GDD results in Table 1.3 and Table 1.2 are similar in patterns and
signs, it is informative to compare the magnitude of the estimated effects. Ex ante,
the direction of the bias of the binary measure relative to the market access ap-
proach is ambiguous. The binary measure could underestimate the effect of access
to a new road since it considers villages that are indirectly treated as controls. On
the other hand, the market access approach, which considers all villages within
2km of the road as connected to the network, may take villages that are not treated
(e.g. if there are barriers such rivers) as treated. In addition, it may be the case that
connection in the extensive margin and to the nearest village/town, as captured by
the binary measure, may be more salient than incremental connections to farther
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places that is included in the market access approach. Hence, the direction of the
bias is unclear.
To compare the two estimates, I first calculate by how much a direct connection
increases a village’s market access. In the appendix, Table 1.14 shows that when a
village gets a road, its market access increases by 0.8 standard deviations. Hence,
taking the 3% productivity gain estimated for a one standard deviation increase
in market access (Column 4 and 7 in Panel A of Table 1.3), direct access to a UR-
RAP road on average improves productivity by 2.4%. Similarly, considering the
estimated complementarity effects, the results using the market access approach
imply that a given URRAP connection in a village with an extension service in-
creases productivity by 4%. Comparing these estimates with those from Table 1.2,
the magnitude of the effects using the market access approach are smaller than
those obtained using a binary measure of road access.
1.6.3 Results Using Instrumental Variable Based on Predicted Road Network
While the tests for pre-trends demonstrated the lack of differential pre-trends by
treatment status, there may still be concerns regrading omitted variables. In this
section, I provide another set of evidence on the main results using an instrumental
variable strategy, detailed in Section 1.5.3, that isolates the variation in the road
network solely due to topography and budget constraints that are exogenous to
each village.
I begin by discussing the relevance of the instrumental variable. In the ap-
pendix, Table 1.15 presents the first stage regression results of actual market access
on predicted market access. The instrument has a strong first stage - with a F-
statistic equal to 91.28 in the baseline specification. While predicted market access
does not perfectly capture actual market access, its strong relevance indicates that
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the factors considered in the prediction of the network are indeed followed by poli-
cymakers on the ground. Given that I can predict a significant part of the variation
in the actual market access solely using topography and budget constraints also
provides further credence to the preceding identification strategy that posits that
timing of which villages obtained the road are beyond the purview of the village.
In Panel B of Table 1.3, I report the instrumental variable estimates on the ef-
fects of market access and extension on the three measures of productivity. The IV
findings on the complementarities between access to extension and road are robust
and comparable in magnitude to the corresponding OLS results in Panel A. While
extension in isolation increases overall yield, as measured by production value per
hectare, it has no effect when considering value added per hectare or TFP. Simi-
larly, increases in market access in isolation has no effect on productivity across
the three outcomes. However, in villages with extension services, a one standard
deviation increase in market access improves productivity by 4-6%.
Given the potential measurement error of road access, it is possible that the IV
estimates may be higher than the OLS estimates. Indeed, in Table 1.3, while the
effects estimated using the IV approach in Panel B are slightly larger than the OLS
estimates in Panel A, the coefficients are not statistically different.
Overall, the results from the IV estimation corroborate the main OLS findings.
While access to extension or a road in isolation has no effect on productivity, the
two factors improve productivity significantly when they are present in village
simultaneously.
1.6.4 Robustness of Main Findings to Additional Controls
The results so far paint a consistent picture regarding the effects of access to a road
and extension – despite the two programs being ineffective in isolation, they have
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strong positive effects on productivity when they are present in a village simulta-
neously. In this section, I discuss the evidence on robustness of the main findings
from the three empirical strategies to additional controls for potential confounders.
Table 1.4 reports the results from the fully interacted model (Equation 1.1) with
sequential addition of controls in each column. Panel A presents the OLS results
using the binary road access measure, Panel B reports the OLS results using the
market access approach, and Panel C provides the IV results using the predicted
market access instrument. In each of the panels, Column 1 presents the baseline
results.
Since the implementation of the road and extension programs are decentralized
to the regional government, one may be concerned that the estimated effects of
access to extension or road may be confounded by differential regional trends. In
column 2, I show that the results are robust to controlling for region by year fixed
effect that allow for flexible trends for each region.
One may also be concerned that villages with better agro-climatic suitability
get earlier access to a road or extension and growing more productive over time
due to other unobserved factors. In column 3, I find that the results are robust to
the inclusion of differential trends by village level agro-climatic suitability for the
20 main crops using FAO GAEZ data on crop specific attainable yields.2
Finally, policymakers may target villages to receive a road or extension based
on characteristics, such as proximity to towns or district capitals, that may also put
them on differential productivity trend for other reasons. In column 4, I show that
the complementarity between access to a road and extension is robust to allow-
2I consider the agro-climatically attainable yields with intermediate input use and rain-fed culti-
vation. The list of crops considered are: barley, millet, maiz, rice sorghum, wheat, sunflower,
coffee, groundnut, oils, rapeseed, chickpea, pulses, sweet potato, potato, beetroot, carrots, onions,
tomato.
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ing for differential trends by proximity to over 45 rural services and facilities that
could affect the provision of road and extension and the growth of agricultural
productivity. 3
Heterogeneous Effects on Productivity of Cereals vs Non-Cereals
Across specifications, there is strong evidence that access to extension, in isolation,
has no effect on overall value added per hectare or TFP. However, cereals have
been the main focus of the extension program, and we may expect that access
to extension has heterogeneous effects across crop groups. As Figure 1·14 shows,
cereals constitute over 84% of the area under extension package despite accounting
for only 67% of the cultivated area. Within cereals, close to 35% of the area is under
the extension package program. Hence, access to extension may be more beneficial
for cereal cultivation relative to other crops.
Table 1.5 presents the estimates on the effects of the road and extension pro-
grams for log value added per hectare for cereals and non-cereals (pulses and
oils).4 Consistent with the overall effect, access to a road increases the productivity
of both cereals and non-cereals by 4% and 5%, respectively. However, unlike the
findings in Table 1.2, access to extension on average improves cereal productivity
by 2%, but it has no significant effect on the productivity of non-cereals.
In line with the results in Table 1.2, there are strong complementarities between
3The controls included year fixed effects interacted with the log distance from the enumeration area
to the locations of places or rural services and facilities in 2007: Village Office, National Capital
(Addis Abeba), Zone Capital, District Capital, Town, Market, Flour Mill, Factory, Hotel, Moun-
tains, Bridges, Forrest, Banks, Gas Stations, Post Office, Quarries, Coffee Washing Stations, Sawing
Mills, Police Stations, Airports, Animal Husbandry, Dams, Meteorology Stations, Cooperatives,
Radio Stations, Micro-finance , Electric Power Lines, Trails, Swamps, Flooded Areas, Irrigation,
Telephone Stations
4Cereals include maize, millet, oats, rice, sorghum, teff and wheat. Pulses and Oils include chick-
pea, haricot bean, horse bean, feild pea, lentil, vetch, soyabean, fenugrk, lineseed, ground nut,
neug, rapeseed, sesame, and sunflower.
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the road and extension program for both cereals and non-cereals - each program in
isolation has no effect on productivity on cereals or non-cereals. However, villages
that have access to both road and extension become 13% and 9% more produc-
tive for cereals and non-cereals, respectively. As Table 1.19 shows, the results are
similar when considering production value per hectare or TFP. The stronger com-
plementarity effects on cereals compared to non-cereals is consistent with the fact
that the extension program emphasized packages that are geared towards improv-
ing cereal productivity.
Column 3 of Table 1.5 shows that cereal productivity declines in the places that
have access to a road but not to extension. There is no such effect for non-cereals.
These findings suggest that the expansion of roads and extension could have nega-
tive general equilibrium effects since a given village’s access to a road or extension
may affect the comparative advantage of the other villages in the network. Villages
with access to only a road become less competitive in cereal production compared
to the villages that have access to both a road and extension given the emphasis of
extension on cereals. On the other hand, households in villages with only a road
also have better options for cultivation of non-cereals or non-farm work compared
to those without a road. In the discussion of potential mechanisms, in Section 1.7.1,
I show that farmers in villages with access to only a road shift out of cereal culti-
vation into non-cereal crops and non-farm occupations. Furthermore, farmers in
villages with only a road are less like to use chemical fertilizers for cereal cultiva-
tion. Hence, the decline in cereal productivity in these villages could reflect the
reduction in efforts and quality of inputs used for cereal cultivation.
Overall, the results in Table 1.2-1.5 shed light on the literature’s mixed evidence
on the effectiveness of extension programs. The null effect of extension on value
added per hectare and TFP is consistent with the findings of Buehren et al. (2017)
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who show that the extension program had no overall effect on productivity. How-
ever, my findings provide further evidence on the heterogeneous effects of access
to extension. First, extension increases physical yield, as measured by produc-
tion value per hectare, but does not affect value added per hectare and TFP. This
highlights the importance of differentiating the effects on physical yield, economic
profits and TFP. Second, although extension does not affect overall agricultural
productivity, I find that it has a significant effect on the productivity of cereals,
which constitute more than 80% of the area under extension in Ethiopia. Third,
I show that extension has a strong effect on overall productivity in villages that
also have access to an all-weather road. The robust complementarities between
extension and road access across specification demonstrates that it is informative
to evaluate the efficacy of each program by accounting for the availability of com-
plementary factors.
1.7 Mechanisms
The key and robust result so far is that while access to a road or extension in iso-
lation have no effect on agricultural productivity, the two factors have substantial
effects in improving productivity when they are available in a village simultane-
ously. This section explores the underlying channels through which rural connec-
tivity and access to extension can have complementary effects on productivity.
I first show that farmers specialize in crops across villages in a manner that re-
flects their comparative advantages with respect to access to markets and the tech-
nologies provided under extension. Then, I provide evidence that road and exten-
sion affect agricultural productivity by facilitating the take up of advising, credit
and modern inputs such as chemical fertilizers and improved seeds. In addition,
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I present evidence, consistent with the changes in cultivation patterns, showing
that households reallocate their labor across sectors in response to their changing
comparative advantages. Finally, I present evidence on the overall impact of the
road and extension programs by considering the changes in food consumption and
household’s perspective on their living standards.
1.7.1 Farmers in Villages With Extension Specialize in Cereals
As Figures 1·12 and 1·13 show, cereals are disproportionately covered under the
extension program. While cereals account for 67% of the cultivated area, they ac-
count for more than 84% of the area under extension. Given the focus of the ex-
tension program on cereals, all else equal, farmers in a village with extension have
better access to technologies suitable for cereal cultivation and thus have a relative
advantage in the cultivation of cereals. Furthermore, in places that have extension,
improved rural connection facilitates farmers ability to specialize in cereals since
they can sell their cereal production to other markets and import non-cereal crops
and other goods. Hence, in this section, I examine whether farmers adjust their cul-
tivation patterns in response to changes in the availability of road and extension. I
also provide suggestive evidence that shows trade patterns reflect the patterns of
specialization.
Table 1.6 shows that in villages with extension farmers are more likely to cul-
tivate cereals both in the extensive and intensive margins. Columns 3 show that
farmers are more likely to cultivate cereals, and the effect is stronger in the places
that also have a road. However, in villages that get only a road, farmers are 2.3%
(≈ 0.02/0.88) less likely to cultivate cereals. Furthermore, Column 5 and 6 shows
that access to extension induces farmers to specialize in cereals. On average, farm-
ers in villages with extension dedicate a 2.2% higher share of their area cultivated
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to cereals, and this is even higher (by 2%) in villages with access to both a road and
extension.
In order to corroborate the findings regarding the changes in crop choice, I
investigate whether the crop specialization patterns are also reflected in patterns of
trade across villages. In the absence of data on trade across villages, I consider how
the ratio of average production to consumption varies across village by availability
of extension and road. A higher production to consumption ratio can reflect excess
output at the village level that is either stored or potentially sold to other villages.
In Table 1.7, I provide suggestive evidence showing that the patterns of produc-
tion and consumption across villages corroborate the specialization patterns doc-
umented above. Column 1 shows that in villages with both a road and extension,
farmers produce more cereals than they consume. Column 2 shows that the same
villages produce significantly less pulses and oils compared to their consumption.
On the other hand, column 2 shows that in villages that only get a road, farmers
produce pulses and oils more than they consume. While insignificant, the results
in Column 1 also indicate that the villages with only a road, farmers produce less
cereals than they consume.
The results in Table 1.5 demonstrate that extension and road have a greater
complementary effect on the productivity of cereals compared to non-cereals. Ta-
ble 1.6 shows that access to extension increases farmers specialization in cereals
with a greater effect in villages that also have a road. The patterns of production
and consumption across villages documented in Table 1.7 are consistent with the
results on crop choice - farmers in villages with both extension and road specialize
in cereals while those with only a road shift to non-cereal cultivation and trade
accordingly. The results in Table 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7 together suggest that the comple-
mentary effects of extension and road on productivity are partly due to farmers’
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increased specialization in cereals to take advantage of the technologies provided
under the extension program and the trade facilitated by the improvements in the
road network.
1.7.2 Access to Roads and Extension Facilitates Use of Advising and Credit
As Figure 1·15 shows, extension agents spend over 35% of their time to advise and
train farmers either through field visits to farmers’ homes or using demonstrations
at the farmer training centers. Farmers also need to travel to training centers or the
development agent’s office to receive advice or get the credit they may need to
purchase inputs. A review of state of extension in Ethiopia has argued that poor
transport infrastructure limits the ability of development agents to contact a large
number of farmers within a given area (Berhane et al., 2018).
In Table 1.8, I show that access to extension and road increase the take up of
agricultural advising and credit. Columns 1 and 2 show that access to road and
extension on average increase take up of advising by 2% and 10% respectively.
Column 3 demonstrates that, while extension on its own increases take up of agri-
cultural advising by 9.2%, the effect is 6.2% higher in the villages that also have an
all-weather road. In column 4, shows that access to a road has no effect on take
up of credit. However, as shown in columns 5 and 6, the availability of extension
increase take up of credit by 4%.
The results in Table 1.8 demonstrate that one of the channels through which the
expansions in the road network and extension affect productivity is by facilitating
the use of advising and credit that provide farmers with the requisite skills and
capital needed to invest in productive practices and inputs.
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1.7.3 Access to Roads and Extension Increases Adoption of Modern Inputs
Access to roads and extension may also affect the use of modern inputs since agri-
cultural advising increasing farmers knowledge of best practices and the provision
of credit provides farmers with the loans they need to make productive invest-
ments.
Indeed, in Table 1.9, I show that extension and road access have strong com-
plementary effects on the application of chemical fertilizer, improved seed and
herbicide. Columns 3, 6, 9, and 10 show that while extension on its own does in-
crease take up of modern inputs, the effects are much larger in the villages that also
have an all-weather road. Another striking result in Table 1.9 is that farmers are
much less likely to use modern inputs in villages with access to only a road. These
results are consistent with the earlier discussion that farmers in villages with only
a road face import competition with a relative disadvantage with respect to access
to inputs, advising and credit. As I show in the subsequent discussion in Section
1.7.4, households in villages with a road but without extension, reduce total area
cultivated and are more likely to switch out of skilled agriculture into non-farm
occupations. Hence, the decline in use of modern inputs in these places could re-
flect the reduction in skills, efforts and quality of inputs applied to agricultural
production.
1.7.4 Households With Access To A Road But Not Extension Shift Out Of the
Farm Sector
Beyond adjusting the choice of crops, households can also respond to changes in
access to markets and technologies by reallocating their labor to non-farm sector.
In this section, I provide evidence that changes in rural connectivity and extension
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also affect agricultural production through the reallocation of labor across sectors.
Table 1.10 shows, in the villages with only a road, individuals shift out of skilled
agriculture into crafts and trade occupation. Extension in isolation has no effect on
occupational choice. However, there is a 22% increase in the share of individuals
engaged in crafts and trades occupations in the places with only a road with an
equivalent increase in the share of skilled agricultural workers in villages with
road and extension. Columns 1-3 in Table 1.11 corroborate the patterns of labor
reallocation documented in Table 1.10. As column 3 shows, in the villages with
access to both extension and road, farmers increase the total area cultivated where
as those in villages with only a road decrease the total area cultivated.
The patterns of labor reallocation are consistent with the earlier findings on
productivity, crop choice and trade across the villages. Villages that gain access to
both an extension and a road have a relative advantage in the cultivation of crops,
especially for cereals, given their improved access to agricultural advice, credit,
inputs and markets. While the villages that get only a road gain access to mar-
kets, they lack the complementary factors provided under the extension program.
Furthermore, as shown in the trade patterns data, producers in villages with only
a road face increased import competition, particularly in cereals, without the req-
uisite support from the extension program. Hence, individuals in villages with
only a road have more incentives to switch out of agriculture into other sectors
while those in the villages with both extension and road are likely to deepen their
engagement in agriculture.
1.7.5 Complementarities and Farm Income
The findings so far indicate that increased rural connectivity and the expansion of
extension have improved overall productivity, particularly in the villages that have
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access to both factors. The investigation of the underlying mechanisms demon-
strated that extension and road access facilitate take up of advising, credit and
modern inputs. Furthermore, households across villages respond to changes in
access to extension or road by adjusting their crop choices or by reallocating their
labor across sectors. In this section, I attempt to provide a summary of the total
effect of the two programs by considering their effect on farm income, food con-
sumption and perceptions on the changes in living standards.
Expansion in the road network and agricultural extension could affect rural
welfare in several ways. Changes in rural connectivity and extension could ben-
efit consumers (through changes in prices, quality and variety of goods), increase
household non-farm income, or provide non-pecuniary benefits such as improved
access to education and health service. Given the scope of this paper, I will focus
the discussion in this section on the effects of the two programs on farm income
and summary outcomes that could provide suggestive evidence on overall effects.
Columns 1-3 in Table 1.11 present the results on the effects of extension and
road access on the average farmer’s income as proxied by total value added per
farmer. Column 1 and 2 show that access to road and extension on average in-
crease farm income by 5% and 7%, respectively. However, the gains are concen-
trated in the villages that have access to both an all-weather road and extension
services. Even though access to a extension in isolation no effect on farm income,
it increases value added per farmer by 24% in the villages that also have a road. On
the other hand, I find that farm income declines by 15% in the villages that only get
a road. These findings re-affirim my persistent findings that show the strong com-
plementarities between the two programs. In isolation, extension has no effect on
farm income and access to a road, without complementary extension, could have
deleterious effects on agricultural production. Nevertheless, when both factors are
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present in a village simultaneously, they result in large improvements in average
farm income.
The changes in the value added per farmer across villages could be driven by
changes in productivity, area cultivated or the composition of crops cultivated.
Columns 4-6 in Table 1.11 report results that could shed light on the factors that
contribute to the observed changes in value added per hectare. Column 4 shows
that in villages that have access to both a road and extension, TFP increases by 10%.
Furthermore, villages that have only a road experience negative but insignificant
decline in productivity. The results are similar when measuring productivity using
value added per hectare.
Column 5 of Table 1.11 shows that in addition to affecting productivity, exten-
sion and road also affect the total area cultivated by the average farmer. In partic-
ular, farmers in villages with both access to extension and road increase the area
cultivated, by 4%, where as those in villages with only a road decrease the total
area cultivated by 6%. These patterns are consistent with the findings in Section
1.7.4 that households in villages with only a road shift out of agriculture where as
those in villages with both road and extension increase their engagement in skilled
agriculture.
The results in Section 1.7.1 showed that villages with both extension and road,
the improvements in cereal productivity is greater and farmers specialize in cereals
where as those in villages with only roads shift to non-cereal cultivation. Consis-
tent with the changes crop choice, the results in column 5 show that in villages
with both extension and road the cereals share of value added increases by 5.5%
(≈ 0.03/0.55).
Taken together, the results in Table 1.11 imply that the complementary effects
of extension and road on farm income is attributable to increases in productivity,
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total area cultivated and the shift towards cereals in which the farmers have a com-
parative advantage in access to technologies provided by the extension program.
On the other hand, the reduction in average farm income is mainly due to the
reduction in the area cultivated combined with the shift out of cereal cultivation.
1.7.6 Effect on Food Consumption and Standard of Living
While access to only a road reduces average farm income, it may not necessar-
ily decrease total household income. The discussion in Section 1.7.4 showed that
farmers in villages with only a road shift out of agriculture into the non-farm oc-
cupations. The reduction in farm income and area cultivated is consistent with the
shift out of agriculture in to non-farm work these villages, and there may not be an
effect on total income since households could supplement or substitute farm earn-
ings through non-farm work. To get at the overall welfare effects, in Table 1.12,
1.13 and 1.20, I examine the effects of access to extension and road on household
consumption, access to food and perceptions about their living standards.
In Table 1.12, I report the results on the impact of access to extension and road
on the number of months the household can feed itself using own production or
through the purchase of crops. In line with the findings on crop choice, productiv-
ity and labor allocation, column 3 shows that in villages that gain access to both
extension and a road, households report that they can feed themselves with their
own production of cereals and pulses for 2.28 more months (28% increase). Consis-
tent with the shift out of agriculture documented in the villages with only a road,
households are less capable of feeding themselves through their own production
of cereals and pulses. However, as columns 6 demonstrates, the effects are not sta-
tistically significant when we consider the ability of households to feed themselves
using their own production or through the sale of their crops.
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Table 1.13 suggests that households in villages with access to both extension
and road spend more on total and food consumptions, and have a higher net calo-
rie intake. Villages with extension access on average have a 11% increase in net
calorie intake. While the signs of the coefficients are consistent with the patterns
and magnitudes documented above, they are not statistically significant.
Similarly, Table 1.20 shows that the negative effects on farm income in the
places with only a road could be mitigated by the observed reallocation of labor
to the non-farm sector. Columns 1 and 2 show that access to a road and extension
on average improve households ability to access food by 6% and 13% respectively.
Despite the decline in farm income and area cultivated in places with only a road,
there is no corresponding decline in the household’s ability to access food. The
results are similar when considering household’s views on the whether the house-
hold or community living standard have improved since the previous year. While
households in villages with only a road experience decline in farm income, they
report positive, but insignificant, improvements in their living standards.
Together, the results in Tables 1.10-1.13 and 1.20 suggest that, while the places
with only a road experience a decline in farm income, the overall effects on con-
sumption and well being may be mitigated by the household’s ability to supple-
ment or substitute farm income with non-farm work. Furthermore, the results on
cultivation and labor reallocation suggest that access to extension and road hasten
the process of structural transformation by facilitating specialization across crops
and occupations.
54
1.8 Conclusion
This paper shows that it is critical to examine the effects of roads and extension ser-
vices simultaneously due to the strong complementarities between access to mar-
kets and technologies. Exploiting two concurrent and independently implemented
programs in Ethiopia that expanded the rural road network and extension, I find
that there are strong complementarities between the two programs. Access to a
road or extension on its own is ineffective in increasing productivity. Improved
rural connectivity and extension improve productivity by facilitating the use of
agricultural advice, credit and modern inputs.
I find that on average access to road and extension increase value added per
worker by 5.2% and 6.6%, respectively. Over 2010-2016, agricultural value added
per worker in Ethiopia increased by 29.4%. Hence, expansions in the road network
and extension services accounted for 18% and 23% of the growth in value added
per worker, respectively.
Increased rural road access presents both beneficial opportunities and poten-
tial risks. While producers in villages that get connected have access to external
markets, they also face increased competition from imports. Changes in access to
road or extension affect households by changing their competitive advantages de-
pending on the presence of either or both factors in the village. I find that in the
villages with a road but without extension value added per worker declines by
17%. However, I find that there are no differences in food consumption and per-
ceptions about standards of living. The results suggest that labor reallocation to
non-farm sectors mitigates the negative spatial effects that arise out of differences
in access to technologies provided by extension.
The findings in this paper shed light on the heterogeneous returns to road and
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extension expansion programs documented in different contexts. The results sug-
gest that the inefficacy of roads in boosting productivity could be due to lack of
complementary access to technologies and inputs. Similarly, the varying results
on the effectiveness of extension programs could be be explained by differences
in rural connectivity. Furthermore, the results underscore that policymakers could
leverage the complementarities between extension and road programs to enhance
the effectiveness of each of the policies. In the absence of a coordinated provision
of extension and rural roads, policymakers may need to account for the potentially
deleterious spillover effects of connectivity and facilitate solutions that mitigate the
impact of the changes in competitive advantages across villages. This paper pro-
vided suggestive evidence showing that labor reallocation can reduce the impact
of the negative spillover effects, and access to rural roads hastens the process of
structural transformation in rural areas. To the extent the occupational changes
result in an efficient reallocation of resources, it may be desirable to facilitate such
changes.
While this study has focused on how roads and extension affect agricultural
productivity, it may be fruitful to examine their role in other socio-economic out-
comes. Changes in rural connectivity and extension could affect a myriad of out-
comes such as education, health, access to consumer goods and deforestation (Ag-
garwal, 2018a,b; Adukia et al., 2017; Asher et al., 2018). Specific to this study,
there are three natural extensions for future work. First, Ethiopia faces persistent
drought-induced famines, and changes in access to markets and technologies may
affect households’ capacity to cope with such shocks. Second, increased market ac-
cess and the ensuing specialization in crops across villages may expose farmers to
volatilities in prices. Extension and rural roads may have complementary effects
on farmers’ exposure and resilience to such volatilities. Third, given the costli-
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ness of investment in technologies and land needed to exploit beneficial oppor-
tunities, rural connectivity and extension could exacerbate inequality by favoring
those with better access to capital. These additional studies could provide insight
into how expansion in the rural road network and extension could, in isolation
and together, affect rural welfare beyond the effects on productivity documented
in this paper.
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1·1: Road Length by Road Class (in kilometers)
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Notes: The figure presents the total length of the road network, in kilometers, by road classes.
Source: ERA (2015)
Figure 1·2: Number of Villages By Construction Commencement
Year
0
1000
2000
3000
2011 2012 2013 2014
Year
Notes: The figure describes the distribution of villages where new URRAP road construction
commenced over 2011-2015
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Figure 1·3: Expansion of the Rural Road Network in Detail
(a) 2011 (b) 2012
(c) 2013 (d) 2014
Notes: Using a select area, figures (a)-(d) demonstrate the sequential roll out of the URRAP roads across over 2011-2014.
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Figure 1·4: Expansion of Farmer Training Centers and Develop-
ment Agent’s Office
Notes: The two figures present the distribution of farmers training centers and development
agent officies that are the focal points for the delivery of extension in 2007 and 2014. The data
sources for the 2007 and 2014 are the Rural Facilities and Services GIS data prepared by the
Central Statistical Agency in preparation for the 2007 and 2020 censuses, respectively
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Figure 1·5: Effect of Access to a URRAP Road on Log Value
Added Per Hectare
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Notes: The figure shows the coefficient estimates from a panel regression of log value added per
hectare on a set of dummy variables indicating the number of years before or since a URRAP
road construction commenced in a village. The omitted category is a dummy for a year before
construction commenced in the village. The regression also include three sets of fixed effects
- village, year and remoteness (log distance to baseline network) by year fixed effects - and
four sets of rainfall measures, mean and deviation from the long run mean for annual total
and growing season rainfall. 90% confidence intervals are displayed around each estimate.
Standard errors are clustered at the district (wereda) level.
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Figure 1·6: Effect of Access to Both a URRAP Road and Extension
on Log Value Added per Hectare
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Notes: The figure shows the coefficient estimates from a panel regression of log value added per
hectare on a set of dummy variables indicating the number of years before or since a village got
access to both extension and started construction of a URRAP road. The omitted category is a
dummy for a year before first year the village has extension and construction of URRAP was
started. The regression also include three sets of fixed effects - village, year and remoteness
(log distance to baseline network) by year fixed effects - and four sets of rainfall measures,
mean and deviation from the long run mean for annual total and growing season rainfall. 90%
confidence intervals are displayed around each estimate. Standard errors are clustered at the
district (wereda) level.
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Figure 1·7: Demonstration of the Market Access Measure in 2012
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of market access measures for select area in 2012.
The darker red the spots have higher market access value. The figure illustrates that market
access approach, discussed in Section 1.5.2, captures the treatment intensity in road access by
showing that the villages that are closest to a dense and more populated network have a higher
market access.
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Figure 1·8: Construction of the Instrumental Variable Approach
(a) URRAP Roads, Land Gradi-
ent and Rivers
(b) URRAP Roads and First Set
of Predicted Roads
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(continued)
(c) URRAP Roads and First
and Second Set of Predicted
Roads
(d) Full Road Network: Ac-
tual (in pink) and Predicted (in
green)
Notes: The four figures illustrate the steps undertaken in the construction of the predicted road network discussed in Section 1.5.3. The black lines are the baseline road
network and the pink lines are the URRAP roads. In figure (a), the figure overlays the land gradient in shades of brown and the blue lines are river streams. The lines in
green in figures (b)-(d) are the roads predicted based on the least cost paths using the methdology discussed in Section 1.5.3.
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1: Official Plans for the Length of Roads to be Constructed
under URRAP
Annual Work Plans (in kilometers)
Region 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total for 2011-2015
Tigray 335 515 550 550 550 2,500
Afar 241 371 396 396 396 1,800
Amhara 2,408 3,708 3,963 3,964 3,960 18,003
Oromiya 4,014 6,180 6,606 6607 6,600 30,007
SNNP 1,873 2,884 3,083 3,083 3,080 14,003
Gambella 27 41 44 44 44 200
Benshangul-Gumuz 241 371 396 396 396 1,800
Somali 401 618 661 661 660 3,001
Dire Dawa 21 33 35 35 35 159
Harar 7 10 11 11 11 50
Annual Total 9,568 14,731 15,745 15,747 15,732 71,523
Notes: This table presents the annual work plans, set in 2010, for the length of roads, in kilo-
meters, to be constructed or upgraded into an all weather road status under URRAP during
the Growth and Transformation Plan over 2011-2015. Source: URRAP/ Wereda Road Devel-
opment Plan from the Ethiopian Road Authority (ERA, 2010b).
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Table 1.2: Access to Road, Extension and Agricultural Productivity
Dependent Variable: Log Production Value Log Value Added Log TFP
per Hectare per Hectare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Road 0.037** -0.044 0.043** -0.054 0.051*** -0.051
(0.015) (0.032) (0.017) (0.036) (0.017) (0.041)
Extension 0.021* 0.005 0.015 -0.004 0.016 -0.003
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
RoadxExtension 0.096*** 0.114*** 0.121***
(0.030) (0.034) (0.040)
Mean of Dep. Var. 9.51 9.51 9.51 9.40 9.40 9.40 7.25 7.25 7.25
N 11773 11773 11773 11773 11773 11773 11773 11773 11773
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remoteness X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the OLS estimates on the effects of road and extension on three alternative measures of productivity. Log
production value per hectare is the log of total value of production of main crops (cereals, pulses and oils), calculated using national
crop prices, divided by total cultivated area for main crops. Similarly, log value added per hectare is the log of total production value
after subtracting estimated costs of fertilizers and seeds divided by total cultivated area. Log TFP is calculated using the Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) approach considering the logs of total production value, costs of fertilizers and seeds, number of holders engaged in
cultivation of main crops, area cultivated and rainfall measures (mean and long run deviation for annual and growing season). Road
is an indicator if a village is intersected by a URRAP road. Extension is an indicator if there is at least one person in the village using
extension. All the regressions include three sets of fixed effects - village, year and remoteness (log distance to baseline network) by
year fixed effects - and four sets of rainfall measures, mean and deviation from the long run mean for annual total and growing season
rainfall.Standard errors are clustered at the district (wereda) level. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.3: Effects on Productivity Using the Market Access Approach - OLS and Instrumental
Variable Results
Dependent Variable: Log Production Value Log Value Added Log TFP
per Hectare per Hectare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Market Access Approach: OLS
MarketAccess 0.024*** -0.002 0.029*** 0.001 0.025*** -0.014
(0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015)
Extension 0.023** 0.025** 0.017 0.019 0.019 0.022
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
MarketAccessxExtension 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.049***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Mean of Dep. Var. 9.52 9.52 9.52 9.40 9.40 9.40 7.25 7.25 7.25
N 11654 11654 11654 11654 11654 11654 11654 11654 11654
Panel B: Market Access Approach: Predicted Market Access IV
MarketAccess 0.024 -0.004 0.035 0.007 -0.005 -0.049
(0.040) (0.043) (0.046) (0.049) (0.043) (0.046)
Extension 0.020* 0.024** 0.015 0.019 0.017 0.023
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
MarketAccessxExtension 0.039** 0.038** 0.061***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.017)
First Stage F-Statistic 91.91 45.78 91.47 45.56 91.91 45.78
Mean of Dep. Var. 9.52 9.51 9.52 9.40 9.40 9.40 7.25 7.24 7.25
N 11659 11793 11659 11641 11773 11641 11659 11793 11659
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remoteness X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the effects of road and extension on productivity where road access is measured using the market acces
approach. Panel A presents the OLS estimates, and Panel B reports the IV estimates. Market access is calculated using equation (1.3) for
each year based on the full road network in that year and distribution of population across villages from the 2007 census. Market access
is normalized so that the corresponding coefficient indicates the percent effect on productivity of a one standard deviation increase in
market access. Extension is an indicator if there is at least one person in the village using extension. The instrument in Panel B is the
predicted market access constructed using the optimal road network as discussed in Section 1.5.3. All the regressions include three sets
of fixed effects - village, year and remoteness (log distance to baseline network) by year fixed effects - and four sets of rainfall measures,
mean and deviation from the long run mean for annual total and growing season rainfall. Standard errors are clustered at the district
(wereda) level. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.4: Robustness of Main Findings to Additional Controls
Dependent Variable: Log Value Added Per Hectare
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS with Binary Road Access
Road -0.054 -0.052 -0.049 -0.042
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Extension -0.004 -0.011 -0.010 -0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
RoadxExtension 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.102*** 0.087***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
Mean of Dep. Var. 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40
N 11773 11773 11773 11773
Panel B: OLS using Market Access
MarketAccess 0.001 0.002 -0.005 -0.001
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Extension 0.019 0.012 0.010 0.013
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
MarketAccessxExtension 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.030** 0.026**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Mean of Dep. Var. 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40
N 11654 11654 11654 11654
Panel C: IV using Market Access
MarketAccess 0.007 0.001 -0.044 -0.058
(0.049) (0.049) (0.052) (0.055)
Extension 0.019 0.012 0.010 0.012
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
MarketAccessxExtension 0.038** 0.038** 0.035** 0.031*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
First Stage F-Statistic 45.56 44.47 37.99 35.23
Mean of Dep. Var. 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40
N 11641 11641 11641 11641
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region X Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Crop Suitabilities X Year FE No No Yes Yes
Proximity to Facilities (in 2007) X Year FE No No No Yes
Notes: This table subjects the results from the fully interacted model (column 6) in Table 1.2 and
1.3 to sequential addition of differential trends by potential confounders. Dependent variable
is log value added per hectare. Column 1 presents the baseline results. Column 2 adds region
by year fixed effects. Column 3 adds the interactions between year fixed effects and agro-
climatically attainable yields for 20 crops, separately. Column 4 adds the interaction of year
fixed effects with log distance from village to the locations 45 rural services and facilities. All
the regressions include three sets of fixed effects - village, year and remoteness (log distance to
baseline network) by year fixed effects - and four sets of rainfall measures, mean and deviation
from the long run mean for annual total and growing season rainfall. Standard errors are
clustered at the district (wereda) level. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.5: Heterogeneous Effects of Roads and Extension on Pro-
ductivity
Dependent Variable: Log Value Added Per Hectare
Cereals Pulses and Oils
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Road 0.036** -0.076* 0.050** -0.028
(0.017) (0.043) (0.024) (0.044)
Extension 0.024* 0.002 -0.017 -0.031
(0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020)
RoadxExtension 0.133*** 0.091**
(0.041) (0.043)
Mean of Dep. Var. 9.37 9.37 9.37 9.37 9.37 9.37
N 11688 11688 11688 11289 11289 11289
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remoteness X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the effects of roads and extension on the productivity of cereals and
non-cereals. Cereals include maize, millet, oats, rice, sorghum, teff and wheat. Pulses and Oils
include chickpea, haricot bean, horse bean, feild pea, lentil, vetch, soyabean, fenugrk, lineseed,
ground nut, neug, rapeseed, sesame, and sunflower. All the regressions include three sets of
fixed effects - village, year and remoteness (log distance to baseline network) by year fixed
effects - and four sets of rainfall measures, mean and deviation from the long run mean for
annual total and growing season rainfall. Standard errors are clustered at the district (wereda)
level. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.6: Cultivation of Cereals
Dependent Variable: Cultivation of Cereals
Any Cultivation Percent of Area Cultivated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Road -0.002 -0.022** 0.239 -0.769
(0.00) (0.01) (0.37) (0.67)
Extension 0.017*** 0.013*** 1.409*** 1.202***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.27) (0.31)
RoadxExtension 0.024*** 1.245*
(0.01) (0.69)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.88 0.88 0.88 64.84 64.84 64.84
N 238464 238464 238464 237881 237881 237881
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remoteness X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates on the effect of road and extenion on crop choice. The
dependent variable in columns 1-3 is an indicator on whether the holder cultivates any cereals,
and the dependent variable in columns 4-6 is a the percent of cultivated area dedicated to
cereals. All the regressions include three sets of fixed effects - village, year and remoteness (log
distance to baseline network) by year fixed effects - and four sets of rainfall measures, mean
and deviation from the long run mean for annual total and growing season rainfall. Standard
errors are clustered at the district (wereda) level. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ :
1%.
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Table 1.7: Production and Consumption
Dependent Variable: Log of Production/Consumption
Cereals Pulses and Oils
(1) (2)
Road -0.292 0.907**
(0.201) (0.349)
Extension -0.079 -0.001
(0.065) (0.152)
RoadxExtension 0.321 -0.926***
(0.202) (0.351)
Mean of Dep. Var. 1.37 2.42
N 982 520
Village FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Remoteness X Year FE Yes Yes
Rainfall Measures Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates of equations (1.1). Log production/consumption of
cereals is the log of the ratio of village level average household production of cereals (from the
AgSS 2010 and 2015) divided by the corresponding average household consumption of cereals
(from HCES 2010 and 2015). Log production for pulses and oils is defined analogously. All
the regressions include three sets of fixed effects - village, year and remoteness (log distance to
baseline network) by year fixed effects - and four sets of rainfall measures, mean and deviation
from the long run mean for annual total and growing season rainfall. Standard errors are
clustered at the district (wereda) level. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.8: Use of Advising and Credit
Dependent Variable: Any Use of
Advising Credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Road 0.02* -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
(0.011) (0.024) (0.009) (0.012)
Extension 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
RoadxExtension 0.06*** 0.00
(0.022) (0.014)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.23 0.23 0.23
N 242147 241794 241794 242147 241794 241794
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remoteness X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates on the effects of extension and road on use of credit
and advising. The outcome in column 1-3 is an indicator if a farmer received any agricultural
advice and the dependent variable in 4-6 is an indicator if the farmer obtained credit in the
survey year. All the regressions include three sets of fixed effects - village, year and remoteness
(log distance to baseline network) by year fixed effects - and four sets of rainfall measures,
mean and deviation from the long run mean for annual total and growing season rainfall.
Standard errors are clustered at the district (wereda) level. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5%
∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.9: Use of Modern Inputs
Dependent Variable: Share of Cultivated Area Under
Chemical Fertilizer Improved Seed Irrigation Herbicide
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Road 0.063 -2.959*** 0.248 -1.203*** 0.110 -0.180 0.476 -0.978
(0.47) (0.76) (0.28) (0.32) (0.14) (0.49) (0.44) (0.89)
Extension 3.943*** 3.310*** 1.644*** 1.347*** 0.286** 0.229* 0.754** 0.467
(0.37) (0.39) (0.19) (0.21) (0.14) (0.13) (0.33) (0.32)
RoadxExtension 3.721*** 1.778*** 0.354 1.745**
(0.81) (0.39) (0.50) (0.89)
Mean of Dep. Var. 35.17 35.17 35.17 6.14 6.14 6.14 1.78 1.78 1.78 13.47 13.47 13.47
N 238464 238464 238464 238464 238464 238464 238464 238464 238464 238464 238464 238464
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remoteness X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates on the effects of roads and extension on use of modern inputs. The first dependent variable,
Chemical Fertilizer, is the holder level measure of the share of area that is cultivated using the chemical fertilizer. The remaining
dependent variables are defined similarly. All the regressions include three sets of fixed effects - village, year and remoteness (log
distance to baseline network) by year fixed effects - and four sets of rainfall measures, mean and deviation from the long run mean for
annual total and growing season rainfall. Standard errors are clustered at the district (wereda) level. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5%
∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.10: Labor Reallocation
Dependent Variable: Indicator for Occupation
Skilled Agriculture Manufacturing Crafts, Trade
and Mining and all Occupations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Road -0.02 -0.22*** 0.00 -0.01* 0.01 0.23***
(0.028) (0.078) (0.002) (0.006) (0.028) (0.079)
Extension 0.00 -0.06 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.07
(0.042) (0.047) (0.003) (0.003) (0.042) (0.047)
RoadxExtension 0.22*** 0.01** -0.23***
(0.080) (0.006) (0.082)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.40 0.40
Observations 35262 35262 35262 35262 35262 35262 35262 35262 35262
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remoteness X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates on the effects of road and extension on labor allocation. Skilled Agriculture is an indicator for
individuals whose main occupation is skilled agricultural and fishery worker. Manufacturing and Mining is an indicator for individuals
working as plant and machine operators and assemblers and those engaged in elementary occupations in manufacturing and mining.
Crafts, Trade and all Occupations is an indicator for any occupation that isnt skilled agriculture or manufacturing/mining. All the
regressions include three sets of fixed effects - village, year and remoteness (log distance to baseline network) by year fixed effects - and
four sets of rainfall measures, mean and deviation from the long run mean for annual total and growing season rainfall. Standard errors
are clustered at the district (wereda) level. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.11: Average Cultivated Area, Productivity and Farm Income
Dependent Variable: Farm Income: Log TFP Log Cultivated Area Cereals Share of
Log Value Added per Farmer per Farmer Value Added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Road 0.052** -0.147*** -0.052* -0.032*** -0.025*
(0.021) (0.042) (0.031) (0.012) (0.013)
Extension 0.066*** 0.026 -0.018 0.016*** 0.010**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005)
RoadxExtension 0.239*** 0.112*** 0.039*** 0.029**
(0.040) (0.030) (0.011) (0.014)
Mean of Dep. Var. 9.42 9.42 9.42 9.52 0.62 0.55
N 11839 11839 11839 11851 11851 11851
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remoteness X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates on the effects of roads and extension on farm income and the drivers of farm income. In columns
1-3 the dependent variable is the log of the total value added for all crops at the village level divided by the number of holders engaged
in agricultural production. In Column 4 the dependent variable is the log of TFP estimated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
approach. In Column 4 the dependent variable is the log of the total cultivated area in the village divided by the number of holders in
the village. In column 5, the dependent variable is the share of value added of cereals in total value added. All the regressions include
three sets of fixed effects - village, year and remoteness (log distance to baseline network) by year fixed effects - and four sets of rainfall
measures, mean and deviation from the long run mean for annual total and growing season rainfall. Standard errors are clustered at
the district (wereda) level. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.12: Crop Production and Household’s Ability To Feed It-
self
Dependent Variable: Number of Months Household Can Feed Itself Using
Own Current Production of Using Own Production
Cereals and Pulses Or Sale of All Crops
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Road -0.143 -2.270** -0.693* -0.770
(0.267) (0.980) (0.369) (1.080)
Extension 0.995* 0.336 -0.187 -0.221
(0.533) (0.593) (0.648) (0.825)
RoadxExtension 2.284** 0.081
(1.003) (1.071)
Mean of Dep. Var. 8.16 8.16 8.16 10.12 10.12 10.12
N 13892 13892 13892 13899 13899 13899
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remoteness X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates on the effects of road and extension on the number of
months a household can feed itself. In column 1-3, the dependent variable is the number of
months a household can feed itself using only its own production of cereals and pulses. In
column 4-6, the outcome variable is the number months a household can feed itself through
consumption or sale of own production. Standard errors are clustered at the district (wereda)
level. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.13: Household Total Expenditure, Food Consumption and Net Calorie Intake
Log Total Log Food Log Net Calorie
Expenditure Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Road 0.018 -0.005 -0.007 -0.076 0.014 -0.092
(0.034) (0.114) (0.039) (0.129) (0.030) (0.111)
Extension 0.054 0.046 0.092 0.070 0.107* 0.075
(0.060) (0.067) (0.072) (0.082) (0.055) (0.056)
RoadxExtension 0.026 0.077 0.115
(0.118) (0.135) (0.112)
Mean of Dep. Var. 10.34 10.34 10.34 9.56 9.56 9.56 15.15 15.15 15.15
N 14912 14865 14865 14912 14865 14865 14912 14865 14865
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remoteness X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates on the effects of access to roads and extension on expenditures and calorie intake. The dependent
variable in column 1-3 is the log of total annual household expenditure, columns 4-6 is the log of annual expenditures on food, and
columns 6-9 is the log of the net colorie intake for the household. in The data comes from the rural sample of the 2010/11 and 2015/16
waves of the Household Consumption and Expenditure Survey. Standard errors are clustered at the district (wereda) level. Significance
levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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1.11 Additional Figures
Figure 1·9: Annual Expenditure on New Roads by Road Class (in
Million 2014 Ethiopian Birr)
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Notes: The figure presents the annual real expenditure, in millions of 2014 Ethiopian Birr, on
new roads by road class type. Source: ERA (2015)
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Figure 1·10: Expansion of the Rural Road Network
Notes: Figures (a)-(d) demonstrate the evolution of the full road network over 2011-2014 through the addition of the URRAP roads.
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Figure 1·11: Expansion of Extension Services
Figure 1·12: Share of Area Under Ex-
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Figure 1·14: Share of Area under Ex-
tension Across Crop Groups
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Figure 1·15: Development Agent’s
Time Use During a Typical Week
Notes: Source for Figure (d) : Berhane et al (2018) using the 2016 Digital Green DA survey of 896 development agents
in Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPR and Tigray regions
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Figure 1·16: Enumeration Areas in the Annual Agricultural Sam-
ple Survey Balanced Panel
Notes: The figure presents the spatial distribution of the enumeration areas (sub-villages) in
the balanced panel from the Agricultural Sample Survey (2010-16) from the four regions con-
sidered in the main analyses.
Figure 1·17: Enumeration Areas in the Rural Sample of the Wel-
fare Monitoring Survey and the Household Consumption and Ex-
penditure Surveys
Notes: The figure presents the spatial distribution of the enumeration areas (sub-villages) ru-
ral sample of the Welfare Monitoring Surveys (2010/11 and 2015/16) from the four regions
considered in the main analyses.
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1.12 Additional Tables
Table 1.14: Effect of Direct URRAP Connection on Market Access
Dependent Variable: Market Access
(1) (2) (3) (4)
URRAP Road 0.820*** 0.815*** 0.801*** 0.800***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
N 11744 11744 11744 11744
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remoteness X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls
Region X Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Crop Suitabilities X Year FE No No Yes Yes
Proximity to Facilities (in 2007) X Year FE No No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the regression of market access on an indcator on whether the village
was intersected by a road. Actual market access is calculated using equation (1.3) for each year
based on the full road network in that year and distribution of population across villages from
the 2007 census. The standard errors are clustered at the district (wereda) level. Significance
levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
84
Table 1.15: First Stage Regression: Actual and Predicted Market
Access
Dependent Variable: Actual Market Access
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predicted MarketAccess 0.217*** 0.215*** 0.200*** 0.194***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
F-Statistic 91.47 89.43 77.10 70.69
N 11641 11641 11641 11641
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remoteness X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls
Region X Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Crop Suitabilities X Year FE No No Yes Yes
Proximity to Facilities (in 2007) X Year FE No No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the first stage regression of actual market access on predicted market
access with sequential addition of robustness controls. Actual market access is calculated using
equation (1.3) for each year based on the full road network in that year and distribution of
population across villages from the 2007 census. Predicted market access is calculated similarly
but using the optimal network predicted in each year based on topography and the regional
budget constraints using the procedures outlined in Section 1.5.3. Both actual and predicted
market access variables are normalized so that the coefficient indicates the standard deviation
effect on actual market access of a one standard deviation increase in predict market access.
The first-stage F statistics are cluster-robust, and standard errors are clustered at the district
(wereda) level. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.16: Robustness of The Market Access Based Results to Varying the Connection Cut-
Offs and Trade Elasticity (θ) Value
Dependent Variable: Log Value Added Per Hectare
Market Access Is Calculated Using
Baseline, θ = 1.1 θ = 1 θ = 1.5 θ = 1.5 θ = 3.6 θ = 3.73 θ = 3.8 θ = 6.74 θ = 12.86 θ = 26.83
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: A Village Within 2km of a Road is Connected
MarketAccess 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Extension 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
MarketAccessXExtension 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.036***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Mean of Dep. Var. 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40
N 11654 11654 11654 11654 11654 11654 11654 11654 11654 11654
Panel B: A Village Within 5km of a Road is Connected
MarketAccess 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Extension 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
MarketAccessXExtension 0.021* 0.021* 0.021* 0.022* 0.022* 0.022* 0.023* 0.023** 0.024** 0.027**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Mean of Dep. Var. 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40
N 11654 11654 11654 11654 11654 11654 11654 11654 11654 11654
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remoteness X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the robustness of the main results on productivity (value added per hectare) using the market access approach
to different ways of constructing the market access. Column 1 in Panel A presents the baseline result. In panel A, the market access
value is constructed assuming any village within 2km of the road is connected to the road. In panel B, I extend the cutoff to 5km.
Columns 2-9 in both panels vary the value of the trade elasticity, θ, used to construct the market access. All the regressions include
three sets of fixed effects - village, year and remoteness (log distance to baseline network) by year fixed effects - and four sets of rainfall
measures, mean and deviation from the long run mean for annual total and growing season rainfall. Standard errors are clustered at
the district (wereda) level.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.17: Robustness of The Market Access Based Results to Varying the Connection Cut-
Offs and Trade Elasticity (θ) Value
Dependent Variable: Log TFP
Market Access Is Calculated Using
Baseline, θ = 1.1 θ = 1 θ = 1.5 θ = 1.5 θ = 3.6 θ = 3.73 θ = 3.8 θ = 6.74 θ = 12.86 θ = 26.83
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: A Village Within 2km of a Road is Connected
MarketAccess -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Extension 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
MarketAccessXExtension 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.052***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Mean of Dep. Var. 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25
N 11672 11672 11672 11672 11672 11672 11672 11672 11672 11672
Panel B: A Village Within 5km of a Road is Connected
MarketAccess 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Extension 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
MarketAccessXExtension 0.032** 0.032** 0.032** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.038***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Mean of Dep. Var. 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25
N 11672 11672 11672 11672 11672 11672 11672 11672 11672 11672
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remoteness X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the robustness of the main results on productivity (log TFP) using the market access approach to different
ways of constructing the market access. Column 1 in Panel A presents the baseline result. In panel A, the market access value is
constructed assuming any village within 2km of the road is connected to the road. In panel B, I extend the cutoff to 5km. Columns 2-9
in both panels vary the value of the trade elasticity, θ, used to construct the market access. All the regressions include three sets of fixed
effects - village, year and remoteness (log distance to baseline network) by year fixed effects - and four sets of rainfall measures, mean
and deviation from the long run mean for annual total and growing season rainfall. Standard errors are clustered at the district (wereda)
level.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.18: Robustness of Main Findings to Additional Controls
Dependent Variable: Log TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS with Binary Road Access
Road -0.057 -0.055 -0.049 -0.023
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
Extension -0.003 -0.011 -0.012 -0.002
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
RoadxExtension 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.113*** 0.072*
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040)
Mean of Dep. Var. 7.24 7.24 7.24 7.24
N 11793 11793 11793 11793
Panel B: OLS using Market Access
MarketAccess -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Extension 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
MarketAccessxExtension 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Mean of Dep. Var. 7.27 7.27 7.27 7.27
N 11672 11672 11672 11672
Panel C: IV using Market Acces
MarketAccess -0.05 -0.06 -0.09* -0.10*
(0.046) (0.046) (0.049) (0.053)
Extension 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
MarketAccessxExtension 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
First Stage F-Statistic 45.78 44.68 38.25 35.55
Mean of Dep. Var. 7.27 7.27 7.27 7.27
N 11659 11659 11659 11659
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region X Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Crop Suitabilities X Year FE No No Yes Yes
Proximity to Facilities (in 2007) X Year FE No No No Yes
Notes: This table subjects the results from the fully interacted model (column 6) in Table 1.2 and
1.3 to sequential addition of differential trends by potential confounders. Dependent variable
is log TFP estimated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method. Column 1 presents the
baseline results. Column 2 adds region by year fixed effects. Column 3 adds the interactions
between year fixed effects and agro-climatically attainable yields for 20 crops, separately. Col-
umn 4 adds the interaction of year fixed effects with log distance from village to the locations
45 rural services and facilities. All the regressions include three sets of fixed effects - village,
year and remoteness (log distance to baseline network) by year fixed effects - and four sets of
rainfall measures, mean and deviation from the long run mean for annual total and growing
season rainfall. Standard errors are clustered at the district (wereda) level.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.19: Heterogeneous Effects of Roads and Extension on Pro-
ductivity: Cereals vs Other Crops
Dependent Variable: Agricultural Productivity
Cereals Pulses and Oils
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Log Production Value Per Hectare
Road 0.027* -0.077** 0.042* -0.029
(0.015) (0.038) (0.021) (0.040)
Extension 0.029** 0.008 0.000 -0.013
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.018)
RoadxExtension 0.123*** 0.082**
(0.036) (0.040)
Mean of Dep. Var. 9.49 9.49 9.49 9.49 9.49 9.49
N 11688 11688 11688 11289 11289 11289
Panel B: Log Value Added Per Hectare
Road 0.036** -0.076* 0.050** -0.028
(0.017) (0.043) (0.024) (0.044)
Extension 0.024* 0.002 -0.017 -0.031
(0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020)
RoadxExtension 0.133*** 0.091**
(0.041) (0.043)
Mean of Dep. Var. 9.37 9.37 9.37 9.37 9.37 9.37
N 11688 11688 11688 11289 11289 11289
Panel C: Log TFP
Road 0.037** -0.065 0.082*** 0.014
(0.018) (0.050) (0.024) (0.053)
Extension 0.014 -0.005 -0.028 -0.039*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021)
RoadxExtension 0.120** 0.079
(0.049) (0.053)
Mean of Dep. Var. 7.33 7.33 7.33 5.62 5.62 5.62
N 11688 11688 11688 11289 11289 11289
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remoteness X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates on the effects of roads and extension on the productiv-
ity of cereals and non-cereals separatley. Cereals include maize, millet, oats, rice, sorghum,
teff and wheat. Pulses and Oils include chickpea, haricot bean, horse bean, feild pea, lentil,
vetch, soyabean, fenugrk, lineseed, ground nut, neug, rapeseed, sesame, and sunflower. All
the regressions include three sets of fixed effects - village, year and remoteness (log distance
to baseline network) by year fixed effects - and four sets of rainfall measures, mean and devia-
tion from the long run mean for annual total and growing season rainfall. Standard errors are
clustered at the district (wereda) level.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 1.20: Changes in Access to Food and Living Standards
Dependent Variable: Compared to Last Year Household Indicated Improvements In
Access to Food Living Standard of the
Household Community
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Road 0.057** 0.054 0.010 0.003 0.017 0.032
(0.029) (0.065) (0.030) (0.074) (0.036) (0.114)
Extension 0.133*** 0.132** 0.093** 0.090* 0.117* 0.122*
(0.042) (0.056) (0.045) (0.055) (0.060) (0.070)
RoadxExtension 0.005 0.009 -0.015
(0.068) (0.078) (0.119)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.36 0.36 0.36
N 14947 14947 14947 14947 14947 14947 14943 14943 14943
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Remoteness X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Measures Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates on the effects of roads and extension on household access to food and perceptions about the
changes in their living standards. All regressions include three sets of fixed effects - village, year and remoteness (log distance to
baseline network) by year fixed effects - and four sets of rainfall measures, mean and deviation from the long run mean for annual total
and growing season rainfall. Standard errors are clustered at the district (wereda) level.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
90
Chapter 2
Frontier Culture: The Roots and Persistence
of “Rugged Individualism” in the United
States
2.1 Introduction
Rapid westward expansion marked the early history of the United States. Accord-
ing to the influential historian Frederick Jackson Turner, the presence of “a contin-
ually advancing frontier line” at the “edge of free land” strongly influenced Amer-
ican culture (Turner, 1893). The frontier fostered the development of distinctive
cultural traits, including individualism and opposition to government interven-
tion. The combination of these two traits characterizes “rugged individualism,” a
term popularized by Herbert Hoover in his 1928 presidential campaign.1
This paper shows that the American frontier shaped a culture of rugged indi-
1The element of anti-statism in rugged individualism makes it different from notions of individ-
ualism that point to weak family ties, loose kinship networks, or low levels of communalism
(see Alesina and Giuliano, 2014; Enke, 2017, 2018, respectively). The Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary defines rugged individualism as “the practice or advocacy of individualism in social
and economic relations emphasizing personal liberty and independence, self-reliance, resourceful-
ness, self-direction of the individual, and free competition in enterprise.” According to Wikipedia,
rugged individualism “refers to the idea that individuals should be able to help themselves out
and that the government does should not involve itself in the economic lives of people or the
nation in general.”
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vidualism that persisted throughout time. First, using Census data from the 18th
and 19th century, we establish the distinctive demographics and higher levels of in-
dividualism that historically characterized frontier locations. Then, using modern
survey and Census data, we show that locations exposed to the frontier for a longer
period historically exhibit higher contemporary levels of individualism, lower de-
sired and actual levels of redistribution, and stronger opposition to government
regulation. Finally, using linked Census records, we document empirical patterns
that point to the origins of frontier culture. Frontier individualism is partly but not
entirely explained by selective migration. Frontier conditions favored individual-
ism through higher socioeconomic returns, and they created expectations of high
income growth through effort, which fueled opposition to government interven-
tion.
To understand the contemporaneous and long-run effects of the frontier, we re-
visit the classic Frontier Thesis through the lens of modern political economy and
social psychology. In our conceptual framework, the significance of the frontier
can be explained by three factors. First, frontier locations attracted individual-
ists able to thrive in harsh conditions. Second, frontier conditions—isolation and
low population density—further cultivated self-reliance, and they offered favor-
able prospects for upward mobility through effort, nurturing hostility to redistri-
bution. Finally, frontier conditions shaped local culture at a critical juncture, thus
generating persistent effects.
We determine the position of the frontier and track its evolution over time us-
ing population data from the Census and applying Geographic Information Sys-
tem (GIS) techniques. Following Turner’s classic essay and the Progress of the Na-
tion report from the 1890 Census, we define the frontier line as the line at which
population density dropped below two people per square mile. We identify the
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frontier as comprised of counties with low population density in close proxim-
ity to the frontier line. This time-varying measure of frontier status is consistent
with Turner’s view of the frontier as “a form of society” rather than a fixed area.
We measure total frontier experience as the time spent on the frontier between
1790 and 1890. This precise and comprehensive measure of frontier history pro-
vides, to our knowledge, the first measure of the duration of frontier exposure at
a fine geographic level. This measure makes it possible to characterize previously
unidentified variation within and across states.
Consistent with historical narratives, we find systematic evidence on the de-
mographic and cultural distinctiveness of frontier locations. Frontier settlers were
disproportionately male, prime-age, and foreign-born. These distinctive traits dis-
play strong associations with each of the two defining features of the frontier—
sparse population and isolation. Using semiparametric regressions, we identify
sharp structural breaks in these traits close to the density cutoff defining the fron-
tier line in historical accounts. Moreover, event study specifications show how
these demographics evolve as counties exit the frontier.
Frontier locations also had sharply higher levels of individualism, as reflected
in the prevalence of infrequent children’s names. This result holds for several alter-
native ways of measuring infrequency and restricting to children with native-born
parents or grandparents. The informational content of given names has been em-
phasized in economics (e.g., Abramitzky et al., 2016; Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2004; Fryer and Levitt, 2004; Olivetti and Paserman, 2015) as well as psychology
and sociology (e.g., Gerrit and Onland, 2011; Gureckis and Goldstone, 2009; Lieber-
son and Bell, 1992). We borrow our names-based measure of individualism from
social psychologists, who note that individualistic types are prone to give their
children infrequent names, reflecting a desire to stand out, as opposed to common
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names, reflecting a desire to fit in (Twenge et al., 2010). Names have the crucial ad-
vantage of allowing us to measure individualism historically. Furthermore, name
choices are particularly useful for studying cultural persistence as they represent a
primordial act of cultural transmission by parents, which can have lasting effects
on children’s identity and behavior (Nelson and Simmons, 2007; Yadin, 2016).
We investigate the long-run effects of frontier exposure on culture using our
novel, county-level measure of total frontier experience (TFE). First, we show that
TFE positively correlates with infrequent naming patterns several generations after
the closing of the frontier. Second, we find a robust association of TFE with oppo-
sition to redistribution and public spending based on contemporary surveys cap-
turing different notions of government intervention. TFE is also associated with
actual policy differences such as lower property tax rates. The results are robust to
state fixed effects as well as geoclimatic controls including area, latitude and longi-
tude, rainfall and temperature, distance to waterways, and potential agricultural
productivity.
These long-run differences in preferences have translated into stronger contem-
porary support for the Republican Party. Each decade of TFE is associated with 3.5
percent more votes for Republican candidates in presidential elections since 2000.
This association ratchets up over the 2000s as each election exhibits a significantly
larger effect of TFE. Frontier exposure explains a significant part of the increase in
Republican vote shares in the American heartland from 2000 to 2016, a period of
rising political polarization. The effect of TFE remains significant when compared
to the effect of Chinese import competition, a leading proximate explanation for
the regional Republican shift (Autor et al., 2016).
We provide insights into why Republican Party support is stronger in areas
with greater TFE by considering preferences over a set of contentious policy is-
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sues: the Affordable Care Act, increases in the minimum wage, the ban on assault
rifles, and the regulation of CO2 emissions. Republican Party positions on these
issues can be linked to salient aspects of frontier culture described in the historical
literature, including opposition to state intervention, strong belief in effort versus
luck in reward, necessity of self-defense, and notions of “manifest destiny.” We
show that locations with greater TFE exhibit stronger opposition to each of these
policies.
These results survive a battery of robustness checks. Our findings hold for
alternative proximity and low density cutoffs defining TFE. They are robust to in-
cluding regions exposed to frontier conditions after 1890, the year in which the
Census declared the frontier closed. The same is true when adding the West Coast,
including California, which experienced its own frontier expansion eastward from
the Pacific Coast in the second half of the 19th century. In fact, we find similar ef-
fects of TFE across Census regions of the country despite large average differences
in preferences across those regions.
We address a host of potential confounders of frontier experience and contem-
porary culture. We show that the effects of TFE are not explained by low pop-
ulation density today nor by a history of low density.2 Rather, they reflect the
history of frontier settlement, which entailed not only low density but also oppor-
tunity afforded by relative resource abundance in remote areas. We account for
other potential confounders, including mineral resource abundance, rainfall risk,
access to railroads, slavery, and birthplace diversity. We also show that African
Americans’ preferences today are unaffected by TFE, consistent with the fact that
mechanisms linking frontier experience to rugged individualism were of limited
2One important robustness check shows that the effects of TFE hold when comparing across coun-
ties within the same decile of historical or contemporary population density within the same state.
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historical relevance for blacks, especially in the antebellum period. In addition,
racial resentment toward blacks does not seem to account for the link between
TFE and opposition to redistribution among the white population. Finally, we re-
port results for placebo outcomes that are less plausibly connected with frontier
culture.
We clarify the long-run identifying variation using an instrumental variables
(IV) strategy. The IV exploits time series variation in immigrant inflows to the
United States. For each location, we consider the intensity of inflows in the period
starting just before the onset of local frontier settlement. The ups and downs of
international immigration from 1790 to 1890 affected the speed of westward ex-
pansion and hence the length of time it took for frontier locations to become estab-
lished settlements. We find similar results when using an alternative instrument
based on predicted outflows from Europe due to climatic shocks, isolating push
factors abroad as in Nunn et al. (2017).
Next, we explore the roots of frontier culture. We first examine the selective
migration of individualists to the frontier. Using a linked sample of households
from the 1870 and 1880 Censuses, we track people across locations and decompose
county-level differences in individualism into components coming from early ver-
sus later settlers. We find that selective migration was significant, though it does
not seem to fully explain the prevalence of rugged individualism on the frontier
historically.
We identify two factors that may have complemented and reinforced selective
migration. First, individualism thrived on the frontier due to its adaptive advan-
tage in a setting of wilderness and isolation, where self-reliance was beneficial for
survival and success. We find that infrequent names are associated with greater
socioeconomic status on the frontier than elsewhere and also with lower rates of
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return migration from the frontier. Second, frontier conditions presented opportu-
nities for upward mobility through effort, which would hone opposition to redis-
tribution. This is consistent with existing evidence of widespread access to land
and high rates of wealth accumulation on the frontier.3
Frontier culture may have persisted through several mechanisms, even after
frontier conditions were long gone. Cultural traits established at early stages can
maintain and even increase their prevalence through various forms of intergen-
erational transmission. As frontier experience started by definition at the earliest
stages of settlement, it was bound to influence the formation of local institutions
and social identity, which probably affected subsequent cultural evolution.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on the historical origins and per-
sistence of cultural traits (e.g., Alesina et al., 2013; Ferna´ndez, 2010; Guiso et al.,
2016; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013; Voigtla¨nder and
Voth, 2012).4 The deep roots of rugged individualism shed new light on a puzzle
in American political economy, namely the relative stability of preferences for re-
distribution over the last 40 years despite significant increases in inequality (see
Ashok et al., 2015).5 Our findings make a distinct addition to the economics litera-
3We also consider a competing, disease-based explanation for the origins of individualism rooted in
biology and known as the parasite-stress theory of values (Fincher and Thornhill, 2012). However,
using data on disease and illness in the 1880 Census, we do not find evidence in support of this
mechanism as a factor explaining frontier culture.
4This includes recent work in the U.S. context exploring the historical legacy of Scots-Irish honor
culture (Grosjean, 2014), slavery (Acharya et al., 2016), mining (Couttenier et al., 2017; Couttenier
and Sangnier, 2015; Glaeser et al., 2015), and agricultural risk (Ager and Ciccone, ming; Davis,
2016).
5In a New York Times article from July 4th, 2017, titled “What’s the Matter with Republicans?”, jour-
nalist David Brooks wonders about voters’ proclivities for supporting policies that are seemingly
against their economic self-interest, and conjectures: “My stab at an answer would begin in the
18th and 19th centuries. Many Trump supporters live in places that once were on the edge of
the American frontier. Life on that frontier was fragile, perilous, lonely and remorseless. [. . . ]
discipline and self-reliance were essential. [. . . ] In their view, government doesn’t reinforce the
vigorous virtues. On the contrary, it undermines them [. . . ] I’d say they believe that big govern-
ment support would provide short-term assistance, but that it would be a long-term poison to the
values that are at the core of prosperity.”
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ture on individualism (e.g., Greif, 1994; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2016; Olsson
and Paik, 2016) and preferences for redistribution (see Alesina and Giuliano, 2010,
for a survey). We use a wealth of subnational data spanning over two centuries to
link the American frontier with rugged individualism, drawing on core political
economy theories in our analysis of mechanisms.
Our analysis relies on subnational variation and does not directly address the
roots of cultural traits in the U.S. as a whole or cultural variation across coun-
tries. However, our results may have broad implications. First, the mere reshuf-
fling of individualists through selective migration may have increased the long-
run prevalence of individualism in the aggregate. Most U.S. locations experienced
frontier conditions for at least a few years in their early history. During this critical
juncture, individualists could exert decisive impacts on local cultural formation,
whereas their influence in settled areas outside the frontier would be limited. Sec-
ond, our findings suggest frontier conditions not only attracted individualists but
also fostered further individualism. Thus, over the process of westward expan-
sion, the frontier imbued a culture of rugged individualism throughout the U.S.
(with varying intensity across locations based on length of exposure).
Differences in rugged individualism across the U.S. may help to explain cul-
tural differences between the U.S. and Europe, insofar as there are common under-
lying determinants. The mechanisms we explore—selective migration, an adap-
tive advantage of individualism, and prospects of upward mobility through effort—
were arguably important in shaping American culture as distinct from European
culture. Indeed, according to Turner, “the Atlantic coast. . .was the frontier of
Europe.” In an early contribution on differences between the U.S. and Europe,
Alesina et al. (2001) conjecture that “American anti-statism” may be partly linked
to the frontier, which “strengthened individualistic feelings and beliefs in equality
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of opportunities rather than equality of outcomes.” We provide the first systematic
evidence on this hypothesis.
We make a novel contribution to the large social science literature animated by
Turner’s ideas. Many studies in history and sociology describe the demographic
characteristics of the frontier. We provide a comprehensive analysis of its distinc-
tive features, measuring the local prevalence of individualism for the first time.
The only study of the Frontier Thesis in economics is Garcı´a-Jimeno and Robin-
son (2011), which links variation in the quality of democratic institutions across
countries in the Americas to variation in the historical importance of frontier land.
Our paper examines subnational variation in individualism and preferences for
redistribution in the U.S., and relies on a novel measure of historical frontier expe-
rience. Some studies in social psychology use state-level data to study variation in
contemporary individualism, comparing demographic features (Vandello and Co-
hen, 1999) or infrequent names (Varnum and Kitayama, 2011) between the western
U.S. and the rest of the country. Our empirical analysis goes beyond these broad
geographic correlations to provide a precise definition of the frontier and to rule
out potential confounders of settlement history. Furthermore, we link the fron-
tier with both historical and modern individualism and identify several possible
explanations for the origins of frontier culture.
Turner’s work has attracted immense attention as well as vast criticism (see,
e.g., Larson, 1993, and other articles in the same journal issue). His narratives
contain departures from the historical record, overblown statements, and mytho-
logical elements. They paint an idealized portrait of the frontiersman and leave
women and minorities out of the picture. The term “free land” appears repeatedly
when, in fact, land was violently taken from Native Americans and, in many ar-
eas, westward expansion was more about “conquest” than “settlement” (Limerick,
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1988). Our research provides empirical support for some important elements of the
Frontier thesis, but it is not a general assessment of Turner’s work nor an endorse-
ment of its ideological overtones. Ultimately, frontier culture is likely rooted in
both facts and myths. Rugged individualism may be stronger in areas with greater
TFE partly due to pervasive subjective beliefs about frontier history.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a general discussion of
individualism and opposition to redistribution as well as economic theories about
their origins and consequences. We also link these theories to the Frontier Thesis
and offer a simple conceptual framework to understand its significance. Section 2.3
explains how we locate the frontier and measure total frontier experience. Section
2.4 documents the distinctive features of frontier populations. Section 2.5 provides
estimates of the long-run effects of frontier experience on culture. Section 2.6 then
offers evidence for why the frontier may have favored individualism and oppo-
sition to redistribution. Section 2.7 concludes with key lessons and caveats about
extrapolating to other countries or even the U.S. as a whole.
2.2 A Modern Reading of The Frontier Thesis
This section provides a conceptual background that connects Turner’s ideas about
the American Frontier with contemporary political economy, cultural economics,
and social psychology. We start by discussing contributions in these fields that
provide insight into outcomes of interest. Then, we restate the Frontier Thesis,
spelling out the potential channels for initial influence and subsequent persistence.
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2.2.1 Individualism and Preferences for Redistribution
A large literature in social psychology portrays individualism as the most impor-
tant dimension of cross-country variation in culture (e.g., Heine, 2010). Following
Hofstede (1980, 1991) and Triandis (1988, 1995, 2001), we think of individualism
(in contrast to collectivism) as comprising several related traits: a view of the self
as independent rather than interdependent, the emphasis on self-reliance, the pri-
macy of self-interest, and the regulation of behavior by personal attitudes rather
than social norms.
Empirical measures of individualism illustrate the concept more concretely.
Some studies use Hofstede’s survey-based index while others propose coarse prox-
ies like divorce rates or the percentage of people living alone. Social psycholo-
gists propose other creative indicators. Kashima and Kashima (1998) show that
in individualistic cultures, “I” and “you” are never dropped, as that would de-
emphasize the individual. Twenge et al. (2010) argue that infrequent (common)
children names reflect parents’ desires to stand out (fit in). In this respect, name
choices echo the behavior characterized by the Kim and Markus (1999) study con-
trasting preference for uniqueness in American culture with preference for confor-
mity in East Asia. Given the choice among a set of colored pens, Americans chose
the minority color while East Asians chose the majority color.
In economics, a small set of contributions has focused on individualism, start-
ing with the work of Greif (1994) on how individualistic and collectivistic cultures
shaped different trade institutions in the Middle Ages. The recent contributions of
Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011, 2015, 2016) show that individualistic countries
have higher levels of income, productivity, and innovation, as well as more demo-
cratic institutions. Gorodnichenko and Roland (2016) explain some of these effects
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through an endogenous growth model in which individualism fosters innovation
by creating incentives to stand out.
Preferences for redistribution are distinct but closely related to individualism.
Paul Samuelson (1965) once noted that “to an economist the word ‘individualism’
is tied up with laissez faire.” In fact, Alesina and Giuliano (2010) measure prefer-
ences for redistribution using the same question from the General Social Survey
that Di Tella et al. (2008) use to measure individualism. Using data from the Euro-
pean Social Survey, Quattrociocchi (2014) shows that immigrants who were born
in countries with a more individualistic culture tend to have weaker preferences
for redistribution in their country of residence. Intuitively, the defining charac-
teristics of individualism—self-interest and inclination toward self-reliance—may
be associated with opposition to redistribution and other forms of government in-
tervention.6 The connection is explicit in the ideology of “rugged individualism,”
which promotes self-reliance and opposes state intervention through taxes or reg-
ulations.
A rich literature on preferences for redistribution offers several useful insights
for understanding the roots and persistence of frontier culture (see, e.g., Alesina
and Angeletos, 2005; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Be´nabou and Ok, 2001; Be´nabou
and Tirole, 2006; Piketty, 1995). First, expectations about future income are central,
as favorable prospects of upward mobility tend to generate opposition to redistri-
bution. Second, the importance of effort (relative to luck) in the income-generation
process may lead to lower desired tax rates. The greater the importance of effort,
6Gorodnichenko and Roland (2012) note that “The individualist view of government would tend to
be wary of possible infringements of government on the individual’s drive to self-achievement.”
In the sociology literature, Celinska (2007) notes that an aspect of “utilitarian individualism and
the consequence of a strong belief in self-reliance” is the “opposition toward governmental ef-
forts to equalize citizens’ economic position, to limit private business, and to build strong social
programs that provide assistance to the most disadvantaged.”
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the larger the efficiency costs of taxes due to adverse incentives, and the larger the
perception that they are unfair. Finally, these studies offer models with multiple
equilibria that can shed light on the persistent nature of cultural traits.
2.2.2 The Frontier Thesis: A Restatement
According to the classic thesis advanced by F. J. Turner, the presence of a fron-
tier separating established settlements from vast tracts of unsettled land during a
formative period shaped the distinctive aspects of American culture. According
to his thesis, “these free lands promoted individualism, economic equality, free-
dom to rise, democracy” (Turner, 1893). He also observed that, on the frontier, the
“tax-gatherer is viewed as a representative of oppression,” since the environment
“produces antipathy to control.”
The conceptual framework guiding our analysis combines some of Turner’s
ideas with insights from economics and social psychology. We think of the con-
temporaneous and long-run effects of the frontier as the result of three main forces.
First, frontier locations attracted people with distinctive characteristics, both in
terms of demographics and the prevalence of individualism. Second, the frontier
experience, characterized by isolation and wilderness, fostered the development of
self-reliance and related cultural traits. Finally, the distinctive features of frontier
populations affected preferences and social norms at a critical juncture of institu-
tional formation and thus left a persistent imprint on local culture. While these
mechanisms may be relevant beyond the context of our study, it is of course pos-
sible that certain preconditions were specific to American history. We discuss the
three mechanisms below and revisit external validity in the conclusion.
Selective Migration. Traditional narratives characterize the frontier by the preva-
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lence of young single men, mostly of low socioeconomic status. Harsh living con-
ditions on the frontier were particularly hostile to women and the elderly, which
helps explain the skewed sex ratio and age distribution in most accounts. In ad-
dition, the frontier attracted workers from the lower end of the urban skill distri-
bution in search of opportunity, as suggested by the theory of the “safety valve”
(see Ferrie, 1997; Goodrich and Davison, 1935, 1936; Steckel, 1989; Stewart, 2006;
Turner, 1893).
Frontier residents also tended to exhibit a high degree of individualism. Mi-
grants generally have independent mindsets. This trait may be stronger among
those moving to the frontier, giving up their social environment to settle in remote
and isolated contexts (see Beck-Knudsen, 2019; Hoang-Anh et al., 2018; Jokela,
2009; Kitayama et al., 2006, 2010; Olsson and Paik, 2016). Moreover, as discussed
next, the adaptive advantage of self-reliance in such conditions might further am-
plify the self-selection of individualist types to the frontier.
Effects of Frontier Conditions. While frontier locations attracted people with
specific traits, the frontier’s unique natural and social conditions, in turn, influ-
enced the settlers’ values, beliefs, and behavior. In Turner’s words, “a modifica-
tion of the original stock occurred.” Remoteness and isolation implied a particular
set of opportunities and challenges. The abundance of land and other natural re-
sources offered ample profit opportunities, insofar as they were deftly exploited.
On the other hand, as Overmeyer (1944) argues, “life was rough, crude, hard, and
dangerous.” Frontier settlers often faced harsh climatic conditions and multiple
types of danger, such as plagues, droughts, blizzards, and crop failure, as well
as attacks from wild animals, Native Americans, and other settlers. Violence was
commonplace, and social infrastructure providing protection and care was limited
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or nonexistent.7
These opportunities and threats on the frontier may have favored individual-
ism through an adaptive mechanism. In the frontier context, people often had
to rely on themselves for protection and prevention, and to improve their living
conditions.8 Moreover, the resourcefulness associated with individualism would
prove useful in a context characterized by novel and uncertain conditions. Thus,
individualistic traits had an adaptive value: beliefs and behavior based on inde-
pendence and self-reliance made people better suited to cope with the frontier en-
vironment (Kitayama et al., 2010; Plaut et al., 2002). In turn, the adaptive advan-
tage of individualism may have increased its prevalence in the population through
differential reproductive success, learning, or both (see Galor and O¨zak, 2016).
Moreover, land abundance and remoteness also offered favorable prospects of
upward mobility and a large perceived importance of effort in income generation.
Based on the political economy theories mentioned in 2.2.1, and as conjectured by
Alesina et al. (2001), these conditions would naturally foster opposition to govern-
ment intervention. This resonates with historical narratives. Billington (1974), a
noted Turnerian, argued that on the frontier “every man was a self-dependent in-
dividual, capable of caring for himself without the fostering care of society,” which
“seemed just in a land that provided equal opportunity for all to ascend the social
ladder.”
7Rampant violence, noted in many historical narratives of the frontier, is a common characteristic
of contexts with low population density, high population mobility, lack of well-defined property
rights, and absence of clear mechanisms for law enforcement (Couttenier et al., 2017; Grosjean,
2014; Nisbett and Cohen, 1996; Restrepo, 2015).
8Some critics of Turner emphasize the importance of cooperation on the frontier (e.g., Boatright,
1941), but his supporters have argued that cooperation was not inconsistent with individualism.
For instance, according to Billington (1974), the frontiersman “spoke for individualism . . . even
though he was equally willing to find haven in cooperation when danger threatened or need
decreed.” While returns to cooperation may have been high at times, maintaining reciprocity
would have been difficult in frontier settings with such high population mobility, as noted in the
literature on social capital (see Munshi, 2014).
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Frontier mentality may also be shaped by “motivated beliefs,” i.e. departures
from objective cognition that fulfill psychological and functional needs (Be´nabou
and Tirole, 2016). Perhaps the inclination toward self-reliance served to cope with
the frontier’s loneliness. Perhaps the importance of effort and the prospects of
upward mobility were exaggerated as this helped to bear the exertion required
by frontier life. Opposition to redistribution may partly reflect a psychological
incentive to consider government intervention inefficient as the state had more
limited presence on the frontier (Be´nabou, 2008).
Cultural Persistence. Culture can be remarkably persistent but can also change
rapidly (Gershman, 2017; Giuliano and Nunn, 2017). In our view, the persistence
of frontier culture long after frontier conditions abated can be linked to the dis-
tinctive traits of early settlers at critical junctures of institutional development. A
seminal theory in cultural geography due to Zelinsky (1973) captures this potential
channel. The “doctrine of first effective settlement” argues that when “an empty
territory undergoes settlement [. . .] the specific characteristics of the first group
able to effect a viable, self-perpetuating society are of crucial significance for the
later social and cultural geography of the area, no matter how tiny the initial band
of settlers may have been.”
The economics literature on culture offers several mechanisms by which the
distribution of cultural traits in the population at a point in time can influence its
subsequent evolution (Bisin and Verdier, 2010). First, it affects the likelihood that
new generations adopt these traits through horizontal transmission. Second, it can
influence vertical transmission, for example, by affecting beliefs about the behav-
ior of other members of society and thus the expected rewards for different traits
(Guiso et al., 2008). Various models of intergenerational transmission imply that
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initial conditions determine the long-run cultural equilibrium. The initial condi-
tions in our setting were precisely those distinctive traits of frontier populations
during the inception of settlement.
Moreover, the initial distribution of traits can influence the long-run cultural
equilibrium by shaping early institutions (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015; Bisin and
Verdier, 2017; Tabellini, 2008a,b). Several political economy models suggest that
initial preferences for redistribution lead to different institutional outcomes, which
in turn affect the evolution of preferences (see Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Alesina
et al., 2012; Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006; Bisin and Verdier, 2005). Consistent with
notions of persistence and path dependence, Turner (1893) noted that “traits [of
frontier society] have, while softening down, still persisted as survivals in the place
of their origin, even when a higher social organization succeeded.”
Motivated beliefs may also contribute to the diffusion of frontier culture and
its persistence after frontier conditions are gone. Intergenerational transmission of
rugged individualism may be stronger in areas with with longer frontier experi-
ence because narratives about local frontier history—whether myth or reality—are
more pervasive. And once the beliefs of frontier culture become part of social iden-
tity, they are likely to stick even if contradicted by facts.
2.3 Mapping the History of the Frontier
This section presents our method for mapping the history of the frontier. After
providing historical background, we explain how to use U.S. Census data and GIS
techniques to determine the position of the frontier line. We then define frontier
counties and our new measure of total frontier experience.
From colonial times until the late 19th century, America underwent rapid pop-
107
ulation growth and a massive westward expansion. Historical sources document
this process, and the noteworthy 1890 Census report on the Progress of the Nation
(Porter et al., 1890) provides a key source of inspiration for Turner’s classic 1893
essay. The authors observe that the Thirteen Colonies, already settled communities
by 1790, were “the sources of supply for a great westward migration,” as people
“swarmed from the Atlantic coast to the prairies, plains, mountains, and deserts by
millions during the last century.” The report describes in great detail the decade-
by-decade push westward.9 From 1790 to 1890, as the nation’s total population
increased from 3.9 million to 62.6 million, the extent of settled area went from un-
der 240,000 square miles to almost 2,000,000. In the same period, the mean center
of population10 shifted westward over 500 miles, from just east of Washington D.C.
to Decatur, Indiana.
The Porter et al. (1890) Census report considered the process of westward ex-
pansion complete, and the frontier closed, by 1890. In a passage famously quoted
in Turner’s essay, it stated that “up to and including 1890 the country had a fron-
tier of settlement, but at present the unsettled area has been so broken into by
isolated bodies of settlement that there can hardly be said to be a frontier line.”
As one of the authors of the Census report put it elsewhere, “the frontier line has
disappeared . . . the settled area has become the rule and the unoccupied places the
exception” (Gannett, 1893).
2.3.1 Locating the Frontier and Tracking its Movements
Prior research on the American frontier adopted simplifying definitions. In a study
of westward migrants in 1850 and 1860, Steckel (1989) identifies the frontier with
9The report included detailed maps of population density, which closely resemble our maps.
10This is the point at which weights of equal magnitude corresponding to the location of each
person in an imaginary flat surface representing the U.S. would balance out.
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the states of Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Texas, and those farther west. Ferrie (1997)
studies migration to the frontier between 1850 and 1870 and defines 90◦ west longi-
tude as the frontier’s eastern boundary. Kitayama et al. (2010) associate the frontier
with the Western United States.
We take a different approach. Following Porter et al. (1890) and Turner’s classic
essay, we define the frontier line as the line dividing settlements with population
density of two or more per square mile from those with less.11 We therefore define
frontier counties as those (i) in close proximity to the frontier line (100 kilometers in
our baseline) so as to capture Turner’s notion of the “frontier belt”,12 and (ii) with
population density below six people per square mile, a cutoff suggested by Porter
et al..13 While these cutoffs are necessarily arbitrary, we offer empirical support for
these definitions in Section 2.4.2, and our primary results in Section 2.5 are largely
unchanged using different distance and density thresholds.
This definition allows us to precisely locate the frontier at any point in time
and also to trace its evolution. As Turner noted, the frontier was “a form of society,
rather than an area.” Its two defining features implied distinct but mutually rein-
forcing forms of isolation, the combination of which was conducive to producing
frontier culture according to Turner’s thesis. Low density entailed isolation from
other people within a given location. Proximity to the frontier line entailed iso-
lation from other population centers, and in many cases limited interaction with
agents of the federal government. Both dimensions entailed a lack of social in-
11Turner (1893) notes, “The most significant thing about the American frontier is, that it lies at the
hither edge of free land. In the census reports it is treated as the margin of that settlement which
has a density of two or more to the square mile. The term is an elastic one, and for our purposes
does not need sharp definition. We shall consider the whole frontier belt including the Indian
country and the outer margin of the “settled area’ of the census reports.”
12Traveling 100 kilometers in a covered wagon would have required about 2–3 days in the early
19th century.
13The Porter et al. report defined locations with > 6 people/mi2 as established, post-frontier settle-
ments.
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frastructure as well as relative resource abundance. However, while low density
locations could be found amidst densely settled areas in the east, such areas ar-
guably offered much more limited prospects for upward mobility than similarly
low density areas close to the frontier line, which attracted pioneering settlers in
search of opportunity.
For each Census year beginning in 1790, we calculate county-level population
density per square mile. For intercensal years, we interpolate county-level popu-
lation density by assuming a constant annual population growth rate that matches
the decadal growth rate. We maintain consistent units of observation over time
by harmonizing all data to the 2010 boundaries using an approach suggested in
Hornbeck (2010) and detailed in Appendix 2.11.14
Using annual county-level population densities, we locate the frontier line for
each year by drawing contour lines that divide counties with population densities
above and below two people per square mile. Figure 2·1 plots the resulting lines
for 1790, 1820, 1850, and 1890, and full details on the underlying GIS procedure
can be found in Appendix 2.10. In order to closely approximate historical notions
of the frontier developed above, we discard all line segments less than 500 km,
as well as isolated pockets of low density counties within the main area of settled
territory (i.e., to the east of the main frontier line).15 Figure 2·2 shows the evolution
of the resulting, main frontier lines in red for 1790–1890.
A second major frontier line emerged on the West Coast, starting in Califor-
14We also find that the use of harmonized 2010 county boundaries has little effect on the location of
the frontier lines relative to an approach based on contemporaneous county boundaries histori-
cally.
15Our results are qualitatively similar when discarding isolated pockets of high density settlement
to the west of the main frontier line. The 500 km cutoff discards many contour lines but retains
some large unconnected lines off of the main east-to-west frontier line, e.g., the ones spanning
Maine in 1820 and Michigan in 1850. Like other cutoffs we are forced to specify, this one is
arbitrary but also robust to other rules, including having no cutoff at all. We detail robustness to
many alternative specifications of frontier counties in Section 2.10.7.
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nia, in the mid-19th century. Initiated by the Gold Rush, this process of settlement
constituted a large, discontinuous leap in the advance of east-to-west expansion.
While Eastern cities were very far away, proximity to the ocean reduced trans-
portation costs. This facilitated the arrival of settlers as well as international trade,
and implied different types of isolation compared to frontier locations in the heart-
land. We leave this secondary frontier out of the baseline analysis but show in
Section 2.5.5 that, in fact, frontier experience has similar long-run effects in the
West as elsewhere.
2.3.2 Total Frontier Experience
The westward movement of the frontier was fast at times, slow at others. Thus,
some locations spent little time in frontier conditions, while others remained on
the frontier for decades. This variation in the duration of frontier exposure is key
for our investigation of long-run persistence.
To measure the intensity of historical frontier experience for each location, we
calculate the number of years spent within the frontier belt from 1790 to 1890. For
each year, we assign each county a dummy variable equal to one if it is on the
frontier according to the abovementioned definitions of proximity to the frontier
line and low density. Then, total frontier experience (TFE) for each county is the
sum of indicators of frontier status from 1790 to 1890.
We set 1890 as the endpoint for measuring TFE following the Progress of the
Nation report and Turner. While many places in the U.S. remained sparsely popu-
lated long after 1890, the other defining feature of the frontier—isolation—did not
persist with the same intensity. Transcontinental railroads were built in the early
1880s, which was also when the Indian wars came to an end. Large-scale federal
irrigation efforts came soon after. As a robustness check, in Section 2.5.5 we con-
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sider a longer time frame for the measurement of TFE, changing the endpoint to
1950.
Our analysis excludes counties to the east of the 1790 east-to-west main frontier
line for which we do not observe total frontier experience given the available data.
To be clear, we do not claim that counties close to the East Coast were never on the
frontier. We simply cannot measure their frontier experience.
Figure 2·3 shows the spatial distribution of TFE, measured in years and using
the 100 km frontier cutoff, for the counties in our main analysis. Total frontier
experience ranges from 0 to 63 years with a mean of 18.2 years and a standard
deviation of 11.2 years. TFE exhibits considerable variation both across and within
states and bands of latitude and longitude more generally. Moreover, the variation
in TFE goes well beyond simply capturing differences in contemporary population
density, as seen in the maps in Appendix 2.10.1 and shown empirically in Section
2.5.5. Within Illinois, for instance, Cass County has TFE of 10 years, while Johnson
County stayed on the frontier for 32 years. Today, however, the two counties have
nearly identical population density of 36 people/mi2. While some of the greatest
TFE is found in the South, it is important to note that we find similar long-run
effects across different Census regions (see Section 2.5.5).
2.4 The Distinctive Features of the Frontier
This section documents the unique demographic features of the frontier and its
higher levels of individualism. Historians and sociologists have devoted consid-
erable effort to analyzing the demographics of frontier locations.16 However, these
studies usually focus on a specific place at a particular time, making it difficult to
16See, for example, Bowen (1978), Coombs (1993), Demos (1968), Easterlin et al. (1978), Eblen (1965),
Modell (1971), Moller (1945), Schaefer (1985), and Smith (1928).
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establish empirical regularities. In contrast, we characterize the demographics of
the frontier using data from all Census rounds from 1790 to 1890. Moreover, we
provide the first empirical validation of differential individualism on the frontier.
We document the distinctive features of the frontier using three complemen-
tary strategies. Section 2.4.1 establishes basic cross-sectional differences between
frontier and non-frontier counties (east of the frontier line), and it shows that both
remoteness and sparsity of frontier counties matter in explaining these differences.
Section 2.4.2 validates these two defining features of frontier counties by identify-
ing nonlinear relationships between these population traits and both density and
distance. Finally, Section 2.4.3 exploits time-series variation comparing counties
before and after exiting the frontier.
We focus on a set of demographic characteristics associated with the frontier
in historical accounts. These include sex ratios, age distributions, foreign-born
population shares, and literacy rates, all of which we draw from historical Census
data in Haines and ICPSR (2010). With the exception of immigrant shares, we
calculate all variables over the white population as this helps with consistency
across time periods and ensures that results are not driven by racial composition.17
We measure individualism based on children’s names. As suggested by social
psychologists, the share of children with infrequent names reflects the prevalence
of individualism, correlating strongly with other proxies, as shown by Varnum and
Kitayama (2011), Ogihara et al. (2015), and Beck-Knudsen (2019).18 We measure the
17The average county during the 1790–1890 period is 83 percent white with little difference be-
tween frontier and non-frontier locations; using specification (2.1) below, frontier counties have a
2 percentage point higher white population share than non-frontier counties. In Section 2.5.5, we
consider the role of race in understanding the legacy of frontier experience.
18Varnum and Kitayama (2011) shows a strong cross-country correlation between infrequent names
and Hofstede’s widely used index of individualism. Beck-Knudsen (2019) shows correlations
that the names-based measure is strongly correlated with Hofstede’s index as well as with the
use of first- and second-person singular pronouns across 44 countries (and across regions within
five countries). In Japan, Ogihara et al. (2015) shows a strong time-series correlation between the
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share of children in a given county under 10 years of age with infrequent names
using full-count, historical Census data from several decades beginning in 1850
and made available by ancestry.com. Appendix 2.11 provides a list of common
names for selected years (e.g., John and Sarah) as well as a random sample of
infrequent names (e.g., Luke and Lucinda).19 Our findings are robust to defining
infrequent names in various ways, (i) focusing on those outside the top 10, 25, or
100, (ii) considering the top names in the nation, Census division, state, or county,
and (iii) restricting the sample to children born in the U.S., with U.S.-born parents,
or with U.S.-born grandparents.20
Overall, the results below provide new, systematic empirical support for his-
torical narratives about the individualists settling the American frontier. The three
approaches offer a stark and consistent picture of the frontier being a qualitatively
different type of society.
2.4.1 Demographics and Individualism on the Frontier: Basic Patterns
We begin by documenting the basic differences in demographics and individual-
ism on the frontier with the following estimating equation:
xcdt = α + β frontierct + θd + θt + εcdt, (2.1)
share of common name pronunciations and an index of individualism similar to the one proposed
by Vandello and Cohen (1999), which includes divorce rates and the percentage of people living
alone.
19As an example of infrequent names on the frontier from popular historical fiction, consider the
Luckett family at the center of the celebrated trilogy, The Awakening Land, by novelist Conrad
Richter. Members of this white, native-born family on the Ohio frontier in 1795 had first names
that included Chancey, Wyitt, and Worth for boys and Ascha, Sayward, Sulie for girls.
20As our baseline measure we choose the share of names outside the top 10 following the social
psychology literature (Varnum and Kitayama, 2011). With this measure, the majority of children
have infrequent names (e.g., 57 percent of boys and 60 percent of girls in 1850). Hence, an “infre-
quent name” may not be a very unusual name but simply one that is uncommon. In any case, all
these measures are highly correlated, and results are qualitatively similar across all of them (see
Appendix 2.10.4).
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where xcdt is one of the population traits of interest in county c in Census division d
at time t, frontierct is time-varying frontier status, and θd and θt are Census division
and year fixed effects, respectively. Panel A of Table 2.1 reports estimates of β, the
frontier differential, for each of six x outcomes.21
Across columns, we find that frontier populations tend to have significantly
more (1) males, (2) prime-age adults, and (3) foreign-born. Frontier counties have
0.15 additional males for every female relative to non-frontier counties where the
average sex ratio is 1.09. The share of prime-age adults (15–49 years old) in the
population is 2.6 percentage points (p.p.) higher than in non-frontier counties, for
which that share is around 46 percent. Additionally, frontier counties have nearly
6 p.p. higher foreign-born population shares than the average non-frontier county
where 7 percent of residents are immigrants. Finally, in column (4), literacy rates
are not significantly different on the frontier. However, literacy may simply be a
noisy measure of skill.
Columns 5 and 6 show that individualism is more pervasive in frontier coun-
ties as reflected in the share of children with infrequent names. In frontier coun-
ties, around 2 p.p. more girls (boys) have infrequent names relative to the average
non-frontier county with around 66 (58) percent having infrequent names. These
measures capture the share of children aged 0–10 with names that are outside the
top 10 most popular names in that decade’s birth cohort within the Census di-
vision.22 We restrict here to white children with native-born parents, but results
21These outcomes are all measured at the 2010 county-level but are not all available in every Census
round, which explains why the sample varies across columns. Non-frontier counties include
those to the east of the 100 km belt around the frontier line in the given decade but west of the 1790
frontier line, for consistency with the sample used in the long-run analysis. Including counties to
the east of that line leaves results unchanged. Treating counties to the west of the frontier belt in
the given decade as frontier amplifies the differential β, as those living in wilderness conditions
tend to be even more distinctive.
22A potentially confounding naming practice lies in the passing on of parental first names to chil-
dren. Using data discussed in Section 2.6.1, we find that while only around three (five) percent
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are similar using the other ancestry restrictions and other measures of popularity
noted above.
We further clarify the frontier differential by distinguishing the two attributes
of frontier locations: (i) proximity to the frontier line and (ii) low population den-
sity. Panel B of Table 2.1 estimates
xcdt = α+β1 near frontier linect+β2 low population densityct+θd+θt+εcdt, (2.2)
where near frontier linect is an indicator for having a centroid within 100 km of the
frontier line at time t, and low population densityct is an indicator for population
density below six people per square mile.
Overall, the results in Panel B suggest that both remoteness and sparsity con-
tribute to the distinctive demographics and higher rates of individualism in fron-
tier counties.23 Frontier differentials are not merely an artifact of their low popu-
lation density. There is something distinct about people living close to the frontier
line. Nor are these differences in frontier counties due to arbitrary density or prox-
imity cutoffs, as we show next.
of girls (boys) have such matronymics (patronymics), this practice is less common on the frontier
and significantly so for boys. Choosing novel names for one’s children rather than passing on
one’s own arguably reflects a desire to instill independence. As such, this finding is consistent
with our broader claim that the higher prevalence of infrequent names on the frontier reflects
greater individualism.
23Column 4 shows that the null for illiteracy in Panel A is due to offsetting positive effects of low
density and negative effects of proximity. This pattern does not arise for other outcomes and
suggests scope for further work on the safety valve hypothesis.
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2.4.2 The Frontier Is Qualitatively Different: Semiparametric Evidence
In this section, we validate the notion that the frontier was a structurally distinct
type of settlement. We use the following semiparameric specification:
xcdt = α + g(population densitycdt) + θd + θt + εcdt, (2.3)
where g(·) is a nonlinear function recovered using the partially linear (Robinson,
1988) estimator. While we estimate g(·) across all counties in the sample, we restrict
the graphs presented in this section to counties with less than 50 people/mi2 in
order to focus on changes close to the assumed frontier threshold. In Appendix
2·7, we conduct an analogous exercise for proximity to the frontier line instead of
density.
Figure 2·4 provides a stark illustration of the qualitative differences in demo-
graphics and individualism in low density areas. Each graph shows the local linear
regression function and 95 percent confidence interval around g(·). In graph (a),
the sex ratio displays levels around 1.6 in the most sparsely populated counties
and declines sharply as population density rises to 3–4 people/mi2. The slope of
g(·) then abruptly flattens out as the sex ratio stabilizes at around 1.05–1.1 males for
every female. In graph (b), the prime-age adult share declines sharply as we move
towards density levels of 2–3 people/mi2 and then levels off. Graphs (c) and (d)
show similar downward-sloping albeit less sharply nonlinear shapes. However,
graphs (e) and (f) show stark nonlinear shapes for infrequent child name shares.
Appendix Figure 2·7 shows evidence of similar nonlinear patterns, though less
stark, when we consider proximity to the frontier instead of density.
Overall, the results in Figure 2·4 point to a structural break in demographics
and individualism at levels of population density consistent with the seemingly
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arbitrary cutoffs in the historical literature. In fact, using the Chow (1960) test,
we can easily reject the null hypothesis of a constant effect of population density
above and below 6 people/mi2 (the upper bound of frontier settlement according
to Porter et al., 1890), or above and below any cutoff in the 2–6 range. We can also
be agnostic about the relevant cutoff, using the Zivot and Andrews (2002) test to
identify unknown structural break points in each decade. In 1850, for example, we
find a break in the sex ratio at 2.7 people/mi2, the prime-age adult share at 2.0, and
infrequent names for boys (girls) at 3.2 (2.6).
2.4.3 Frontier Transitions: Event-Study Evidence
Building on the prior cross-sectional results, we now use time-series variation as
counties transition from frontier to established settlement. We estimate an event-
study analogue to equation (2.1):
xcdt = α +
40∑
j=−20
γj1(years since exiting frontier = j) + θd + θt + εcdt, (2.4)
where the γj coefficients identify the average x for counties that have exited or
will exit the frontier j years prior or in the future, respectively. We plot 95 percent
confidence intervals for the γ terms, each of which are estimated with reference to
the decade in which the county transitioned out of the frontier.
The estimates in Figure 2·5 provide additional insight into the process of de-
mographic and cultural change along the frontier. Panel (a) reveals an abrupt shift
in the sex ratio as counties exit the frontier. On average, counties have 0.25 higher
sex ratios in the two decades prior to exiting the frontier whereas those decades
thereafter exhibit lower ratios that stabilize by the second decade. Panel (b) pro-
vides similar evidence of convergence towards a lower prime-age adult share as
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counties exit the frontier. Panel (c) shows that the foreign-born population share
exhibits a steady and roughly linear decline along the frontier transition path. Re-
sults are noisier for illiteracy rates in panel (d).
Panels (e) and (f) demonstrate the declining prevalence of infrequent children’s
names as counties approach the decade in which they exit the frontier. Thereafter,
we see naming patterns stabilize around a less individualistic equilibrium in which
popular names becomes more common at the local level. However, as we show
next, the length of exposure to frontier culture in these early stages of settlement
has implications for differences in the prevalence of rugged individualism across
counties today.
2.5 Long-Run Effects of Frontier Experience on Culture
In this section, we examine the long-run effects of frontier experience on culture
and discuss their implications for modern political economy debates. We present
our empirical framework, discuss key data sources, and then move to our main
cross-county results
Our motivation stems from the theories of cultural persistence discussed in
Section 2.2.2. While the high levels of individualism on the frontier historically
could have dissipated, it is also possible that frontier experience shaped the long-
run evolution of local culture. The duration of exposure to frontier conditions
determined the scope for the mechanisms through which rugged individualism
came to thrive on the frontier, which we analyze in Section 2.6. In the presence of
multiple equilibria and path dependence, these early stages of cultural formation
would represent a critical juncture, and frontier experience could have a lasting
legacy.
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2.5.1 Estimating Equation
We relate historical frontier exposure to modern measures of individualism and
preferences for individuals in county c. In particular, our main county-level, cross-
sectional estimating equation is given by:
yc = α + β total frontier experiencec + x
′
cγ + θFE(c) + εc, (2.5)
where yc is some long-run outcome capturing cultural traits (e.g., individualism
or preferences for redistribution). Total frontier experience (TFE) is the amount of
time in decades a given county remained on the frontier according to our baseline
definition in Section 2.3.2. Our baseline sample, seen in Figure 2·3, is restricted to
those counties for which the 1790–1890 period contains the whole extent of fron-
tier experience as discussed in Section 2.3.2. In baseline specifications, the vector
xc comprises predetermined or fixed county-level covariates including latitude,
longitude, county area, average rainfall and temperature, elevation, potential agri-
cultural yield, and distance to rivers, lakes, and the coast (see Appendix 2.11 for
details). The θFE(c) term includes state fixed effects (FE) in the preferred speci-
fication. The coefficient β therefore identifies a local effect of TFE after account-
ing for geoclimatic factors that shape culture and also determined the duration of
frontier experience historically. Following the approach suggested by Bester et al.
(2011), standard errors in all specifications are clustered on 60-square-mile grid
cells that completely cover counties in our sample.24 When considering several
correlated outcomes, we also estimate mean effects based on the Kling et al. (2007)
24Inference remains unchanged when using the computationally more intensive Conley (1999) spa-
tial HAC estimator with a bandwidth of 150–300 km. We retain the arbitrary grid-cell approach
as it is considerably easier to implement and less prone to instabilities, which becomes important
with the sparser geographic coverage in some of the survey data.
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approach.25
The main threat to causal identification of β lies in omitted variables corre-
lated with both contemporary culture and TFE. We take many steps to address
this concern with the goal of isolating variation in TFE that influences modern
culture through the channels outlined in Section 2.2.2. First, in Section 2.5.5, we
add a richer set of controls to xc aimed at removing variation that may be asso-
ciated with confounding factors such as current population density. Second, we
use the Oster (2016) approach to show that unobservables are unlikely to drive our
results. Third, in Section 2.5.6, we pursue an instrumental variables (IV) strategy
that exploits variation in the speed of the frontier’s westward movement induced
by changes in the intensity of national immigration flows over time.
In Appendix 2.10.3, we revisit the Illinois counties of Cass and Johnson noted
in Section 2.3.2 to illustrate the link from historical TFE to contemporary political
economy. This case study also clarifies how our empirical strategy, robustness
checks, and IV approach help to isolate variation in TFE that is less confounded
with other drivers of long-run cultural differences.
2.5.2 Data on Contemporary Culture and Political Economy
We measure contemporary culture and policy outcomes using several data sources.
We draw upon three nationally representative surveys: the Cooperative Congres-
sional Election Study (CCES), the General Social Survey (GSS), and the American
National Election Study (ANES). These surveys are staples in the social science
25This takes a weighted average of the estimates of β for each of K related outcome variables (on
the same scale) with the weights equal to the inverse sample standard deviation of that variable
for a suitable control group. The choice of that control group affects the mean effect size but
not significance. Results are very similar across three alternative approaches, including the few
counties with zero frontier experience, those with less than a decade, and those with below the
median.
121
literature on political preferences and social norms, often asking different ques-
tions about similar underlying preferences. Their geographic coverage differs and
is quite narrow for the GSS and ANES. Appendix 2.11 describes each survey, dis-
cusses advantages and disadvantages, and also provides definitions and sample
coverage maps.
Additionally, for the full sample of counties, we observe infrequent names from
post-1890 Census rounds and two salient policy outcomes. First, we measure the
Republican vote share in recent presidential elections using data from Leip’s Atlas.
Second, we take estimates of property tax rates from the American Community
Survey in 2010 as prepared by the National Association of Home Builders. To-
gether, these local voting records and survey data allow us to paint a rich picture
of the persistent culture of rugged individualism in areas exposed to the frontier
for a longer time.
2.5.3 Total Frontier Experience and Persistent Individualism
We begin by documenting a long-run association between total frontier experience
(TFE) and contemporary individualism. Nearly five decades after the closing of the
frontier, infrequent children’s names are more pervasive in counties with greater
TFE. In Table 2.2, we report the effect of TFE on the share of white boys (Panel A)
and girls (Panel B) age 0–10 given infrequent names in the 1930s. The data come
from the full count 1940 Census and capture naming choices multiple generations
after counties exited the frontier.26 Our baseline measure of infrequent names con-
siders those outside the top 10 within the county’s Census division. In the average
26Ideally, we could carry these results through to the contemporary period, but, unfortunately,
the 1940 Census is the latest round that provides information on names. Although the Social
Security Administration releases baby name counts by state, it does not do so at the county level
as required for our empirical strategy.
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county, 72 percent of boys and 79 percent of girls have infrequent names with stan-
dard deviations of 0.07 and 0.04, respectively. We normalize these variables so that
standard deviation effect sizes can be read directly from the coefficients.
The most demanding OLS specification in column 4 of Table 2.2 suggests that
each additional decade of TFE is associated with 0.11 (0.16) standard deviations
higher share of infrequent names for boys and girls, respectively. Comparing coun-
ties across the interquartile range of TFE (11 vs. 24 years) implies 1.4 (1.1) percent
more boys (girls) with infrequent names. We build up to this result by expanding
the set of control variables, starting in column 1 with no controls. Columns 2 and 3
add Census division and state fixed effects, respectively, to rule out broad regional
differences in TFE and culture. Our main specification in column 4 includes the
full set of baseline geoclimatic controls. Comparing across columns 1–4, the co-
efficient remains relatively stable despite large changes in the R2. This pattern is
consistent with limited selection-on-unobservables according to the parameter δ
reported in the table; Oster (2016) suggests that |δ| > 1 implies limited scope for
unobservables to explain observational results.
Furthermore, these results are not sensitive to the particular measure of infre-
quent names or the national background of the parents assigning names. We doc-
ument this robustness in Appendix 2.10.4. After replicating the baseline result
in column 1, Appendix Table 2.14 restricts columns 2–4, respectively, to children
with native-born fathers, native-born parents, native-born grandparents. Together,
these help address concerns about immigrants having infrequent name preferences
and being more likely to settle in frontier areas historically.27 Column 5 defines in-
27The robustness to these alternative measures of ancestry is consistent with the rapid speed of
assimilation to American name choices reported in Abramitzky et al. (2016). They show that the
immigrant–native gap in Americanized name choice is halved within 20 years after parents arrive
in the U.S.
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frequent names based on the top 10 names nationally while columns 6 and 7 do
so at the state and county level, respectively. Columns 8 and 9 define infrequent
names as those outside the top 25 and top 100 names, respectively. Finally, column
10 restricts to non-biblical names to account for the fact that religiosity may be con-
founded with TFE and naming choices. Across measures, we see a similar effect of
TFE.
Together with the findings in Section 2.4, these results suggest that infrequent
name choices were not only more common in frontier areas historically but are
also more prevalent in the long run in areas with greater TFE. Indeed, the effect of
TFE on infrequent name choices can be seen in the early 1900s with little change
thereafter (see Appendix Table 2.16). This points to the persistence of the early
frontier culture of individualism long after frontier conditions abated.
In Appendix 2.10.4, we further validate the link between TFE and individual-
ism today using a well-suited measure from the ANES data in 1990. In particular,
greater TFE is associated with respondents identifying more strongly with self-
reliant as opposed to cooperative behaviors. We turn now to identify the closely
related link between frontier experience and opposition to government interven-
tion.
2.5.4 Total Frontier Experience and Opposition to Redistribution and Regula-
tion
This section identifies a long-run effect of total frontier experience (TFE) on con-
temporary political preferences. First, greater TFE is associated with opposition
to redistribution, preferences for limited government, and low levels of local tax-
ation. Second, these differences in preferences translate into stronger Republican
Party support today. Finally, we identify a link between TFE and opposition to
124
government regulations surrounding issues that were salient in frontier culture
historically. We view all of these outcomes as closely connected measures cap-
turing the same underlying opposition to government intervention. In all cases,
we report estimates of equation (2.5) controlling for the geoclimatic characteris-
tics used in column 4 of Table 2.2 as well as individual demographics (age, age
squared, gender, and race dummies) and survey wave fixed effects where relevant.
We continue finding supportive Oster (2016) tests for selection-on-unobservables
while other robustness checks and instrumental variables results are discussed in
Sections 2.5.5 and 2.5.6.
Redistribution and Limited Government. Table 2.3 shows that greater TFE is as-
sociated with stronger opposition to income redistribution today. In column 1, we
use ANES data from 1992 and 1996, which asks respondents whether they would
like to see “federal spending on poor people be increased, decreased (or cut en-
tirely) or kept about the same.” Around nine percent of individuals would like
to see such redistributive spending decreased. Each additional decade of TFE is
associated with one additional p.p. increase in support of cuts. Column 2 pro-
vides complementary evidence, showing that each decade of TFE is associated
with 0.7 p.p. higher support for cutting state spending on welfare as reported in
the CCES. Following Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), column 3 uses a measure from
the GSS indicating the intensity of preferences for redistribution on a scale from
1 to 7 (with 1 being that the government should not be engaged in redistribution
and 7 being that the government should reduce income differences through redis-
tribution). Each additional decade of TFE is associated with around 0.02 standard
deviations lower support for redistribution. These effect sizes are akin to a 5–10
year age gap in preferences among respondents, with older respondents more in
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favor of welfare spending cuts, reflecting well-known cohort differences.
Turning to other measures, columns 4 and 5 show that residents of areas with
greater TFE exhibit stronger fiscal conservatism. Column 4 uses a CCES question
on whether individuals would prefer to cut domestic spending or to raise taxes to
balance the federal budget. Column 5 uses an index based on the principal com-
ponents of a set of questions from the GSS on whether the government spends too
much on an array of public goods and social transfers. In both cases, we find that
individuals are significantly more opposed to high levels of government spending
in areas with greater TFE. The Kling et al. (2007) mean effects analysis yields sim-
ilar insights. For example, combining the CCES measures in columns 2 and 4 into
a single index yields a statistically significant effect of around 0.02.
Finally, column 6 of Table 2.3 shows that these reported preferences line up
with actual policy differences across counties. In particular, each decade of TFE
is associated with around 3.4 percent lower reported property tax rates, which
range from 0.1 to 2.9 percent across counties in our study. Given that much of the
variation in tax rates lies across rather than within states, this is not a small effect.
In fact, it is roughly akin to the within-state difference between counties that are 10
percent more versus less aligned with the Republican Party, a policy outcome we
consider next.
Party Identification. We show in Table 2.4 that the persistent effects of TFE have
strong implications for the growing strength of the Republican Party. Republican
Party platforms have been increasingly associated with broad opposition to gov-
ernment intervention and aversion to redistribution. As a baseline, we consider
the average vote share across the five elections since 2000. Column 1 shows that
each decade of TFE is associated with around a 2 p.p. greater Republican vote
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share relative to the mean of 60 percent. This effect size is plausible and in line
with individual-level regressions using degree of stated support for the Republi-
can Party in the CCES.28 For perspective, the 2 p.p. effect is roughly the difference
in population-weighted, average county-level vote shares in Iowa (48.4 percent)
and Wisconsin (46.3 percent) over these five elections. This average effect across
the 2000s masks an interesting ratcheting up over time as seen in columns 2–6. An
additional decade of TFE is associated with a significantly higher Republican vote
share in each subsequent election, based on cross-equation tests of relative effect
sizes.
Columns 7 and 8 then provide marked evidence of the relatively larger shift
towards the Republican Party in areas with greater TFE. The average heartland
county in our long-run analysis exhibits a 9 p.p. shift towards Republican candi-
dates from 2000 to 2016. Each decade of TFE is associated with an additional 1.6
p.p. relative to that mean. Alternatively, comparing a county at the 25th percentile
of TFE (11 years) to a county at the 75th percentile of TFE (24 years), implies an
additional 2.2 p.p. Republican Party shift. As a benchmark, Autor et al. (2016) find
that an interquartile shift in exposure to import competition from China implies
a 1.7 p.p. Republican shift relative to a mean of -0.6 p.p. over the same period in
their full-country sample of commuting zones.29 A similarly large shift can be seen
in column 8, which shows the frontier effect on the differential between 2012 and
28Using the CCES 2007, 2012, and 2014 survey rounds, we construct an indicator equal to one if the
respondent identifies as a “strong Republican” on a seven point scale ranging from “strong Demo-
crat” to “strong Republican” with around 17 percent of individual–years reporting the latter. The
estimates imply that an additional decade of TFE is associated with around 4.5 percent greater
intensity of strong Republican support. As a benchmark, consider that with each additional year
of age, individuals are around 2 percent more likely to report strong Republican support.
29In a more direct comparison, we use the original data from Autor et al. (2013) and map the China
shock to our sample of counties. Estimating a single equation with both measures, we find that
the TFE effect is around one-quarter as large as the effect of the more proximate China shock,
though both remain statistically and economically significant.
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2016. These findings offer suggestive evidence of a potential link between frontier
culture and the growing strength of the Republican Party in certain areas of the
American heartland.
In sum, Table 2.4 suggests relatively more conservative voting preferences in
areas that were part of the frontier for a longer duration in the 19th century. While
people vote Republican for many reasons, one recurring theme in recent years is
the view that government should not be too heavily relied upon and hence gov-
ernment should be small. Some of these views bear an interesting similarity to
the individualistic norms described in historical narratives of the frontier. It is in
this respect that we view these voting outcomes as reflecting preferences shaped
by frontier culture whether by way of motivated beliefs or other mechanisms dis-
cussed in Section 2.2.2.
Using the CCES, we provide further insight into why TFE may be associated
with increasing Republican Party support today. In Table 2.5, we relate TFE to
measures of opposition to (1) the Affordable Care Act (ACA or “Obamacare”), (2)
increases in the minimum wage, (3) the ban on assault rifles, and (4) Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) regulations on pollution. These policy issues have been
sharply contentious, with the two parties adopting increasingly polarized posi-
tions. Moreover, they can be connected to norms and beliefs pervasive on the fron-
tier in terms of the link between effort and reward (ACA and minimum wage), the
right to bear arms (ban on assault rifles), and the salience of manifest destiny (EPA
regulations). The results in Table 2.5 show that places with greater TFE display
significantly stronger opposition to each of these government regulations. Com-
bining all estimates into a single index implies a mean effect size of around 0.04
that is significant at the 1 percent level. Moreover, as shown in Appendix 2.10.5,
these results are also robust to controlling for individual-level education, family
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income, and reported strength of party identification.
Summary of Results. Overall, the findings in Tables 2.3–2.5 paint a rich picture
of the cultural and political legacy of historical frontier exposure. It is plausible
that the early settlers left a lasting imprint on frontier locations and that the degree
of that imprint increased with duration of exposure. As a summary takeaway, the
Kling et al. (2007) mean effect on individualism (infrequent name share), conser-
vative political preferences (Republican vote share) and policy (property tax rate)
suggests that each decade of TFE is associated with roughly 0.15 standard devia-
tions more frontier culture today.
Moreover, in connecting these outcomes to define a culture of “rugged individ-
ualism,” it is important to note that infrequent name shares (in 1940) are strongly
associated with greater Republican vote shares and lower property tax rates to-
day.30 In other words, the estimated effects in Table 2.2 are identified off of a sim-
ilar set of counties as in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, again pointing to the close connection
between individualism and opposition to redistribution.
2.5.5 Further Analysis and Robustness Checks
We report here several results that demonstrate the robustness of our key findings
and interpretation. In Table 2.6, we expand our sample to include the secondary
frontier on the West Coast, we measure TFE through 1950, and we show results
separately by major Census region.31 In Tables 2.7 and Table 2.8, we account for a
battery of potential confounders, including present-day population density, min-
30Conditional on state fixed effects, a one standard deviation increase in (average male and female)
infrequent name shares in 1940 is associated with 0.3 greater (0.23 lower) standard deviations of
Republican vote shares (property tax rates).
31Appendix 2.10.7 shows robustness to a battery of alternative ways of measuring TFE by varying
the density and proximity cutoffs as well as the treatment of small pockets of dense (sparse)
settlement beyond (inside) the main frontier line.
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eral resource abundance, historical access to railroads, population diversity and
slavery. Tables 2.6-2.8 focus on the key outcomes of infrequent names, property
taxes, and Republican voting. Appendix 2.10.8 reports these checks for the other
survey-based outcomes. Although we include controls that may be outcomes of
frontier experience and hence “bad controls,” robustness to their inclusion rules
out some long-run channels. In Table 2.9, we analyze racial differences to help
sharpen our interpretation of the long-run effects of TFE. We conclude by consid-
ering placebo outcomes.
Adding West Coast, Extended Time Frame, Regional Heterogeneity. We start in
Table 2.6 by adding West Coast frontier counties to our sample. These 105 counties
were settled starting in the mid-19th century and were located to the west of the
major frontier line on the West Coast in 1890 (the year in which the Census declared
the frontier closed). As shown in column 1, for all key outcomes, the estimated
effects of TFE remain significant, with very similar magnitudes.
Then, we split the sample by Census region and show that the effects of TFE
hold separately in the Midwest (column 2), the South (column 3), and the West
(column 4).32 The coefficient estimates are generally largest in the Midwest and
smallest in the West. The relatively noisier estimates for the West are due to the
small sample size (152 counties) as seen in subsequent columns 6–8 that extend the
frontier time period through 1950, incorporating counties that experienced frontier
conditions beyond 1890. Here, the effects of TFE are economically and statistically
significant across all regions.
32There are four Census regions: Northeast, South, Midwest, and West. We do not consider the
Northeast as there are too few counties in this region (66 east of the 1790 frontier line) for credible
within-state regression analysis. Note that our baseline sample includes 47 counties in Colorado,
New Mexico, and Wyoming in the West region (see Figure 2·3) but not on the West Coast frontier
as used in column 1 of Table 2.6.
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At first glance, the stability across regions may seem puzzling insomuch as the
West region on average exhibits more collectivism and less opposition to redistri-
bution.33 However, our empirical strategy isolates the effects of TFE within-region
and, moreover, within-state. That is, counties within California with greater TFE
exhibit more prevalent individualism and opposition to redistribution compared
to counties within California with lower TFE. If anything, the similar results across
regions is reassuring and suggests that our findings capture a specific cultural
legacy of settlement history, a point we further substantiate in subsequent tables.
Finally, note in columns 5–8 that the extended 1950 sample delivers estimated
effects of TFE that are somewhat smaller in magnitude than the baseline 1890 sam-
ple. This could reflect that in the 20th century, transcontinental railroads and im-
proved communications made frontier locations less isolated than were histori-
cally. According to Lang et al. (1995), “the modern-day [post-1890] frontier is not
the nineteenth-century one. It is smaller, more law-abiding and regulated, less iso-
lated, less rugged, and less dangerous.” Moreover, these authors note that “the
frontier has not for generations been the dream of those who seek a fortune or a
new life.”34 Together, these factors may imply more limited scope for the mecha-
nisms generating and amplifying frontier culture during early stages of settlement.
Disentangling Population Density. Contemporary population density is a key
potential confounder of the effects of TFE. Population density can be very persis-
tent (Bleakley and Lin, 2012). Places with low TFE may display different cultural
and political attributes simply because they are sparsely populated today. For ex-
33The large effects of TFE in the South may also seem surprising given the legacy of slavery. We
address this issue below.
34Going further, the “nineteenth-century frontier was a dynamic settlement process” whereas the
“twentieth century frontier is a more static place.” It is this dynamic process that most concerned
Turner and which forms the core of our analysis.
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ample, as is well-known, there is a large rural–urban divide in Republican vote
shares.
We take several steps in Table 2.7 to disentangle the effects of frontier settle-
ment history from those of present-day population density. Column 1 displays the
baseline estimates for each of our key outcomes. Column 2 controls for population
density in 1890, the final year of the frontier era. Column 3 implements a flexible
specification including dummies for each decile of within-state population density
in 1890. Column 4 controls for population density measured contemporaneously
with the outcome variable. Column 5 repeats the decile-specific fixed effects ap-
proach for contemporary density. All specifications include state fixed effects and
our baseline geographic and agroclimatic controls. The flexible specifications of
density are very demanding, leaving limited variation to identify our coefficient
of interest. Nevertheless, statistical and economic significance remain for all out-
comes. The same holds for alternative specifications relying on polynomials or
splines of population density. This suggests that modern preferences were shaped
by the history of frontier settlement through channels other than simply persis-
tently low population density.35
The remaining columns of Table 2.7 further clarify that the long-run effects of
TFE are driven by the history of frontier settlement rather than the history and
persistence of low or high density. Columns 6 and 7 show that TFE has similar
effects in urban and rural areas, splitting the sample into counties above and be-
low the 90th percentile of urban population shares, respectively. Finally, column 8
35While TFE and modern density are indeed highly correlated, the latter may have independent
effects or capture a mechanism through which TFE affects outcomes today. For example, high
TFE locations with greater individualism and less redistribution (and thus low provision of pub-
lic goods) may have been unattractive and thus grew slowly over the last century. This might
have discouraged outsiders with different cultural traits from moving into such areas in the post-
frontier period.
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separates out the history of low density—the number of decades with density be-
low 6 people/mi2—from the measure of total frontier experience. Recall that this
was one of the defining features of frontier locations, proximity to the frontier line
being the other. The coefficient on TFE remains significant, indicating that both
dimensions of the history of frontier experience are important. In sum, the effects
of TFE go above and beyond the correlated effects of present-day and historical
low population density.
Additional Controls. While our baseline regressions include spatial fixed effects
and an array of geoclimatic controls, there are of course other factors that may be
correlated with TFE and contemporary culture. We address this concern in part by
including a number of additional controls in Table 2.8.36
Column 1 reports once again our baseline estimates. Columns 2–5 add, one at
a time, four geoclimatic features whose importance has been emphasized in pre-
vious work: ruggedness (Nunn and Puga, 2012a), rainfall risk (Ager and Ciccone,
ming; Davis, 2016), distance to portage sites (Bleakley and Lin, 2012), and distance
to mines. The latter seems likely to generate a downward bias in our estimates,
as Couttenier and Sangnier (2015) show that across U.S. states opposition to redis-
tribution is associated with mineral abundance (which in turn is likely to reduce
TFE by leading to more rapid settlement). In all cases, though, the point estimates
remain nearly identical.
We also consider a number of other controls. Column 6 adds distance to the
nearest Indian battle site. Conflict with Native Americans probably increased TFE
and plausibly affected preferences. Columns 7 adds the prevalence of slavery (in
1860, just before the Civil War), another potential confounder. Column 8 adds the
36See Appendix Table 2.19 for the full elaboration of coefficients.
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sex ratio, which was systematically higher in the frontier and could by itself be a
force shaping long-run cultural outcomes (see Grosjean and Khattar, ming).
Columns 9–11 add additional demographic variables: the share of migrants in
the population, the share of Scottish and Irish migrants (which have been associ-
ated with higher levels of violence, as shown by Grosjean, 2014), and a measure of
birthplace diversity. We measure all of these in 1890, the endpoint of the frontier
period.37
Column 12 controls for the number of years that each location was connected
to the railroad network (until 1890), which is likely to reduce TFE and may also
affect attitudes toward government intervention. Column 13 adds the share of
the population employed in manufacturing (in 1890), a basic measure of economic
development. In column 14, we include all the additional controls in the same re-
gression. Throughout Table 2.8, the estimated effects of TFE remain significant and
relatively stable despite the substantial added explanatory power of the additional
controls. Finally, note that adding controls for population density (as in Table 2.7)
leaves the results in column 14 largely unchanged.
Racial Differences. To shed further light on the link between historical frontier
experience and modern preferences, we show that there are stark differences in the
long-run effects of TFE by race. We saw in Table 2.6 that TFE has large effects on
Republican vote shares in the South (Census region), but in Table 2.8, controlling
for the slave share in the 1860 county population reduced the average long-run
effect for the full sample. Table 2.9 offers some insight into these results. We find
precise null effects of TFE for African American respondents across the six mea-
sures of opposition to redistribution and regulation in the CCES. Moreover, while
37We also tried analogous controls usign the average values over the 1820–1890 period and obtained
similar results.
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non-whites (i.e., blacks and others) generally exhibit weaker opposition to govern-
ment intervention, it is only the black population for whom we find null effects.
These results lend support to our interpretation of the long-lasting effects of
frontier experience on culture and political preferences. Most of today’s black pop-
ulation in the U.S. can trace their familial roots to slavery. Given the extreme barri-
ers to geographic and socioeconomic mobility faced by slaves and their postbellum
descendants, the mechanisms linking frontier experience to modern outcomes (see
Section 2.2.2) would have been largely irrelevant to blacks living in high TFE re-
gions.38
These racial differences in the effects of TFE are connected to the possibility that
racial resentment by whites may explain some of our findings on opposition to re-
distribution and shifts in voting patterns across the United States. Indeed, part of
that resentment may be linked to beliefs—accurate or not—about the role of effort
versus luck in generating income (e.g., pertaining to views of affirmative action
and welfare programs). Using measures from the CCES, we find a significant as-
sociation between this type of racial resentment and TFE, but it does not survive
controlling for contemporary population density, thus pointing to an urban–rural
divide rather than a high TFE–low TFE divide.39 This stands in contrast to the
38The results in Table 2.9 are driven largely by the South. When splitting the sample into the South
and non-South Census regions, we find more muted and in some cases no differences in the ef-
fects of TFE between black and non-black respondents. This may be due in part to the selective
migration of blacks out of the South and into frontier areas in the late 1800s. While still sub-
ject to different barriers to upward mobility than whites, such self-selected black migrants were
arguably more exposed to the influence of frontier conditions than those remaining in the post-
bellum South. See Billington and Hardaway (1998) for a rich exploration of African Americans
on the frontier.
39The 2010, 2012, and 2014 rounds of the CCES make two statements about racial resentment and
ask respondents to state their degree of agreement on a scale from strongly agree to strongly
disagree: (i) “The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked
their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.” (64 percent somewhat
or strongly agree), and (ii) “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions
that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.” (51 percent somewhat
or strongly disagree). While TFE exhibits a significant positive association with both measures
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robustness of the association of TFE with our key outcomes of interest.
Placebo Outcomes. While frontier experience affects many cultural traits, pref-
erences over certain policies do not have a clear connection with historical frontier
experience. For illustration, we consider preferences over a few foreign policy is-
sues as placebo outcomes: support for U.S. military intervention abroad in the case
of genocide or civil war (35 percent in the CCES), opposition to the Iran sanctions
regime (20 percent), and opposition to the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (45
percent). Estimating our baseline specification, we find relatively precise null ef-
fects of TFE on these three measures (-0.004, -0.003, and 0.003, respectively).
2.5.6 Instrumental Variable Strategy
Despite the battery of robustness checks, omitted variables remain a concern. This
section introduces an instrumental variables (IV) strategy that isolates external
variation in TFE, beyond what can be explained by geoclimatic controls. We ex-
ploit time series variation in the intensity of immigration inflows to the U.S. Our
approach ensures that key results are driven by historical variation in local TFE
associated with national population shocks.
Immigrants contributed to westward expansion by exerting population pres-
sure on the Eastern seaboard and by going west themselves. Appendix 2.10.9 doc-
uments the connection between the intensity of migrant inflows and the speed of
westward expansion. For a given location, TFE partly reflects the speed of west-
ward movement at the national level during the relevant time frame. To construct
the instrument, we determine the first year in which each county is within 110 km
in our baseline regression (0.010** and 0.012***, respectively), controlling for 2010 population
density, as in column 3 of Table 2.7, renders the estimates null and insignificant (0.001 and 0.004,
respectively).
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of the frontier line. At this time, the county’s local conditions do not affect the con-
temporaneous process of westward expansion, but the moving frontier is getting
close. We then consider the average annual immigrant inflow (in logs) in the next
30 years.40
An important identifying assumption is that the intensity of immigrant flows
to the U.S. is unaffected by the conditions of any given frontier county. This would
not hold if, for example, Europeans’ migration decisions in a given period were
influenced by knowledge of frontier locations (e.g., their levels of land productiv-
ity). To address this concern, we aim to eliminate potential pull factors and isolate
push factors unrelated to conditions on the frontier. Following Nunn et al. (2017),
we predict migrant outflows from Europe based on climate shocks, and use these
predictions to construct an alternative version of the instrument. Appendix 2.10.9
provides full details.
Table 2.10 presents IV estimates for the same four primary outcomes as in Table
2.6.41 In Panel A, we find large and statistically significant effects of TFE that are
slightly larger but generally indistinguishable from the OLS estimates.42 Panel
B shows similar results when using predicted rather than actual migrant flows
in the IV construction. Both instruments are quite strong (see Appendix Table
2.24 for the first stage). Overall, the IV exercises strengthen our understanding
of the identifying variation linking frontier experience to modern culture. While
the shocks underlying the IV may not be perfectly excludable, they do generate
external variation in TFE and move us closer to a causal interpretation.
40We choose this window as a baseline because nearly 85 percent of counties exit the frontier within
that time. Results are similar for other time windows.
41The alternative measures of infrequent names are also robust to the IV approach (see Appendix
Table 2.15).
42The slightly larger effect sizes in the IV could be due to measurement error or a local average
treatment effect arising from the instrument isolating variation in TFE that is more closely linked
to the mechanisms we explore in the following section.
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2.6 The Roots of Frontier Culture
This section explores mechanisms through which the frontier shaped a culture of
individualism and opposition to government intervention. Section 2.6.1 shows
that there was significant selective migration of individualistic types to the fron-
tier, though not all of the differential individualism on the frontier can be explained
by selection.43 We then document empirical patterns consistent with frontier con-
ditions shaping people’s values and behavior. Section 2.6.2 shows that individ-
ualism was differentially rewarded on the frontier, which may have fostered the
prevalence of this trait over time. Section 2.6.3 shows that frontier conditions im-
plied favorable prospects of upward mobility and a large perceived importance of
effort in income generation, which would hone opposition to redistribution.44
The results presented here are meant to be suggestive rather than conclusive.
We do not try to disentangle the quantitative importance of the different mecha-
nisms, which we view as complementary and mutually reinforcing. For instance,
a greater adaptive advantage of individualism on the frontier would induce more
(less) selective migration (outmigration) of individualists. And conversely, selec-
tive migration of individualists to the frontier would likely increase the advantage
of this trait, insofar as conformity to group norms would be of limited value in a
society of individualists. In addition, the greater the advantage of individualism
in the frontier, the more favorable their upward mobility prospects, which would
43While emphasizing the implications of selective migration of individualists for frontier culture,
selection on other attributes might have been important as well. For example, selective migration
of men, reflected in the high sex ratios seen in Section 2.4, might have also contributed to rugged
individualism as men may be less inclined toward cooperation and interdependence (Cross and
Madson, 1997; Gabriel and Gardner, 1999) and more opposed to redistribution (Ashok et al.,
2015). In a recent contribution, Grosjean and Khattar (ming) establish the long-run effects of his-
torical male-biased sex ratios on gender norms and female labor force participation in Australia.
44In Appendix 2.10.10, we consider another potential mechanism, the prevalence of infectious dis-
eases, and show that the evidence does not support its relevance in explaining differential indi-
vidualism on the frontier.
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feed into opposition to redistribution. And if this shaped local institutions and the
provision of public goods, it could further reinforce selective migration of individ-
ualists over time.
Once frontier culture put down roots, it may have persisted through various
mechanisms, even if the distinctive features of frontier settlement were long gone.
Initial conditions can determine the long-run equilibrium through the dynamics of
intergenerational cultural transmission. Moreover, since the frontier shaped cul-
ture at the earliest stages, it was bound to influence the formation of local institu-
tions and social identity, which likely affected the subsequent evolution of cultural
traits.
2.6.1 Selective Migration
This section investigates the role of selective migration in explaining the perva-
siveness of individualism on the frontier. Our basic strategy is to distinguish the
relative contributions of early versus later frontier settlers to the overall differ-
ential in individualistic naming patterns. The key intuition is that because the
latter have lived in the given location for a longer period of time, local condi-
tions have a greater scope for affecting their preferences by the time we observe
them. To estimate selection patterns, we need to track households across time.
For this purpose, we use full count data from the 1870 and 1880 Censuses pro-
vided by ancestry.com and the North American Population Project or NAPP
(Sobek et al., 2017), respectively. We focus on the latest consecutive rounds avail-
able within the frontier period to ensure a large sample. The data include location,
names, and demographics. We link individuals across rounds using an algorithm
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developed by Feigenbaum (2016).45
Table 2.11 reports estimates of the frontier differential in infrequent naming
patterns based on versions of the following equation for different sub-populations
of movers and stayers:
child has infrequent nameic,1880 = α + β frontierc,1880 + x
′
icζ + εic,1880, (2.6)
where the binary dependent variable equals one if child i residing in county c in
1880 has a name that falls outside the top 10 nationally in that decade, and the
frontier indicator equals one if county c lies on the frontier according to our base-
line definition. We restrict attention to white children aged 0–10 with native-born
parents and cluster standard errors at the county level. The xic vector includes
age×gender and birth order fixed effects as well as indicators for whether the par-
ents have infrequent names, but results are identical without these controls.
Column 1 of Table 2.11 identifies the significance of selective migration. Chil-
dren in households that migrated to the frontier between 1870 and 1880 are 4.2 p.p.
more likely to have infrequent names than those remaining in non-frontier areas
during that period, 71 percent of whom have infrequent names. While we do not
45The base sample in 1880 is restricted to male household heads, native-born, aged 30–50, white,
and who have at least one (biological) child aged 0–10. The target year is 1870. The set of poten-
tial matches for these men are first identified based on first and last name, birth state and birth
year. A random training sample is then drawn from among the potential matches and manually
trained. The importance of each match feature is quantified using a probit model, and used to
estimate a probability score for each link. A true match is defined as one with a sufficiently high
score both in absolute and relative terms. The match rate was 25 percent, which is comparable
with the rates achieved by recent studies linking records with broadly comparable data albeit
different target populations (e.g., 29 percent in Abramitzky et al., 2012; 26 percent in Collins and
Wanamaker, 2017; and 22 percent in Long and Ferrie, 2013). Although matching on names leaves
scope for sample selection, our core results in Tables 2.11 and 2.12 look similar when reweighting
using the inverse probability of being linked across Census rounds (following Bailey et al., 2017).
We estimate these probabilities using the same characteristics used for linking as well as an inter-
action of infrequent name status and frontier location in 1880. These interactions re-balance the
linked sample to account for differential missing-ness along our key variables of interest.
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observe whether these children were born before or after arriving on the frontier,
this differential points to the self-selection of individualist types.
Column 2 captures the overall frontier differential in individualism. Children
in frontier counties in 1880 are 7.5 p.p. more likely to have an infrequent name
relative to children in non-frontier locations. Next, we show that the longer-term
frontier residents (stayers) exhibit stronger individualism than recent arrivals from
other counties. Column 3 decomposes the 7.5 p.p. differential into differences com-
ing from early versus later frontier settlers. Early settlers in frontier counties are
nearly three times more likely to give their children infrequent names than those
that arrived more recently during the 1870s. Column 4 corroborates this differen-
tial, restricting the sample to those living in frontier counties in 1880. These results
suggest that greater time on the frontier is associated with more individualistic
naming patterns.
Overall, the findings in Table 2.11 provide suggestive evidence that selection
was significant does not fully explain the frontier differential in individualism. It
is of course still possible that selective migration before 1870, which cannot be ob-
served in this data, helps explain some of the differential.46 For example, pre-1870
frontier migrants may be more individualistic than post-1870 frontier migrants.
However, for this to fully explain the differences, the degree of differential selec-
tion would have to be nearly three times as large, which seems unlikely given that
both groups of individuals migrated when the county was characterized by fron-
tier conditions.
If the results instead suggested that selective migration explained all of the
frontier differential, it might seem that the presence of a frontier had no aggre-
46Abramitzky et al. (2014) make a similar selection argument about early versus later immigrants
to the U.S.
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gate implications for American culture. While the reallocation of people across the
country cannot change the national prevalence of individualism at a given point in
time, it may do so in the long-run because individualists arrived in frontier loca-
tions at a time when local culture and institutions were taking shape. By compar-
ison, individualists’ emigration from non-frontier regions arguably had more lim-
ited countervailing effects since those areas had already reached more advanced
stages of settlement.
If selective migration does not fully explain the frontier differential, as our re-
sults suggest, the implication is that frontier life reinforced and amplified the al-
ready individualistic tendencies of settlers. We now explore one potential expla-
nation for why: individualism had differential returns on the frontier.
2.6.2 The Adaptive Advantage of Individualism
The opportunities and threats faced by frontier settlers may have favored individ-
ualism through an adaptive mechanism. Because people on the frontier primarily
had to rely on themselves for protection and material progress, the independent,
self-reliant types would arguably have fared better (Kitayama et al., 2010).47 More-
over, frontier settlers faced novel agroclimatic conditions, and there was little local
knowledge about how best to approach the harsh and unfamiliar setting (see Bal-
tensperger, 1979; Libecap and Hansen, 2002; Shannon, 1977). Adherence to old
traditions and norms was less suited to the environment than non-conformism
and innovation, two traits associated with individualism.48
47This view can be framed within a notion of culture as decision-making rules-of-thumb used in
uncertain environments, as proposed by evolutionary anthropologists (Boyd and Richerson, 1985,
2005). In their models, a process of natural selection governed by the payoffs from different rules-
of-thumb determines which rule prevails.
48The connection between innovation and individualistic culture is discussed at length in Gorod-
nichenko and Roland (2012). In characterizing the traits of frontier populations, Turner (1893)
himself mentions individualism along with the “coarseness and strength combined with acute-
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This section presents evidence consistent with an adaptive advantage of indi-
vidualism in frontier conditions. Using data from the linked Census sample, we
show that households exhibiting greater individualism were more successful eco-
nomically and more likely to stay in frontier locations.
First, we estimate the relationship between father i’s economic status in county
c in 1880, yic,1880, and infrequent names according to the following difference-in-
difference type specification:
yic,1880 = α+β own infrequent namei+η(own infrequent namei×frontierc,1880)+ δ children infrequent namei+ζ(children infrequent namei×frontierc,1880)+θc+εic,
where β captures the hedonic returns to the father’s own infrequent name outside
the frontier and η the differential effect on the frontier. At the same time, δ captures
the association of infrequent name choices for children born during the 1870s and
the father’s economic well-being outside the frontier, and ζ the frontier differen-
tial. We restrict attention to white, native-born fathers that did not move between
counties from 1870 to 1880 and had at least one child in 1880. Again, we define
infrequent names as those outside the top 10 nationally, but other definitions yield
similar results.
We measure economic status yic using data on occupation from the 1880 Cen-
sus recorded in the linked sample. We consider the Duncan (1961) socioeconomic
index (sei) and the occupational score (occscore) provided by the NAPP. Both mea-
sures range from 0 to 100 and capture the income returns associated with occupa-
tions in the 1950 Census, and sei additionally captures education and occupational
prestige. These measures are widely used in the economic history literature and
capture broad differences in economic status across individuals (see Olivetti and
ness and inquisitiveness” and the “practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedients.”
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Paserman, 2015, for a discussion). Finally, we cluster standard errors at the county
level, and the county fixed effects, θc, account for all differences in outcomes com-
mon across individuals within the same county.
The estimates in Panel A of Table 2.12 provide evidence of differential returns
to individualism on the frontier. Across all specifications, fathers with infrequent
names outside the frontier exhibit socioeconomic status that is nearly 0.05 standard
deviations lower than fathers with more common names. This is roughly the typi-
cal difference between a farmer and a blacksmith or a blacksmith and a carpenter.49
This apparent economic penalty might be due to various types of discrimination or
other mechanisms favoring conformity. However, this penalty is more than offset
on the frontier where infrequent names exhibit a differentially positive association
with economic status. We find a similar differential for infrequent names of chil-
dren, which exhibit a positive correlation with father’s status outside the frontier
and an even stronger positive correlation on the frontier. These results, which hold
for both sei and occscore, suggest that individualists are relatively better off on the
frontier.
In Appendix Table 2.26, we show that these differential hedonic returns arise
not only for levels but also for changes in socioeconomic status. The NAPP linked
sample for 1870–1880 allows us to investigate changes in occupational standing
for 1 percent of the entire population. We are constrained to this small subset of all
individuals in the prior analyses because the full county data for 1870 provided by
ancestry.com does not include occupational or socioeconomic status measures.
The results show that fathers with infrequent names exhibit significantly faster
growth in sei and occscore on the frontier but not outside the frontier. These results
and those in Table 2.12 are robust to allowing those in farming occupations to have
49A list of the top 10 occupations in frontier versus non-frontier counties is in Appendix Table 2.13.
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a different intercept (see Appendix Table 2.27).
In Panel B of Table 2.12, we provide a second piece of evidence consistent with
an individualist advantage on the frontier. We estimate the following equation
relating infrequent names to migration choices for household h living in frontier
county c in 1870:
outmigratehc = α + βf father has infrequent nameh
+βm mother has infrequent nameh + η any children with infrequent nameh
+θc + εhc,
where outmigratehc is a binary outcome indicating whether the household moved
from a frontier county in 1870 to a non-frontier county by 1880. The key explana-
tory variables are defined as above, with the mother’s infrequent name status de-
fined similarly. The results suggest that, within a given frontier county, households
in which fathers have infrequent names are around 4 percentage points less likely
to leave the frontier by 1880. This is a sizable magnitude given that 40 percent of
linked households in our sample left the frontier during this period.50 We observe
little relationship to mother’s names, but households with children with infrequent
names are also significantly less likely to leave the frontier.51
Overall, the findings in Table 2.12 suggest that inherited and revealed individ-
ualism are associated with a higher likelihood of socioeconomic success on the
frontier. This may explain the self-selection of individualists to the frontier as well
as the diffusion of individualistic traits after arrival. The adaptive value of indi-
50Appendix Table 2.28 shows that this migration accounts for most departures from frontier coun-
ties. The other direction of migration—from frontier counties to other frontier counties—is not
associated with infrequent names.
51Of course, this latter result is less straightforward to interpret as we do not observe the timing of
migration within the decade.
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vidualism probably favored its prevalence in frontier settlements not only through
selective immigration and emigration but also through other mechanisms includ-
ing differential fertility and survival, and various forms of cultural transmission.
2.6.3 Effort as the Road to Riches
This final section argues that the opportunities and challenges on the frontier con-
tributed to a culture of opposition to government intervention. The frontier’s
favorable prospects of upward mobility and a large perceived importance of ef-
fort in income generation may have fostered opposition to tax redistribution, as
suggested by the literature discussed in Section 2.2.2. This connection between
the American frontier and theories of preferences for redistribution, hinted at by
Alesina et al. (2001), echoes Billington (1974), who argued that the frontiersman
“wanted not government interference with his freedom as he followed the road to
riches.”
In his reading of the Turner thesis, Billington (1974) emphasizes the implica-
tions of the frontier’s land abundance and “widespread property holdings.” In
these conditions, “a man’s capacities, not his ancestry, determined his eventual
place in the hierarchy, to a greater degree than in older societies.” The frontiers-
man believed that “his own abilities would assure him a prosperous future as he
exploited the natural resources about him.” Access to land offered profit of op-
portunities, even for settlers with low initial wealth. Class distinctions were also
weakened by the ubiquity of threats characterizing frontier life. As Overmeyer
(1944) argues, since everyone “had to face the same hardships and dangers,” the
frontier was a “great leveling institution.”
Numerous historical studies present stylized facts consistent with the frontier
presenting both prospects for upward mobility and a large perceived importance
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of effort.52 As summarized by Stewart (2006), the frontier was “a place of economic
opportunity,” where settlers had low levels of initial wealth, but land-holding was
widespread and rates of wealth accumulation were high, especially for early set-
tlers and those that were able to endure.
Indeed, as shown in Appendix Figure 2·8, historical Census data on landhold-
ings is consistent with the idea that frontier locations offered a more level playing
field. Land inequality, captured by the Gini coefficient, was significantly lower on
the frontier, with a pattern resembling what we documented for key demographics
and individualism in Section 2.4. Moreover, this difference dissipated over time as
counties exited the frontier and the usual forces giving rise to inequality took hold.
In sum, the stylized facts summarized above suggest a relatively limited role
for inherited social class as a key determinant of income and wealth generation in
the frontier economy. This implied a level playing field offering equality of oppor-
tunity, and a relatively high importance of effort as opposed to luck (of being born
into a given class). Together with the selection and cultivation of individualism,
these conditions plausibly contributed to the origins and persistence of frontier
culture.
2.7 Discussion
This paper provides new evidence on the historical and long-run effects of the
American frontier on culture at the subnational level. Historically, frontier loca-
tions exhibited starkly different demographics and a higher prevalence of individ-
ualism as reflected in name choices for children. Today, counties that remained on
the frontier for a longer period historically exhibit stronger opposition to govern-
52See Curti (1959), Galenson and Pope (1989), Gregson (1996), Kearl et al. (1980), and Schaefer
(1987).
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ment intervention in the form of redistribution, taxation and various regulations.
Guided by the historical record and insights from social psychology and political
economy, we offer empirical evidence on the origins of frontier culture, identifying
the importance of selective migration, the adaptive advantage of self-reliance, and
expectations of high income growth through effort.
The results shed new light on the roots and persistence of rugged individu-
alism in the United States. We provide some of the first systematic evidence on
a prominent theme in American history and lend credence to some elements of
Turner’s famous thesis. Our method for locating and tracking the frontier histori-
cally should prove useful in other attempts to understand the legacy of the frontier.
Our findings have suggestive implications about the sharp contrast between
the U.S. and Europe in terms of preferences for redistribution and redistributive
policies, a recurring topic in the literature (e.g., Alesina et al., 2001; Alesina and
Glaeser, 2004; Alesina et al., 2012; Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006). According to Turner,
initially “the Atlantic coast . . . was the frontier of Europe,” but subsequently “the
advance of the frontier . . . meant a steady movement away from the influence of
Europe,” as “moving westward, the frontier became more and more American.”
Intuitively, as settlers of European origin shed their former culture and embraced
rugged individualism across the U.S., America as a whole became more and more
different from Europe.
The results also offer new perspective on contemporary political debates. The
deep roots of opposition to redistribution in the United States may explain why
their levels remain persistently high even in the face of sharply rising inequality.
Our findings suggest that expressions of stark opposition to government interven-
tion amidst growing political polarization may reflect not only a reaction to current
events but also a rekindling of long-standing elements of American culture. Ad-
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mittedly, since our study is based on subnational variation, extrapolation to the
national level is speculative.
The persistence of rugged individualism points to the relevance of critical junc-
tures. Early stages of settlement were formative for local culture and institutions,
so the frontier was bound to leave a long-lasting imprint. As the frontier moved
with time-varying speed, each location experienced frontier conditions in its early
history for a different amount of time, and in most cases for more than a few
years. Thus, the process of westward expansion created cross-sectional variation
in rugged individualism, and may have amplified its prevalence at the national
level.
Frontier settlement may have different effects in other countries. For instance,
Argentina and Russia also underwent massive territorial expansion in their early
history, but were ruled by elites that built very different institutions. In their anal-
ysis of how historical frontiers affected later democratic quality across countries
in the Americas, Garcı´a-Jimeno and Robinson (2011) show that the positive effects
of frontiers depend on the quality of initial institutions. The national institutions
of the United States, which favored relatively high levels of geographic mobility,
access to land, and security of property rights, may have been preconditions for
the operation of the mechanisms we emphasize.
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2.8 Figure
Figure 2·1: Population Density and the Frontier for Selected Years
Notes: Based on county-level data from National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 11.0. Population is allocated across
years and counties based on the procedure described in Section 2.3.1, which builds upon Hornbeck (2010). The red frontier line is based
on the algorithm described in Section 2.3.1 and Appendix 2.10.
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Figure 2·2: The Evolution of the Frontier, 1790 to 1890
Notes: The dark red lines correspond to the main frontier lines emerging form east-to-west expansions (our baseline analysis). The light
red lines correspond to the frontiers resulting from west-to-east expansions from the West Coast, which we examine for robustness.
In both cases, we exclude smaller “island frontiers” lines in the interior. Full details on the frontier line algorithm can be found in
Appendix 2.10.
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Figure 2·3: Total Frontier Experience, 1790 to 1890
(baseline sample lies between 1790 and 1890 main frontier lines, see Section 2.3.2 and notes
below)
Notes: Based on county-level data from National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 11.0. Total frontier experience is
the total number of years the county was within 100 km of the frontier line and its population density was below 6 people per square
mile, between 1790–1890. The white areas to the east of the 1790 main frontier line are counties for which we do not know frontier
history given the lack of Population Census data before 1790. The white areas to the west are beyond the 1890 frontier line and hence
not included in our baseline sample, which is confined to the frontier era as defined by Porter et al. (1890) in the Census Progress of the
Nation report. We include many of those counties to the west when extending the frontier era through 1950 for robustness.
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Figure 2·4: Demographics and Individualism by Population Den-
sity, 1790 to 1890
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Notes: These figures plot semiparametric estimates of equation (2.3) relating population density to demographic char-
acteristics prominent in historical accounts of the frontier (a-d) and proxies for individualism (e-f). We estimate these
curves g(·) based on the Robinson (1988) partially linear approach, pooling across all available years 1790–1890 for
each county c. The specification includes Census division and year fixed effects, which are partialled out before esti-
mating these shapes, and are based on an Epanechnikov kernel and rule-of-thumb bandwidth. The dashed lines are
95 percent confidence intervals. The estimates are recovered over all counties, but the figure zooms in on those with
less than 50 people/mi2 for presentational purposes. (a) Sex Ratio for whites is the ratio of the number of white males
over white females. (b) Prime-Age Adult Share is the fraction of whites aged 15–49 over the total number of whites. (c)
Foreign-Born Share is the ratio of foreign-born persons over total population. (d) Illiteracy is the illiteracy rate for whites
aged 20 or older. (e) and (f) Infrequent Names are the share of boys and girls, respectively, with names outside of the
top 10 most popular names in their Census division with the sample restricted to children aged 0–10 with native-born
parents.
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2.9 Tables
Table 2.1: Demographics and Individualism on the Frontier
Dependent Variable: Male/Female Prime-Age Foreign-Born Illiterate Share of Infrequent Child
Ratio Adult Share Share Share Girl Names Boy Names
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Baseline Frontier Definition: Low Density and Proximity to Frontier Line
frontier county 0.144*** 0.026*** 0.060*** -0.007 0.022*** 0.021***
(0.019) (0.004) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
Mean Dep. Var. in Non-Frontier Counties 1.09 0.46 0.07 0.18 0.66 0.58
Number of County-Years 9,628 5,508 10,826 2,779 6,873 6,874
R2 0.06 0.20 0.34 0.17 0.49 0.13
Panel B: Distinguishing Low Density and Proximity to Frontier Line
near frontier line 0.087*** 0.022*** 0.055*** -0.058*** 0.018*** 0.014*
(0.013) (0.003) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007)
low population density 0.097*** 0.005 0.032*** 0.055*** 0.005 0.010
(0.011) (0.003) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007)
Mean Dep. Var. in Non-Frontier Counties 1.09 0.46 0.07 0.18 0.66 0.58
Number of County-Years 9,628 5,508 10,826 2,779 6,873 6,874
R2 0.07 0.19 0.36 0.19 0.49 0.13
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of equations (2.1) and (2.2) in Panels A and B, respec-
tively. The dependent variables and sample are the same as in Figures 2·4 and 2·5. The sample
size varies across columns depending on availability in the given Census round. All variables,
except foreign-born share, are defined over the white population. Infrequent names capture
the share of boys and girls, respectively, with names outside of the top 10 most popular names
in their Census division with the sample restricted to children aged 0–10 with native-born par-
ents. Low population density equals one if the county has density less than 6 people per square
mile, and near frontier line equals one if the county is within 100 km of the frontier line in the
given year. The sample excludes counties to the east of the 1790 frontier line and west of the
main 1890 frontier line in keeping with our baseline long-run sample restrictions. All regres-
sions include year and Census division FE. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell
approach of Bester et al. (2011) as described in Section 2.5.1.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Figure 2·5: Demographics and Individualism Along the Transi-
tion out of the Frontier
Event Study Estimates with Respect to Year of Exiting the Frontier
(a) Sex Ratio
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-.02
0
.02
.04
.06
pr
im
e-
ag
e 
ad
ul
t s
ha
re
: e
ffe
ct
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 d
ec
ad
e 
of
 fr
on
tie
r e
xit
-20 -10 0 10 20 30 40
Year Before/After Leaving the Frontier
(c) Foreign-Born Share
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(d) Illiteracy
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(e) Infrequent Names: Boys
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(f) Infrequent Names: Girls
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Notes: This figure plots coefficients from the event study regressions in equation (2.4) for each
of the outcomes in the semiparametric regressions presented in Figure 2·4. The decade-specific
point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals are each with reference to the county-
specific decade of exiting the frontier. All regressions include division and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of Bester et al. (2011) as described in
Section 2.5.1.
155
Table 2.2: Total Frontier Experience and 20th Century Individu-
alism
Dep. Var.: Infrequent Names Among
White Children Aged 0-10 with
Native-Born Parents, 1940 Census
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Boys with Infrequent Names
(normalized share)
total frontier experience 0.220*** 0.134*** 0.112*** 0.112***
(0.034) (0.025) (0.026) (0.022)
Oster δ for β = 0 3.36 1.75 1.70
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
R2 0.06 0.48 0.54 0.61
Panel B: Girls with Infrequent Names
(normalized share)
total frontier experience 0.202*** 0.157*** 0.161*** 0.161***
(0.033) (0.028) (0.030) (0.024)
Oster δ for β = 0 5.12 3.35 3.42
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
R2 0.05 0.28 0.33 0.42
Division Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls No No No Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (2.5) for our leading proxy of individualism
in the 20th century, the share of boys and girls age 0–10 with infrequent names in the 1940
Census. The dependent variable is normalized so that the coefficient indicates the standard
deviation effect of each additional decade of frontier exposure historically. This baseline sam-
ple is based only on counties inside the 1790–1890 east-to-west frontier. The baseline measure
of infrequent names is given by the share of children with native-born parents in county c
with a name that falls outside the top 10 names for children with native-born parents born in
the same Census division within the given decade. Other measures of infrequent names are
considered in Appendix Table 2.14. Frontier experience is expressed in decades. Column 1 is
the simple bivariate regression. Columns 2 and 3 add Census division and state fixed effects,
respectively. Column 4 adds the following controls: county area; county centroid latitude and
longitude; distance to oceans, lakes and rivers from county centroid; mean county temperature
and rainfall; elevation; and average potential agricultural yield. Standard errors are clustered
based on the grid-cell approach of Bester et al. (2011) as detailed in Section 2.5.1. The Oster
(2016) tests in columns 2–4 are each with reference to the baseline specification in column 1
with no controls.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 2.3: Total Frontier Experience and Opposition to Government Intervention and Redis-
tribution
Dependent Variable: Prefers Cut Prefers Cut Believes Gov’t Prefers Reduce Index of County
Public Spending Public Spending Should Debt by Preferences for Property
on Poor on Welfare Redistribute Spending Cuts Spending Cuts Tax Rate, 2010
Scale: binary binary normalized binary normalized [0, 100]
Data Source: ANES CCES GSS CCES GSS ACS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
total frontier experience 0.010*** 0.007** -0.022* 0.014*** 0.028** -0.034***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002) (0.011) (0.007)
Oster δ for β = 0 5.59 6.86 5.79 2.40 2.28 1.67
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.09 0.40 0.00 0.41 -0.00 1.02
Number of Individuals 2,322 53,472 9,085 111,853 5,739 2,029
Number of Counties 95 1,863 255 1,963 253 2,029
R2 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.82
Survey Wave Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes –
Individual Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes –
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (2.5) for several measures capturing preferences for redistribution and state spending
as well as actual property tax rates. Total frontier experience is expressed in decades. Full details on the outcomes can be found in
Appendix 2.11. We use all available survey rounds with the given outcome, and in all cases, we restrict to those counties in our base-
line sample as described in the notes to Table 2.2. All columns are based on the specification in column 4 of Table 2.2 with additional
individual-level controls for age, age squared, gender, and race in columns 1–5. The ANES measure in column 1 equals one if the re-
spondent prefers that federal government spending on poor people be cut. The CCES measure in column 2 equals one if the respondent
would prefer to cut public spending on welfare programs. The GSS measure in column 3 is a normalized measure of intensity of support
on a 7 point scale of the statement that the government should reduce income differences in society through redistribution. The CCES
question in column 4 equals one if the household would prefer that the state budget be balanced through spending cuts rather than
tax increases. The GSS measure in column 5 is a normalized first principal component analysis (PCA) index based on a series of ques-
tions about whether the government spends too much on different public goods and transfer programs. The measure of county-level
property tax rates in column 6 is estimated from American Community Survey data from 2010. Combining estimates from different
columns and related outcomes across subsequent tables yields mean effects estimates based on the Kling et al. (2007) approach that
retain statistical and economic significance as discussed in Section 2.5.4. Standard errors are clustered based on the grid-cell approach
of Bester et al. (2011) as detailed in Section 2.5.1. The Oster (2016) tests are with reference to a baseline specification with no controls.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 2.4: Total Frontier Experience and Republican Vote Share
Dependent Variable: Republican Vote Share in Recent Presidential Election
2000–16 (Avg.) 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 ∆ ’16–’00 ∆ ’16–’12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
total frontier experience 2.055*** 1.215*** 1.580*** 1.979*** 2.329*** 3.171*** 1.956*** 0.842***
(0.349) (0.312) (0.327) (0.364) (0.390) (0.416) (0.265) (0.134)
Oster δ for β = 0 13.01 10.47 6.44 6.12 18.68 -24.08 -7.38 -3.65
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
Mean of Dependent Variable 60.0 56.6 60.3 57.4 60.6 65.4 8.9 4.9
R2 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.38 0.37 0.32 0.35 0.33
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (2.5) for measures of the county-level Republi-
can vote share in the last five presidential elections with data from the Leip Atlas. Total frontier
experience is expressed in decades. Column 1 averages across all five elections. Columns 2–6
report year-specific effects. The sample and measure of frontier experience are as described in
the notes to Table 2.2, and all estimates are based on the specification in column 4 from that ta-
ble. Cross-equation tests reveal that the effect sizes are statistically different in each subsequent
year and each year is statistically different from 2016. Standard errors are clustered based on
the grid-cell approach of Bester et al. (2011) as detailed in Section 2.5.1. The Oster (2016) tests
are with reference to a baseline specification with no controls.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 2.5: Total Frontier Experience and Preferences Over Con-
tentious Policy Issues
Dependent Variable: Opposes Opposes Increasing Opposes Banning Opposes Regulation
Affordable Care Act Minimum Wage Assault Rifles of CO2 Emissions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
total frontier experience 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.015*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
Oster δ for β = 0 2.96 3.05 2.46 2.22
Number of Individuals 29,446 5,134 29,404 29,215
Number of Counties 1,728 1,066 1,723 1,718
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.53 0.31 0.37 0.32
R2 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.08
Survey Wave Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (2.5) for four measures of support for conser-
vative issues that are particularly relevant to the frontier setting in historical accounts. Total
frontier experience is measured in decades. The dependent variables are all binary indicators
based on questions in the CCES across different years. The measure in Column 1 equals one
if the individual in 2014 believes that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) should be repealed, in
Column 2 equals one if the individual in 2007 opposes an increase in the minimum wage, in
Column 3 equals one if the individual in 2014 opposes a ban on assault rifles, and in Column
4 equals one if the individual in 2014 opposes regulation of pollution by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). The set of specifications are otherwise the same as in Table 2.3; see
the notes therein for details. Standard errors are clustered based on the grid-cell approach of
Bester et al. (2011) as detailed in Section 2.5.1. The Oster (2016) tests are with reference to a
baseline specification with no controls.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 2.6: Robustness (I): Adding West Coast, Extended Time Frame, Regional Heterogeneity
Frontier Time Frame: Baseline (1790–1890) Extended (1790–1950)
Regional Sample Restriction: Plus Only Only Only Extended Only Only Only
West Coast Midwest South West Sample Midwest South West
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Infrequent Name Share in 1940 (normalized), Boys
total frontier experience 0.111*** 0.236*** 0.111*** 0.113* 0.074*** 0.125*** 0.076*** 0.056***
(0.021) (0.044) (0.030) (0.059) (0.013) (0.035) (0.025) (0.018)
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
Panel B: Infrequent Name Share in 1940 (normalized), Girls
total frontier experience 0.156*** 0.220*** 0.162*** 0.108 0.092*** 0.108*** 0.096*** 0.083***
(0.023) (0.049) (0.029) (0.080) (0.016) (0.038) (0.027) (0.019)
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
Panel C: County Property Tax Rate in 2010
total frontier experience -0.031*** -0.051*** -0.027*** -0.006 -0.025*** -0.042*** -0.031*** -0.009**
(0.006) (0.014) (0.007) (0.013) (0.004) (0.012) (0.006) (0.004)
Mean of Dependent Variable 1.01 1.24 0.75 0.76 0.98 1.23 0.78 0.72
Panel D: Average Republican Vote Share over 2000-2016
total frontier experience 2.070*** 1.882*** 2.458*** 1.459 1.302*** 1.515*** 1.429*** 1.197***
(0.332) (0.414) (0.396) (0.890) (0.256) (0.350) (0.422) (0.274)
Mean of Dependent Variable 59.43 59.15 61.78 48.81 60.49 59.43 63.18 56.10
Number of Counties 2,141 987 936 152 2,500 1,038 1,074 322
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Focusing on four key outcomes across Panels A–D, this table extends our baseline sample of counties and examines region-
by-region sample splits. Column 1 adds 105 counties along the secondary West Coast frontier (see Figure 2·3). Column 2 restricts to
counties in the Midwest Census region, column 3 restricts to the South region, and column 4 restricts to the West, which includes the
105 counties added in column 1 plus 47 others in states in the West region but falling inside the 1890 main east-to-west frontier line.
Column 5 expands the column 1 sample to include counties beyond the (main and secondary) 1890 frontier lines but inside the eventual
frontier line realized by 1950. Columns 6–8 then proceed with the same region-by-region sample splits. Standard errors are clustered
based on the grid-cell approach of Bester et al. (2011) as detailed in Section 2.5.1.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 2.7: Robustness (II): Population Density and Urbanization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Population Density, 1890 X
Population Density Decile Within-State, 1890 X
Population Density, 1940/2010 X
Population Density Decile Within-State, 1940/2010 X
Sample Restriction None None None None None > 90th ≤ 90th None
percentile urban
pop. share, 1940/2010
Panel A: Infrequent Boy Name Share in 1940 (normalized)
total frontier experience 0.112*** 0.103*** 0.044* 0.101*** 0.063*** 0.099*** 0.072*** 0.069***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.032) (0.024) (0.025)
total low density experience 0.067***
(0.018)
Oster δ for β = 0 1.70 1.52 0.53 1.47 0.84 3.13 1.12 0.68
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,021 2,036 2,021 242 1,794 2,036
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
R2 0.61 0.62 0.67 0.62 0.67 0.85 0.60 0.62
Panel B: Infrequent Girl Name Share in 1940 (normalized)
total frontier experience 0.161*** 0.154*** 0.078*** 0.151*** 0.103*** 0.134*** 0.123*** 0.090***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.039) (0.026) (0.028)
total low density experience 0.113***
(0.022)
Oster δ for β = 0 3.42 3.09 1.20 3.02 1.82 2.49 2.95 1.03
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,021 2,036 2,021 242 1,794 2,036
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00
R2 0.42 0.43 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.73 0.40 0.44
Panel C: County Property Tax Rate in 2010
total frontier experience -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.010* -0.022* -0.014*** -0.028***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.008)
total low density experience -0.008
(0.005)
Oster δ for β = 0 1.67 1.55 0.82 1.01 0.58 2.17 0.85 1.00
Number of Counties 2,029 2,029 2,014 2,029 2,014 223 1,806 2,029
Mean of Dependent Variable 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.34 0.98 1.02
R2 0.82 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.90 0.86 0.82
Panel D: Republican Vote Share, Average 2000–16
total frontier experience 2.055*** 1.905*** 1.333*** 1.517*** 1.545*** 1.886* 1.490*** 1.255***
(0.349) (0.347) (0.353) (0.347) (0.351) (0.987) (0.353) (0.404)
total low density experience 1.256***
(0.290)
Oster δ for β = 0 13.01 8.89 2.61 4.40 3.46 3.71 11.16 2.06
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,021 2,036 2,021 223 1,813 2,036
Mean of Dependent Variable 60.04 60.04 60.11 60.04 60.11 49.73 61.30 60.04
R2 0.33 0.35 0.39 0.40 0.37 0.29 0.38 0.35
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table disentangles the effects of TFE from the effects of historical and contempo-
rary population density. Column 1 reproduces the baseline estimates for the four outcomes.
Column 2 and 3 control for historical population density and within state population density
deciles in 1890, the year the frontier closed according to the Census, respectively. Column 4
and 5 control for contemporary population density and within state population density deciles
in 1940 or 2010 depending on the outcome, respectively. Columns 6 and 7 split the sample into
counties above and below the 90th percentile of urban population shares in 2010. Column
8 controls for the total number of years that the country had population density less than 6
people/mi2 from 1790–1890. This is one of the components of total frontier experience, the
other being the total number of years that the county was within 100 km of the frontier line
during that period. Standard errors are clustered based on the grid-cell approach of Bester
et al. (2011) as detailed in Section 2.5.1. The Oster (2016) tests are with reference to a baseline
specification with no controls.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 2.8: Robustness (III): Additional Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Baseline controlling for. . .
ruggedness X X
rainfall risk X X
distance to nearest portage site X X
distance to nearest mine X X
distance to nearest Indian battle X X
slave population share, 1860 X X
sex ratio, 1890 X X
immigrant share, 1890 X X
Scottish and Irish immigrant share, 1890 X X
birthplace diversity, 1890 X X
years connected to railroad by 1890 X X
manufacturing employment share, 1890 X X
Panel A: Infrequent Boy Name Share in 1940 (normalized)
total frontier experience 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.109*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.114*** 0.080*** 0.112*** 0.105*** 0.079*** 0.099*** 0.072*** 0.120*** 0.065***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
Oster δ for β = 0 1.70 1.75 1.65 1.71 1.71 1.70 1.01 1.71 1.54 1.07 1.42 0.92 1.91 0.70
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
R2 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.67 0.62 0.65 0.66 0.74
Panel B: Infrequent Girl Name Share in 1940 (normalized)
total frontier experience 0.161*** 0.164*** 0.159*** 0.167*** 0.162*** 0.166*** 0.125*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.133*** 0.154*** 0.112*** 0.170*** 0.123***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022)
Oster δ for β = 0 3.42 3.56 3.28 3.56 3.44 3.45 2.05 3.44 3.32 2.44 3.06 1.84 3.87 1.78
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.47 0.43 0.48 0.47 0.58
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table augments the baseline specification, reproduced in column 1, with a set of controls aimed at clarifying potentially confounding channels by which TFE
affects four key outcomes. The variables are defined in Section 2.5.5 and at the end of Appendix 2.11, but we note here that the measure in column 5 is based on the
known mining sites pre-1890. Standard errors are clustered based on the grid-cell approach of Bester et al. (2011) as detailed in Section 2.5.1. The Oster (2016) tests are
with reference to a baseline specification with no controls.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Robustness (III): Additional Controls (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Baseline controlling for. . .
ruggedness X X
rainfall risk X X
distance to nearest portage site X X
distance to nearest mine X X
distance to nearest Indian battle X X
slave population share, 1860 X X
sex ratio, 1890 X X
immigrant share, 1890 X X
Scottish and Irish immigrant share, 1890 X X
birthplace diversity, 1890 X X
years connected to railroad by 1890 X X
manufacturing employment share, 1890 X X
Panel C: County Property Tax Rate in 2010
total frontier experience -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.023*** -0.036*** -0.023***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Oster δ for β = 0 1.67 1.72 1.71 1.58 1.69 1.60 1.52 1.67 1.36 1.32 1.33 1.10 1.93 1.07
Number of Counties 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029
Mean of Dependent Variable 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
R2 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.85
Panel D: Republican Vote Share, Average 2000–16
total frontier experience 2.055*** 2.050*** 2.115*** 2.095*** 2.055*** 2.172*** 1.399*** 2.060*** 1.715*** 1.717*** 1.689*** 1.640*** 2.137*** 0.931***
(0.349) (0.349) (0.338) (0.344) (0.350) (0.351) (0.361) (0.347) (0.328) (0.340) (0.327) (0.361) (0.350) (0.316)
Oster δ for β = 0 13.01 12.84 15.11 13.78 13.02 16.49 3.45 13.25 6.17 6.19 5.92 5.14 17.16 1.57
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
Mean of Dependent Variable 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04
R2 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.49
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table augments the baseline specification, reproduced in column 1, with a set of controls aimed at clarifying potentially confounding channels by which TFE
affects four key outcomes. The variables are defined in Section 2.5.5 and at the end of Appendix 2.11, but we note here that the measure in column 5 is based on the
known mining sites pre-1890. Standard errors are clustered based on the grid-cell approach of Bester et al. (2011) as detailed in Section 2.5.1. The Oster (2016) tests are
with reference to a baseline specification with no controls.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 2.9: Racial Differences in the Long-Run Effects of Frontier Experience
Dependent Variable: Prefers Cut Prefers Reduce Opposes Opposes Opposes Opposes
Public Spending Debt by Affordable Increasing Banning Regulation of
on Welfare Spending Cuts Care Act Minimum Wage Assault Rifles CO2 Emissions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
total frontier experience ×white 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
total frontier experience × black -0.008 -0.002 -0.000 0.005 -0.002 -0.008
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007)
total frontier experience × other 0.010 0.015** 0.014 0.009 0.019** 0.029***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008)
white 0.044*** 0.065*** 0.047*** -0.064** 0.006 0.046***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.032) (0.012) (0.015)
black -0.177*** -0.065*** -0.215*** -0.285*** -0.148*** -0.067***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.021) (0.038) (0.021) (0.025)
Number of Individuals 53,472 111,853 29,446 5,134 29,404 29,215
Number of Counties 1,863 1,963 1,728 1,066 1,723 1,718
TFE(black)=TFE(white), p-value 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.022 0.000
Mean of Dependent Variable, Whites 0.43 0.44 0.58 0.32 0.39 0.35
Share White Respondents 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.86 0.76 0.76
Share Black Respondents 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.11
Share Other Respondents 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.13 0.13
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table allows the effects of TFE to vary by (self-identified) race of respondents for the six CCES outcomes used in Tables 2.3
and 2.5. Standard errors are clustered based on the grid-cell approach of Bester et al. (2011) as detailed in Section 2.5.1.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 2.10: Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimates for Summary
Outcomes
Dependent Variable: Infrequent Name Share County Republican
normalized Property Vote Share
Boys Girls Tax Rate Avg.
1940 1940 2010 2000–16
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: IV = Log Average Actual
National Migration Inflows Over 30 Years
total frontier experience 0.207*** 0.207*** -0.045*** 3.407***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.014) (0.585)
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,029 2,036
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.00 0.00 1.02 60.04
First Stage F Statistic 193.64 193.64 194.13 193.64
Panel B: IV = Log Average Predicted
National Migration Inflows Over 30 Years
total frontier experience 0.239*** 0.235*** -0.049*** 3.177***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.014) (0.624)
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,029 2,036
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.00 0.00 1.02 60.04
First Stage F Statistic 195.84 195.84 196.31 195.84
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports instrumental variables estimates of equation (2.5) based on the in-
struments described in Section 2.5.6. We again report results for the four summary outcomes
examined in prior tables, and total frontier experience is measured in decades. Panel A reports
the IV estimates for the baseline sample and specification using the log of the average national
annual actual migration inflows over the 30 years since the frontier is within 110km from the
county centroid. Panel B reports the estimates using the IV constructed based on annual migra-
tion inflows to the US predicted by weather shocks in Europe. The details on the construction
of both instrumental variables are presented in the Appendix Section 2.10.9. The first-stage F
statistics are cluster-robust, and standard errors are clustered based on the grid-cell approach
of Bester et al. (2011) as detailed in Section 2.5.1.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 2.11: Frontier Individualism and Selective Migration
Dependent Variable: Child Has Infrequent Name in 1880
(1) (2) (3) (4)
omitted reference group: non-frontier non-frontier non-frontier frontier
resident, 1870–80 resident, 1880 resident, 1880 immigrant, 1870–80
frontier county resident in 1880, 0.042*** 0.055***
arrived between 1870 and 1880 (0.012) (0.011)
frontier county resident in 1880 0.075***
(0.018)
frontier county resident in 1880, 0.186*** 0.118***
arrived before 1870 (0.035) (0.026)
mean infrequent name, omitted group: 0.707 0.708 0.708 0.767
Number of Individuals 1,223,600 1,239,513 1,239,513 12,630
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05
Gender×Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (2.6) based on the linked historical Census data
from 1870 to 1880 for households with white, native-born fathers age 30–50 and children aged
0–10 in 1880. This linked sample is detailed in footnote 45 in the paper. The dependent variable
is an indicator equal to one if the child is given a name that falls outside the top 10 most
popular names nationally in the 1870s. The top of each column reports the omitted reference
group and the mean infrequent name share among them. We define immigrant status here
based on whether the father switched counties between 1870 and 1880. Frontier counties are
as defined in 1870 and 1880 based on the main east-to-west frontier line. Column 1 reports
the selective migration differential between migrants from non-frontier to frontier counties
and those that remained in non-frontier counties in both 1870 and 1880. Column 2 reports
the overall differential in infrequent names between frontier and non-frontier counties in 1880,
i.e., inclusive of stayers in frontier counties. Column 3 breaks down the overall differential
into the component due to migrants between 1870 and 1880 and those that resided in the
frontier county prior to 1870 (either by birth or earlier migration). Column 4 then restricts to
frontier county residents, identifying the differential between recent immigrants and longer-
term residents. In addition to gender×age and birth order fixed effects, all regressions control
for indicators for whether the mother and father have infrequent names. Standard errors are
clustered by county in 1870.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 2.12: Individualism, Socioeconomic Success, and En-
durance on the Frontier
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Dep. Var.: Father’s Economic Status
in 1880 (normalized)
sei occscore
at least one child 0-10 has infrequent name 0.077*** 0.080*** 0.065***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
at least one child 0-10 has infrequent name × frontier county 0.077* 0.073* 0.066
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
father has infrequent name -0.047*** -0.049*** -0.044***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
father has infrequent name × frontier county 0.072** 0.069** 0.075**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Number of Individuals 264,038 264,038 264,038 264,038
R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Dep. Var.: Migrated from Frontier County
in 1870 to Non-Frontier County in 1880
father has infrequent name -0.042*** -0.041***
(0.009) (0.009)
mother has infrequent name -0.010 -0.009
(0.007) (0.007)
at least one child 0-10 has infrequent name -0.026** -0.023**
(0.011) (0.011)
Number of Individuals 27,066 27,066 27,066 27,066
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.410 0.410 0.410 0.410
R2 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08
Origin County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (2.7) in Panel A and equation (2.7) in Panel
B based on the same linked sample of households from the 1870 and 1880 Census described
in the notes to the previous table and at length in Section 2.6.1. Infrequent name measures
are as defined elsewhere and based on the top 10 nationally for all family members. The
frontier dummy in both panels is as defined earlier. In Panel A, the dependent variable in
columns 1–3 is the normalized Duncan (1961) socioeconomic index (sei) and in column 4 is
the normalized occupational score (occscore), both as observed in 1880 and as provided by the
North Atlantic Population Project (NAPP). The sample in Panel A includes all white native-
born male household heads (fathers) aged 30–50 that did not migrate across counties between
1870 and 1880. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. The sample in Panel B is
restricted to all white native-born households aged 30–50 residing in frontier counties in 1870,
and the dependent variable equals one if the household moved to a non-frontier county by
1880. Standard errors are clustered at the origin county. All regressions include dummies for
the number of children born in the 1870s.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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2.10 Additional Results
2.10.1 Comparing Total Frontier Experience and Current Population Density
Figure 2·6: TFE is Distinct from Current Population Density
(a) Total Frontier Experience, 1790 to 1890
(b) Population Density, 2010
Notes: Panel (a) reproduces Figure 2·3, and (b) presents a similarly scaled map of population
density in 2010 for the same counties.
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2.10.2 Further Background Characterizing Frontier Life
Figure 2·7: Distribution of Demographics and Individualism by
Distance to the Frontier
(a) Sex Ratio
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Notes: Distance to the frontier, measured in kilometers, is the distance from the county’s cen-
troid to the nearest frontier line. The distance is negative if the county centroid is to the west of
the nearest main frontier line. Figures (a)-(f) provide the semiparametric estimates of the corre-
sponding dependent variables, with 95 percent confidence intervals, as a function of distance
to the frontier estimated using county-level pooled data and applying a nonlinear function
recovered using the partially linear Robinson (1988) estimator. The specification includes Cen-
sus division and year fixed effects and are based on an Epanechnikov kernel and rule-of-thumb
bandwidth.
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Figure 2·8: Inequality is Lower on the Frontier
(a) Semiparametric
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Notes: Based on county level data from National Historical Geographic Information System:
Version 11.0 Database from 1790-1890. Land inequality is measured using the county level
gini coefficient based on the number of farms in seven bins of farm size. The semiparametric
specification in (a) is the same as in Figure 2·4, and the event study specification in (b) is the
same as in Figure 2·5. See the notes therein for details.
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Table 2.13: Occupational Composition in Frontier and Non-
Frontier Counties
Employment
Share
Frontier Counties
Farmers (owners and tenants) .606
Laborers (n.e.c.) .125
Farm laborers, wage workers .047
Managers, officials, and proprietors (n.e.c.) .040
Carpenters .023
Truck and tractor drivers .014
Blacksmiths .013
Operative and kindred workers (n.e.c.) .012
Other non-occupational response .012
Lawyers and judges .009
Non-Frontier Counties
Farmers (owners and tenants) .534
Managers, officials, and proprietors (n.e.c.) .063
Laborers (n.e.c.) .061
Operative and kindred workers (n.e.c.) .0465
Carpenters .037
Farm laborers, wage workers .028
Salesmen and sales clerks (n.e.c.) .015
Blacksmiths .014
Other non-occupational response .012
Physicians and surgeons .010
Notes: This table reports the top 10 occupational shares in frontier and non-frontier counties in
1870 using the 1870–1880 linked sample that we use in our main analysis in Section 2.6.
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2.10.3 Case Study Illustrating Long-Run Effects
To fix ideas, consider the two counties of Cass and Johnson
mentioned in Section 2.3.2 and seen in the TFE map on
the right, which is a snapshot of Illinois from Figure 2·3.
Both are roughly equidistant from the Mississippi River
and the important historical city of St. Louis. Today,
the two rural counties look very similar. Cass has 36.3
people/mi2, median income is around US$ 41,544, and 86
percent of the population is white. Johnson also has 36.6
people/mi2, median income around US$ 41,619, and 89
percent white population. These two counties had very
similar population density in 1890 as well. However, they
differ significantly in their total frontier experience histor-
ically. Cass was on the frontier for 10 years, and Johnson
for 32 years. This difference may be explained by any
number of factors shaping the westward movement of the
frontier through this area of the midwest in the early 1800s
as seen in Figure 2·2. One potentially important contributor
lies in our instrumental variable. Johnson entered the
frontier in 1803 whereas Cass entered in 1818. While only
15 years apart, this implied a considerable difference in
exposure to subsequent immigration-induced pressure on
the westward expansion of the frontier over the next few
decades as evidenced in Figures 2·9, 2·10, and especially
2·11 below.
These historical differences in TFE translate into substantial
long-run differences in the prevalence of rugged individu-
alism in local culture. In Cass, 75 (64) percent of girls (boys)
have infrequent names in 1940, Republican presidential can-
didates captured 55 percent of the vote in the average elec-
tion since 2000, and local property tax rates are around 1.9
percent in 2010. Meanwhile, in Johnson, 78 (71) percent of
girls (boys) have infrequent names in 1940, 68 percent av-
erage Republican vote shares since 2000, and 1.3 percent lo-
cal property tax rates in 2010. This is striking insomuch as
the two counties have such similar contemporary popula-
tion density, median income, and racial composition.
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2.10.4 Further Robustness Checks on Individualism
Tables 2.14 and 2.15 show the robustness of the OLS and IV results, respectively,
for infrequent names to alternative measures of infrequency and restrictions on
(grand)parental ancestry. Table 2.16 shows that the baseline OLS results for infre-
quent names look similar in each decade before 1940 but after the official closing
of the frontier. Table 2.17 validates the long-run relationship of TFE with individ-
ualism using an alternative survey-based proxy from 1990 ANES data.
Power Law Property of Names. One important dimension of robustness that
we corroborate in Tables 2.14 and 2.15 is that the results are not sensitive to the
cutoff for defining infrequent names (10, 25, 100, . . . ). This is likely due to the
fact that naming frequencies in the United States follow a power law (see Hahn
and Bentley, 2003; Gureckis and Goldstone, 2009), and hence the share of people
with each of the top 10 names can be characterized by the same shape parameter
as the share with the top 25 names, and so on. Adopting this parametrization,
the literature on names has documented an increase in the national power law
exponent over time, which suggests a growing trend towards less concentration
among popular names. Our results here identify mid-20th century differences in
name (in)frequency across counties.
Auxiliary Measures of Individualism. Beyond infrequent names, we draw upon
a well-suited measure from the ANES data to provide further evidence of the link
between TFE and high levels of individualism. Specifically, we use the 1990 ANES
round in which respondents were asked whether (1) “it is more important to be a
cooperative person who works well with others”, or (2) “it is more important to be
a self-reliant person able to take care of oneself.” While this question was designed
explicitly for studies of American individualism (see Markus, 2001), unfortunately,
it was only asked in a single round.
Table 2.17 provides evidence that self-reliant preferences are stronger today in
counties with longer exposure to the frontier historically. Around 55 percent of
individuals respond in support of the cooperative answer. However, across dif-
ferent specifications, each decade of additional TFE is associated with around 2–6
percentage points lower support for cooperation over self-reliance.53 While the re-
sults with the full set of controls are noisy, we nevertheless view these findings as
at least suggestive of longstanding claims about the rugged individualism perva-
sive on the frontier. In linking to results elsewhere in the paper, it is worth noting
that individuals that identify as Republican in the ANES data are around 15–20
percent more likely to believe that it is better to be a self-reliant than a cooperative
person.
53In a related result using the CCES, we find that residents in counties with greater TFE are signifi-
cantly less likely to have ever belonged to a union. While this result may be explained in part by
differences in sectoral composition, it is also consistent with weaker collectivist tendencies.
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Table 2.14: Robustness to Other Measures of Infrequent Names (OLS Estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sample: White Children Aged 0-10, 1940 Census
Further Sample Restriction: None Native Native Native None None None None None None
Father Parents Grand-
parents
Infrequent Measure: Top 10 Division Top 10 Top 10 Top 10 Top 25 Top 100 Top 10
National State County Division Division National
Non-Biblical
Panel A: Share of Boys with Infrequent Names
total frontier experience 0.109*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.089*** 0.123*** 0.121*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.115*** 0.100***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.020) (0.022) (0.034) (0.023) (0.022) (0.017)
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
R2 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.25 0.63 0.61 0.20 0.64 0.67 0.73
Panel B: Share of Girls with Infrequent Names
total frontier experience 0.167*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.085*** 0.166*** 0.175*** 0.047 0.148*** 0.157*** 0.155***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.034) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,035 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
R2 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.11 0.48 0.41 0.22 0.58 0.64 0.53
Notes: This table reports analogous estimates of column 4 in Table 2.2 for alternative measures of the prevalence of individualistic nam-
ing patterns. The dependent variable is normalized across all columns. Column 1 show the results with no further sample restriction.
Column 2 restricts the measure to children with native-born fathers, column 3 restricts to those with native-born mothers and fathers
(the baseline in Table 2.2), and column 4 restricts to those with native-born grandparents. Column 5 changes the definition of infre-
quency of names to be based on the top 10 nationally, column 6 changes to the top 10 at the state level, and column 7 to the top 10 at the
given county level. Column 8 increases the uncommon threshold to the top 25, and column 9 increases that to the top 100. Column 10
restricts to top names that do not have biblical roots. Standard errors are clustered based on the grid-cell approach of Bester et al. (2011)
as detailed in Section 2.5.1.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 2.15: Robustness to Other Measures of Infrequent Names (IV Estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sample: White Children Aged 0-10, 1940 Census
Further Sample Restriction: None Native Native Native None None None None None None
Father Parents Grand-
parents
Infrequent Measure: Top 10 Division Top 10 Top 10 Top 10 Top 25 Top 100 Top 10
National State County Division Division National
Non-Biblical
Panel A: Share of Boys with Infrequent Names
total frontier experience 0.208*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.171*** 0.201*** 0.210*** 0.227*** 0.188*** 0.207*** 0.157***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.046) (0.041) (0.041) (0.078) (0.041) (0.037) (0.035)
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
First Stage F Statistic 193.6 193.6 193.6 193.6 193.6 193.6 193.6 193.6 193.6 193.6
Panel B: Share of Girls with Infrequent Names
total frontier experience 0.214*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.084** 0.165*** 0.205*** 0.095 0.217*** 0.223*** 0.162***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.037) (0.039) (0.043) (0.066) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039)
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,035 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
First Stage F Statistic 193.6 193.6 193.6 193.6 193.6 193.6 193.6 193.6 193.6 193.6
Notes: This table reports analogous instrumental variables estimates of the OLS specifications in Table 2.14. See the notes to Table 2.10
for details on the IV.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 2.16: Persistence of Individualism
Sample: White Children Aged 0-10 with Native-Born Parents
1910 1920 1930 1940
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Share of Boys with Infrequent Names
total frontier experience 0.155*** 0.157*** 0.150*** 0.239*** 0.119*** 0.174*** 0.112*** 0.207***
(0.029) (0.059) (0.026) (0.047) (0.025) (0.040) (0.022) (0.042)
Number of Counties 2,029 2,029 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
R2 0.28 0.03 0.39 0.02 0.49 0.02 0.61 0.01
First Stage F Statistic 197.3 193.6 193.6 193.6
Panel B: Share of Girls with Infrequent Names
total frontier experience 0.114*** 0.128*** 0.152*** 0.178*** 0.146*** 0.169*** 0.161*** 0.207***
(0.022) (0.043) (0.021) (0.047) (0.024) (0.043) (0.024) (0.041)
Number of Counties 2,029 2,029 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
R2 0.49 0.02 0.55 0.04 0.51 0.04 0.42 0.04
First Stage F Statistic 197.3 193.6 193.6 193.6
Notes: This table reports analogous OLS and IV estimates of Table 2.2 but for each year since
1910. Standard errors are clustered based on the grid-cell approach of Bester et al. (2011) as
detailed in Section 2.5.1.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 2.17: Total Frontier Experience and Contemporary Cooper-
ation vs. Self-Reliance
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
total frontier experience -0.019* -0.025** -0.041*** -0.026** -0.025
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.029)
Oster δ for β = 0 -2.77 -2.61 -15.37 -249.36
Number of Individuals 567 567 567 567 567
Number of Counties 48 48 48 48 48
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.549 0.549 0.549 0.549 0.549
First Stage F Statistic 9.9
R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01
Individual Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Division Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes No No
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls No No No Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates for a dependent variable based on a proxy for individualism
in the 1990 round of ANES, covering 567 individuals in 48 counties across 17 states in our
sample. The measure asks individuals whether (1) “it is more important to be a cooperative
person who works well with others”, or (2) “it is more important to be a self-reliant person
able to take care of oneself.” The dependent variable equals one if they answer (1). We report
the same set of specifications in columns 1–4 as in Table 2.2 to demonstrate the statistically
and economically significant effect sizes despite the coverage limitations. Standard errors are
clustered based on the grid-cell approach of Bester et al. (2011) as detailed in Section 2.5.1. The
Oster (2016) tests are with reference to a baseline specification with no controls.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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2.10.5 Addressing Potential Individual-Level Confounders of Policy Preferences
Many of the policies in Tables 2.3 and 2.5 elicit strong partisanship within the U.S. as Republicans and Democrats
hew closely to the party line. However, as seen in Tables 2.18, greater TFE is associated with stronger opposition to
government intervention even after controlling for the strength of Republican party support reported in the CCES.
Moreover, these results survive further controls for individual education and family income. Again, although these
covariates are “bad controls,” their inclusion helps rule out the concern that all of the observed effects are driven by
prolonged frontier experience simply leading to tribal party- and class-based identity unrelated to the deep roots of
frontier culture.
Table 2.18: Robustness to Controls for Income, Education, and Partisan Identification
Dependent Variable: Prefers Cutting Public Prefers Balancing Budget Prefers Repealing Opposes Increasing Opposes Banning Opposes EPA
Spending on Welfare By Cutting Spending Affordable Care Act Minimum Wage Assault Rifles Regulation of CO2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
total frontier experience 0.007** 0.006* 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.015** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
identifies as very strong Republican 0.299*** 0.379*** 0.415*** 0.457*** 0.284*** 0.338***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009)
family income > USD 50,000 0.099*** 0.048*** -0.019*** -0.004 0.019***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
education > high school 0.007 -0.007 -0.080*** 0.076*** 0.015** 0.018***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006)
Oster δ for β = 0 6.86 4.63 2.40 1.76 2.96 2.26 3.05 1.85 2.46 2.19 2.22 2.16
Number of Counties 53,472 47,851 169,630 80,155 29,446 26,131 5,134 4,618 29,404 26,093 29,215 25,938
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.40 0.39 0.43 0.38 0.53 0.53 0.31 0.30 0.37 0.36 0.32 0.31
R2 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.21 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.14
Notes: This table subjects the results in Table 2.5 to additional, non-predetermined controls for education, family income, and Republican
Party identification as described in Appendix 2.11. Standard errors are clustered based on the grid-cell approach of Bester et al. (2011)
as detailed in Section 2.5.1. The Oster (2016) tests are with reference to a baseline specification with no controls.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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2.10.6 Full Elaboration of Additional Controls in Table 2.8
Table 2.19: Robustness (III): Additional Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Panel A: Infrequent Boy Name Share in 1940 (normalized)
total frontier experience 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.109*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.114*** 0.080*** 0.112*** 0.105*** 0.079*** 0.099*** 0.072*** 0.120*** 0.065***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
ruggedness 4.944*** 3.619***
(0.821) (0.635)
rainfall risk 2.772 0.039
(1.854) (1.509)
distance to nearest portage site 0.036 0.036
(0.047) (0.039)
distance to nearest mineral discovery site 0.088*** 0.095***
(0.026) (0.023)
distance to nearest Indian battle -0.026 -0.040
(0.037) (0.027)
slave population share, 1860 -0.011*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.001)
sex ratio, 1890 -0.355*** -0.213**
(0.137) (0.087)
immigrant share, 1890 -0.007* 0.025***
(0.004) (0.009)
scottish/irish immigrant share, 1890 -0.260*** -0.197***
(0.019) (0.019)
birthplace diversity, 1890 -1.102*** -1.181*
(0.257) (0.659)
years connected to railroad by 1890 -0.018*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002)
manufacturing employment share, 1890 -0.073*** -0.052***
(0.006) (0.005)
Oster δ for β = 0 1.70 1.75 1.65 1.71 1.71 1.70 1.01 1.71 1.54 1.07 1.42 0.92 1.91 0.70
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
R2 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.67 0.62 0.65 0.66 0.74
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reproduces the estimates from Table 2.8, showing the coefficient estimates for the additional variables listed at the top of that table. Standard errors are clustered based on the grid-cell approach of Bester et al.
(2011) as detailed in Section 2.5.1. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 2.20: Robustness (III): Additional Controls
Panel B: Infrequent Girl Name Share in 1940 (normalized)
total frontier experience 0.161*** 0.164*** 0.159*** 0.167*** 0.162*** 0.166*** 0.125*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.133*** 0.154*** 0.112*** 0.170*** 0.123***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022)
ruggedness 6.192*** 4.778***
(1.002) (0.778)
rainfall risk 3.462 -0.063
(2.202) (1.881)
distance to nearest portage site 0.119** 0.089**
(0.055) (0.041)
distance to nearest mineral discovery site 0.132*** 0.139***
(0.031) (0.027)
distance to nearest Indian battle -0.050 -0.083**
(0.041) (0.032)
slave population share, 1860 -0.013*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
sex ratio, 1890 -0.341** -0.265**
(0.133) (0.104)
immigrant share, 1890 0.000 0.041***
(0.006) (0.012)
scottish/irish immigrant share, 1890 -0.229*** -0.157***
(0.023) (0.022)
birthplace diversity, 1890 -0.639** -1.905**
(0.322) (0.789)
years connected to railroad by 1890 -0.022*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002)
manufacturing employment share, 1890 -0.074*** -0.055***
(0.006) (0.006)
Oster δ for β = 0 3.42 3.56 3.28 3.56 3.44 3.45 2.05 3.44 3.32 2.44 3.06 1.84 3.87 1.78
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.47 0.43 0.48 0.47 0.58
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reproduces the estimates from Table 2.8, showing the coefficient estimates for the additional variables listed at the top of that table. Standard errors are clustered based on the grid-cell approach of Bester et al.
(2011) as detailed in Section 2.5.1. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Robustness (III): Additional Controls (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Panel C: County Property Tax Rate in 2010
total frontier experience -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.023*** -0.036*** -0.023***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ruggedness -0.959*** -0.724***
(0.219) (0.208)
rainfall risk 0.959* 0.736
(0.581) (0.516)
distance to nearest portage site 0.026 0.006
(0.019) (0.016)
distance to nearest mineral discovery site 0.026*** 0.024***
(0.009) (0.008)
distance to nearest Indian battle -0.004 0.002
(0.011) (0.009)
slave population share, 1860 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
sex ratio, 1890 -0.010 -0.024
(0.027) (0.024)
immigrant share, 1890 0.007*** -0.003
(0.001) (0.003)
scottish/irish immigrant share, 1890 0.059*** 0.029***
(0.008) (0.006)
birthplace diversity, 1890 0.636*** 0.541**
(0.084) (0.244)
years connected to railroad by 1890 0.005*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000)
manufacturing employment share, 1890 0.016*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
Oster δ for β = 0 1.67 1.72 1.71 1.58 1.69 1.60 1.52 1.67 1.36 1.32 1.33 1.10 1.93 1.07
Number of Counties 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029 2,029
Mean of Dependent Variable 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
R2 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.85
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reproduces the estimates from Table 2.8, showing the coefficient estimates for the additional variables listed at the top of that table. Standard errors are clustered based on the grid-cell approach of Bester et al.
(2011) as detailed in Section 2.5.1. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Robustness (III): Additional Controls (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Panel D: Republican Vote Share, Average 2000–16
total frontier experience 2.055*** 2.050*** 2.115*** 2.095*** 2.055*** 2.172*** 1.399*** 2.060*** 1.715*** 1.717*** 1.689*** 1.640*** 2.137*** 0.931***
(0.349) (0.349) (0.338) (0.344) (0.350) (0.351) (0.361) (0.347) (0.328) (0.340) (0.327) (0.361) (0.350) (0.316)
ruggedness -11.710 -34.668***
(11.247) (9.508)
rainfall risk -77.882* -108.600***
(42.010) (36.779)
distance to nearest portage site 0.930 0.966
(0.777) (0.623)
distance to nearest mineral discovery site 0.191 0.137
(0.406) (0.344)
distance to nearest Indian battle -1.393** -0.794*
(0.603) (0.471)
slave population share, 1860 -0.237*** -0.270***
(0.035) (0.034)
sex ratio, 1890 -5.000*** -1.948**
(1.856) (0.940)
immigrant share, 1890 -0.417*** -0.217
(0.051) (0.198)
scottish/irish immigrant share, 1890 -2.738*** -1.427***
(0.263) (0.243)
birthplace diversity, 1890 -32.582*** -4.970
(3.563) (13.286)
years connected to railroad by 1890 -0.186*** -0.089***
(0.026) (0.025)
manufacturing employment share, 1890 -0.689*** -0.422***
(0.090) (0.075)
Oster δ for β = 0 13.01 12.84 15.11 13.78 13.02 16.49 3.45 13.25 6.17 6.19 5.92 5.14 17.16 1.57
Number of Counties 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
Mean of Dependent Variable 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04 60.04
R2 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.49
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reproduces the estimates from Table 2.8, showing the coefficient estimates for the additional variables listed at the top of that table. Standard errors are clustered based on the grid-cell approach of Bester et al.
(2011) as detailed in Section 2.5.1. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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2.10.7 Alternative Measures of Total Frontier Experience
Our baseline measure of TFE closely followed definitions in the historical literature
as discussed in Section 2.3. In Table 2.21, we demonstrate the robustness of our re-
sults to three relevant margins of adjustment to our measure of TFE. In each case,
we redefinie what it means for county c to be on the frontier at time t. First, we
reduce the catchment area from 100 km to 50 km in proximity to the frontier line.
Second, we adjust the density restriction to include counties with > 2 people/mi2
but still less than 6, counties with ≤ 18 people/mi2, and then remove the popu-
lation density restriction altogether. Finally, we consider defining the frontier line
as including only the main, westernmost extent of all contour lines identified by
the GIS algorithm. The overall message is that our particular choice of the frontier
definition based on the historical record is not driving the main findings.
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Table 2.21: Robustness to Alternative Measures of TFE for Sum-
mary Outcomes
Dependent Variable: Infrequent Name Share County Republican
normalized Property Vote Share
Boys Girls Tax Rate Avg.
1940 1940 2010 2000–16
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFE: 100 km, ≤ 6/mi2, all contour lines (baseline) 0.112*** 0.161*** -0.034*** 2.055***
(0.022) (0.024) (0.007) (0.349)
TFE: 50 km, ≤ 6/mi2, all contour lines 0.117*** 0.173*** -0.035*** 2.051***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.007) (0.358)
TFE: 100 km, ≤ 18/mi2, no inner island lines 0.096*** 0.105*** -0.027*** 1.575***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.007) (0.339)
TFE: 50 km, ≤ 18/mi2, no inner island lines 0.085*** 0.105*** -0.025*** 1.458***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.006) (0.351)
TFE: 100 km, 2-6/mi2, no inner island lines 0.081** 0.110** -0.014* 1.877***
(0.033) (0.044) (0.008) (0.485)
TFE: 50 km, 2-6/mi2, no inner island lines 0.063* 0.105** -0.012 1.771***
(0.038) (0.049) (0.009) (0.530)
TFE: 100 km, no density restriction, no inner island lines 0.033 0.030 -0.011 1.001***
(0.021) (0.025) (0.007) (0.335)
TFE: 50 km, no density restriction, no inner island lines 0.054*** 0.068*** -0.018*** 1.078***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.006) (0.339)
TFE: 100 km, ≤ 6/mi2, including inner island lines 0.132*** 0.188*** -0.032*** 2.048***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.006) (0.320)
TFE: 50 km, ≤ 6/mi2, including inner island lines 0.143*** 0.205*** -0.035*** 2.098***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.007) (0.335)
TFE: 100 km, ≤ 6/mi2, main single contour line 0.087*** 0.117*** -0.037*** 1.872***
(0.026) (0.032) (0.008) (0.436)
TFE: 50 km, ≤ 6/mi2, main single contour line 0.082*** 0.113*** -0.043*** 1.787***
(0.028) (0.034) (0.008) (0.460)
TFE: 50 km, ≤ 6/mi2, no inner or outer island lines 0.111*** 0.149*** -0.034*** 2.133***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.007) (0.357)
TFE: 50 km, ≤ 6/mi2, no inner or outer island lines 0.111*** 0.159*** -0.035*** 2.116***
(0.023) (0.026) (0.007) (0.373)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (2.5) for three measures of infrequent names for white children, age
0–10 in the 1940 Census. Each cell is a different regression based on the given dependent variable in the column and
the measure of total frontier experience in the given row. The frontier lines considered in the baseline are countour
lines longer than 500km after removing all ”inner island lines” that are east of the main frontier line. The alternative
measures of frontier experience considered above vary (i) the catchment area from 100 to 50 km from the contour lines,
(ii) the density restriction from≤ 6 people/mi2 to 2≥people/mi2≤ 6 to no restriction, (iii) including inner island lines,
and (iv) including only the longest single contour line. Standard errors are clustered based on the grid-cell approach
of Bester et al. (2011) as detailed in Section 2.5.1.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
184
2.10.8 Robustness Checks for Additional Survey Outcomes
The following tables report several robustness checks for the additional survey-based outcomes not reported in the
main robustness checks tables.
Table 2.22: Robustness (I): Adding West Coast and Extended Time Frame for Survey Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Data Source: ANES CCES GSS CCES GSS CCES
Dependent Variable: Prefers Cut Public Spending Government Prefer Cut Index of Opposes Opposes Opposes Opposes EPA
on Poor on Welfare Should Debt by Preferences for Affordable Increasing Banning Regulation
Redistribute Spending Cuts Cut Spending Care Act Min. Wage Assault Rifle of CO2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Adding West Coast to the Baseline Sample
total frontier experience 0.008* 0.009*** -0.007 0.015*** 0.033*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.017***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Number of Individuals 2,810 66,254 11,271 139,618 7,109 36,768 6,553 36,711 36,479
Number of Counties 108 1,963 290 2,064 288 1,828 1,157 1,823 1,818
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.10 0.39 -0.00 0.40 0.00 0.51 0.30 0.36 0.31
Panel B: Extending Historical Frontier Period to 1950
total frontier experience 0.007 0.011*** 0.006 0.013*** 0.035*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.016***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Number of Individuals 3,035 74,260 12,566 157,131 7,916 41,211 7,252 41,151 40,895
Number of Counties 113 2,241 319 2,389 317 2,076 1,294 2,072 2,067
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.10 0.39 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.52 0.31 0.37 0.32
Survey Wave Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State/Division Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table estimates the specifications in columns 1 (Panel A) and 5 (Panel B) of Table 2.6 for the other, survey-based outcomes
examined in Section 2.5.4. Standard errors are clustered based on the grid-cell approach of Bester et al. (2011) as detailed in Section 2.5.1.
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Table 2.23: Robustness (II) and (III): Population Density and Other Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Data Source: ANES CCES GSS CCES GSS CCES
Dependent Variable: Prefers Cut Public Spending Government Prefer Cut Index of Opposes Opposes Opposes Opposes EPA
on Poor on Welfare Should Debt by Preferences for Affordable Increasing Banning Regulation
Redistribute Spending Cuts Cut Spending Care Act Min. Wage Assault Rifle of CO2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Adding Population Density in 1890
total frontier experience 0.012*** 0.005 -0.025* 0.011*** 0.028** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.012*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002) (0.011) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of Individuals 2,322 53,472 9,085 111,853 5,739 29,446 5,134 29,404 29,215
Number of Counties 95 1,863 255 1,963 253 1,728 1,066 1,723 1,718
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.09 0.40 0.00 0.41 -0.00 0.53 0.31 0.37 0.32
Panel B: Adding Table 2.8, Column 14 Controls
total frontier experience 0.002 0.005 -0.017 0.010*** 0.010 0.016*** 0.019** 0.010** 0.011***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.013) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of Individuals 2,188 51,171 8,466 106,964 5,382 28,165 4,905 28,128 27,941
Number of Counties 87 1,711 242 1,792 240 1,591 1,004 1,589 1,582
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.09 0.40 0.00 0.41 -0.00 0.53 0.31 0.37 0.31
Survey Wave Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State/Division Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic/Agroclimatic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table estimates the specifications in column 2 of Table 2.7 (Panel A) and column 10 (Panel B) of Table 2.8 for the other,
survey-based outcomes examined in Section 2.5.4. Standard errors are clustered based on the grid-cell approach of Bester et al. (2011)
as detailed in Section 2.5.1.
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2.10.9 Instrumental Variables Strategy: Further Background and Additional
Results
We augment the widely-used Migration Policy Institute (2016) data on annual mi-
gration inflows (collected by the Office of Immigration Statistics) with data from
Tucker (1843) for the pre-1820 period (see Appendix 2.11). Figure 2·9 shows the
ups and downs of immigration to the U.S. over the study period. Figure 2·10 then
shows the strong positive correlation between these immigrant inflows by decade
and the speed of westward expansion, proxied by the east-to-west distance trav-
eled by the country’s population centroid. This simple scatterplot helps visual-
ize the process by which immigrants arriving in the U.S. (largely on the Eastern
seaboard) pushed the edges of settlement farther westward, which in turn has-
tened the forward march of the frontier line. In periods with low immigrant in-
flows, this push slowed down, leading some counties to remain part of the frontier
for longer than those that just happen to be getting closer to the frontier line at a
time of rapid inflows into the U.S. Table 2.24 demonstrates the strong first stage in
our main IV regressions from Table 2.10.
Figure 2·9: Annual Migration Inflows
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Notes: This figure plots the total number of migrants entering the United States, 1790-1890.
The data for 1820–1890 is available from the Migration Policy Institute (2016), while the data
for 1790-1819 is imputed from Tucker (1843).
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Figure 2·10: Immigration and Westward Expansion
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Notes: This figure plots the length of the decadal westward shift of the center of population (in
km) against the average annual immigrant inflow during the decade. The center of population
is the point at which weights of equal magnitude corresponding to the location of each per-
son in an imaginary flat surface representing the U.S. would balance out. This measure was
reported historically by the U.S. Census Bureau (see footnote 10 in the paper).
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Table 2.24: First Stage Results for the Instrumental Variables Esti-
mates in Table 2.10
Dependent Variable (in first stage): total frontier experience
(1) (2)
Log Average Actual National Migration Inflows -1.016***
(0.073)
Log Average Predicted National Migration Inflows -2.010***
(0.144)
Log county area 0.234*** 0.232***
(0.072) (0.073)
Latitude -0.091 -0.076
(0.079) (0.075)
Longitude -0.153*** -0.176***
(0.029) (0.030)
Mean Annual Temperature -0.144** -0.102
(0.071) (0.068)
Mean Annual Rainfall -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Mean of Median Altitude -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
Distance to Coast -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
Distance to Rivers 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Distance to Lakes -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Average Agricultural Suitability 2.686*** 0.876
(0.788) (0.752)
Number of Counties 2036 2036
First Stage F Statistic 193.6 195.8
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the first stage results corresponding to the baseline IV regressions
presented in Table 2.10.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
Section 2.5.6 shows that the main results are robust to an instrumental variable
estimation exploiting time series variation in national migration inflows. To ad-
dress concerns regarding the excludability of the baseline instrument due to pull
factors associated with immigrant inflows, we show in Panel B of Table 2.10 that
the IV results are qualitatively unchanged when using an instrument based on
push factors unrelated to frontier conditions. For this version of the IV, we draw
on the approach in Nunn et al. (2017), using country-year level data on migrant
inflows from 16 European countries to the US from 1820–1890 and constructing
predicted migration outflows induced by weather shocks. First, using country-
specific regressions, we predict the annual migrant outflows from each country
to the US as a function of country-specific shocks to temperature and rainfall in
the prior year (see Nunn et al., 2017, for details on these measures). Second, we
aggregate across countries to obtain the total predicted migrant inflows to the US
for each year. Analogous to our baseline instrument, we then construct the IV for
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each county in our sample by calculating the average annual predicted migrant
inflow to the US over the 30 years starting from the first year in which the given
county is just west of the frontier. Figure 2·11 shows how the predicted inflows,
which isolate push factors, compare to the actual inflows, which naturally include
both push and pull. While the data on migrant inflows from Europe to the US is
available only starting in 1820, we retain the full sample of counties in the IV re-
gressions by imputing the inflows for 1790-1819 using linear extrapolation of the
post-1819 predicted inflows.54
Figure 2·11: Actual vs. Predicted Immigration Inflows from Eu-
rope to the United States
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Notes: This figure compares the actual migration inflows from Europe from 1820–1890 to
the predicted flows based on the total country-specific predicted outflows using the climatic
shocks approach in Nunn et al. (2017) as described above.
54Restricting the sample to counties just west of the frontier after 1820—for which the IV is solely
based on predicted flows without extrapolation—delivers similar results, though the estimates
are noisier due to the smaller sample size.
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2.10.10 The Parasite-Stress Theory of Values
The parasite-stress theory of values due to Thornhill and Fincher (2014) argues that
the prevalence of infectious diseases leads to higher levels of in-group assortative
sociality, which they associate with collectivism, as an adaptive response that mini-
mizes contagion. In the context of our study, this theory might suggest that frontier
individualism resulted from the low prevalence of infectious diseases on the fron-
tier. However, this potential mechanism does not arise in historical narratives. Nor
do we find evidence of differential disease prevalence or morbidity on the frontier.
As seen in Table 2.25 below, the prevalence of pathogens—associated with tuber-
culosis, malaria, and typhoid, among other diseases considered in Gorodnichenko
and Roland (2016)—does not exhibit any differential intensity on the frontier. We
can measure the incidence of these specific infectious diseases as well as a broad
array of other illnesses for the first time in the 1880 Population Census. Adopting
specifications similar to Table 2.1, we find little evidence that individuals living
on the frontier had differential (infectious) disease or illness. If the parasite-stress
mechanism were salient, we would find that frontier locations exhibit significantly
less prevalence of infectious diseases. While the relatively precise zeros in the table
may be specific to 1880, this provides suggestive evidence that the parasite-stress
channel is not a first-order factor in explaining the differential individualism on
the frontier.
Table 2.25: No Differential Infectious Diseases or Sickness on the
Frontier
Dependent Variable: Share of Pop. with Share of Pop. with
Infectious Disease Any Illness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
on the frontier 0.0001 0.0009
(0.0003) (0.0013)
near frontier line -0.0001 0.0011
(0.0001) (0.0007)
low population density 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0010)
Mean Dependent Variable 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.009
Number of County-Years 1,780 1,780 1,780 1,780
R2 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08
Notes: This table reports estimates of the relationship between frontier definitions and the share
of the county with any of the infectious diseases considered in Gorodnichenko and Roland
(2016) (columns 1–2) and any illness (column 3–4). The infectious diseases of interest include
tuberculosis, malaria, and typhus. The specification is otherwise similar to that in Table 2.1,
with Census division FE and standard errors clustered using the grid-cell approach of Bester
et al. (2011).
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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2.10.11 Further Results on Individualism, Success, and Endurance on the Frontier
Table 2.26: Individualism and Changes in Socioeconomic Status
Dependent Variable: sei1880 − sei1870 occscore1880 − occscore1870
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
has infrequent name 0.374 0.338 0.205 -0.240 0.731 0.739 0.626 0.573
(1.029) (0.989) (0.982) (0.878) (0.558) (0.524) (0.517) (0.488)
has infrequent name × frontier county 21.463** 20.116** 20.944*** 18.681*** 9.012** 8.281** 8.990** 8.537**
(9.689) (8.088) (7.616) (6.466) (4.517) (4.139) (4.212) (4.050)
Number of Individuals 4,268 4,268 4,268 4,268 4,268 4,268 4,268 4,268
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.245 -0.245 -0.245 -0.245 -0.548 -0.548 -0.548 -0.548
R2 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.40 0.23 0.27 0.29 0.39
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age, Age Squared Control No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Number of Children Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Farmer Dummy No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Baseline sei or occscore No No No Yes No No No Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates analogous to those in Panel A of Table 2.12 but based on the NAPP Linked Sample based on a 1 percent of the population in the 1870
and 1880 Population Censuses. The sample is restricted relative to the one in Table 2.12 as we are interested in the change in socioeconomic status (sei) and occupational
standing (occscore) between 1870 and 1880, and this information is only available in both years for this smaller linked sample. The estimates are based on white, male
household heads that reside in the same county in 1870 and 1880. The dependent variable is the change in sei or occscore; results are similar taking logs, but the levels
allow us to retain individuals that switch from zero valued status to positive or vice versa. The frontier dummy equals one if the given county lies in the frontier in 1880.
The infrequent name measure is based on the top 10 names nationally. The controls listed at the bottom of the table include a dummy for farmer occupations in 1870 in
columns 3/4 and 7/8, and the baseline dependent variable in columns 4 and 8. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5%
∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
192
Table 2.27: Individualism and Socioeconomic Success on the Frontier
∣∣ Farmer Dummy
Dep. Var.: Father’s Economic Status
in 1880 (normalized)
sei occscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
at least one child 0-10 has unique name 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.036***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
at least one child 0-10 has unique name × frontier county 0.051 0.047 0.032
(0.034) (0.034) (0.029)
father has unique name -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.023***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
father has unique name × frontier county 0.063** 0.061** 0.065***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Number of Individuals 264,038 264,038 264,038 264,038
R2 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.45
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Farmer Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table re-estimates the regressions in Panel A of Table 2.12, controlling for an indicator of whether or not the individual is in a farming occupation. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. All regressions include dummies for the number of children born in the 1870s. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 2.28: Individualism and Endurance on the Frontier
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable:
Panel A: Emigrated from Frontier County in 1870
father has infrequent name -0.051*** -0.050***
(0.009) (0.009)
mother has infrequent name -0.005 -0.005
(0.007) (0.007)
at least one child 0-10 has infrequent name -0.024** -0.020*
(0.010) (0.010)
Number of Individuals 27,066 27,066 27,066 27,066
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.583 0.583 0.583 0.583
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Panel B: Migrated from Frontier County
in 1870 to Non-Frontier County in 1880
father has infrequent name -0.042*** -0.041***
(0.009) (0.009)
mother has infrequent name -0.010 -0.009
(0.007) (0.007)
at least one child 0-10 has infrequent name -0.026** -0.023**
(0.011) (0.011)
Number of Individuals 27,066 27,066 27,066 27,066
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.410 0.410 0.410 0.410
R2 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08
Panel C: Onward Migrated from Frontier
County in 1870 to Frontier County in 1880
father has infrequent name -0.006 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006)
mother has infrequent name 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005)
at least one child 0-10 has infrequent name 0.001 0.001
(0.008) (0.008)
Number of Individuals 27,066 27,066 27,066 27,066
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Notes: This table reproduces the estimates from Panel B of Table 2.12 alongside other outcomes
in Panels A and C that clarify that the “return migration” effect comprises the full effect on
outmigration destinations discussed with respect to that finding. Standard errors are clustered
at the origin county level.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
194
2.11 Variable Definitions and Sources
Harmonization to 2010 Boundaries
We harmonize all historical Census data to the 2010 boundaries using an approach
suggested in Hornbeck (2010). First, we intersect the county shapefiles from each
of the decadal census years with the 2010 county shapefile and calculate the area of
each intersection. When the 2010 county falls in one or more counties of the earlier
shapefile, each piece of the 2010 county is assigned a value equal to the share of
the area of the piece in the earlier county multiplied by the total value of the data
for the earlier county. Then, the data for each county in 2010 is the sum of all the
pieces falling within its area. This harmonization procedure would be exact if all
the data from the various years are evenly distributed across county areas.
Demographic Variables and Individualism
Population density. Population/area. Digitized U.S. Census data on population for
every decade in 1790–2010, from Minnesota Population Center (2016). The data
on area is calculated using the 2010 county shapefiles from NHGIS (Minnesota
Population Center, 2011) using GIS software. The county level population data
along with other pre-2010 data are harmonized to the 2010 county boundaries and
the data for intercensal years is imputed using the procedure detailed in Section
2.10.
Sex Ratio. Whites males/white females. The data is available for every decade in
1790-1860 and 1890. Data source: (Minnesota Population Center, 2011).
Prime Age Adult Share. Whites aged 15–49/all whites. The data used is consistently
available for every decade in 1830-1860. Data source: (Minnesota Population Cen-
ter, 2011).
Illiteracy. Illiterate whites aged above 20/whites aged over 20. The variable is
available consistently for 1830-1860. Data source: (Minnesota Population Center,
2011).
Immigrant Share. Foreign born/population. The variable used is available for every
decade in 1820-1890 (excluding 1840). Data source: (Minnesota Population Center,
2011).
Out of State Born Share. Out-of-state born/population. The variable is consistently
available for every decade in 1850-1880. Data source: (Minnesota Population Cen-
ter, 2011).
Land inequality. Gini index using distribution of farm sizes, based on county level
data on the number of farms of sizes 0–10, 10–19, 20–49, 50–99, 100–499, 500–1000,
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and above 1000 acres. Available for every decade in 1860-1890. (Minnesota Popu-
lation Center, 2011).
Infrequent Children Names. White Children Aged 0–10 with Non-Top 10 First Names
in Division/White Children Aged 0-10. We also construct similar variables further
restricting to children aged 0–10 with native parents, and native grandparents. In
addition, for the same sample, we construct additional variables by calculating the
popularity of names at the national level instead of the Census division. We use
the following procedure to generate the name shares: start by restricting the sam-
ple as desired (e.g. white children aged 0-10 with native parents), then calculate
the number of children in the county for each given name, then using that value
identify the top 10 given names within the census division (or nationally), and then
accordingly count the number of children in that county with the identified top 10
names in their corresponding census division. The variables restricting to white
children aged 0-10 is available for every decade in 1850–1940 (excluding 1890),
with further native-parent restriction for 1850 and 1880-1940 (excluding 1890), and
with grandparent restriction for 1880–1940 (excluding 1890). To give some exam-
ples, in 1850 the top 10 boy names nationally in descending order of popularity
were John, William, James, George, Charles, Henry, Thomas, Joseph, Samuel and
David. Meanwhile, a random sample of less common names (outside the top 25)
includes ones like Alfred, Nathan, Patrick, Reuben, Herbert, Matthew, Thaddeus
and Luke. For girls, the top 10 include Mary, Sarah, Elizabeth, Martha, Margaret,
Nancy, Ann, Susan, Jane, and Catherine while less common names (outside the
top 25) include ones like Rachel, Susannah, Nina, Olive, Charlotte, Lucinda, and
Roxanna. By 1880, the rankings shifted only slightly for boys with Samuel falling
outside the top 10 and Harry entering. For girls, the changes were a bit more dra-
matic with the new top 10 list being Mary, Sarah, Emma, Ida, Minnie, Anna, Annie,
Martha, Cora, and Alice. Data source: The NAPP full count census data for 1850
and the Ancestry data collected by NBER for 1860–1940.
Economic Status. We measure economics status using either the socioeconomic in-
dex (sei) or the occupational score (occscore) measures provided by the North At-
lantic Population Project: Complete Count Microdata. Both measures range from
0 to 100, and capture the income returns associated with specific occupations in
the 1950 Census while the sei measure additionally captures notions of prestige as
well as educational attainment. Data source: (Minnesota Population Center, 2011).
Survey-Based Cultural Outcomes
Some of our key measures of contemporary preferences for government policy are
based on data from multiple rounds of three widely used, nationally representative
surveys: the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), the General Social
Survey (GSS), and the American National Election Study (ANES). These surveys
are staples in the social science literature on political preferences and social norms.
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For instance, Acharya et al. (2016) uses CCES and ANES in a related methodolog-
ical setting, and Alesina and Giuliano (2010) conducts a thorough investigation of
the determinants of preferences for redistribution using the GSS. The CCES is a
web-based survey conducted every two years, the ANES is an in-person survey
conducted annually since 1948, and the GSS is an in-person survey conducted an-
nually since 1972. All three are repeated cross-sections.
One advantage of working with three surveys is that we can cross-validate the
findings across surveys that ask different questions about similar underlying pref-
erences. For example, the CCES asks respondents if and how respondents would
like state-level welfare spending to change whereas the ANES asks respondents if
and how federal spending on the poor should change. The CCES also includes a
set of questions on policy issues such as gun ownership that are particularly rel-
evant to some of the mechanisms driving the persistence of frontier culture. For
all measures, we link county-level identifiers in the underlying data to the 2010
county boundaries.
Despite their rich level of detail, these surveys have one important limitation
for our purposes, namely the limited geographic scope. The three surveys are
nationally representative, but their coverage differs. While the CCES has broad
spatial coverage, the GSS and ANES do not (see Appendix Figures 2·12). Despite
its broader coverage, the CCES has the potential disadvantage that it captures an
internet-savvy sample that may not be reflective of the underlying population in
the way that an in-person survey generally would. This is particularly disadvan-
tageous given our focus on county-level variation in TFE across a swathe of the
United States outside of major coastal population centers.
Prefers Cutting Public Spending On Poor. The Prefers Cutting Public Spending On
Poor is an indicator variable based on the following survey question: ”Should fed-
eral spending be increased, decreased, or kept about the same on poor people?” The vari-
able takes a value of 1 if the respondent answered ”decreased” and 0 otherwise, and
it is available for 1992 and 1996. Data source: The American National Election
Studies Cumulative Data (2012). The ANES is a large, nationally-representative
survey of the American electorate in the United States taken during the presi-
dential and midterm election years. See Appendix Figure 2·12(a) for the map of
the maximum survey coverage in the final sample of ANES data merged with the
frontier related data.
Prefers State Decrease Welfare Spending. This is an indicator variable based on the
following survey question: “State legislatures must make choices when making spend-
ing decisions on important state programs. Would you like your legislature to increase
or decrease spending on Welfare? 1. Greatly Increase 2. Slightly Increase 3. Maintain
4. Slightly Decrease 5. Greatly Decrease.” Prefers Cut Public Spending on Welfare
takes a value of 1 if the respondent answered ”Slightly Decrease” or ”Greatly De-
crease” and 0 otherwise. The data is available in the 2014 and 2016 waves. Data
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source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study (Ansolabehere and Schaffner,
2017) Common Content surveys. The CCES was formed in 2006, through the co-
operation of several academic institutions, to study how congressional elections,
representation and voters’ behavior and experiences vary with political geogra-
phy and social context using very large scale national surveys. The 2014 and 2016
CCES surveys were conducted over the Internet by YouGov using a matched ran-
dom sample methodology. The Common Content portion of the survey, which
contains our variables of interest, surveyed 56,200 adults in 2014 and 64,600 adults
in 2016. See Appendix Figure 2·12(b) for the map of the maximum survey coverage
in the final sample of CCES data merged with frontier related data.
Believes Government Should Redistribute. Based on the following survey question:
”Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income dif-
ferences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families
or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not
concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Here
is a card with a scale from 1 to 7.” We have recoded the variable so that it is in-
creasing in preference for redistribution, where a score of 1 means that the gov-
ernment should not concern itself with reducing income differences and a score
of 7 means the government ought to reduce the income differences between rich
and poor. The Believes Government Should Redistribute is a normalized version
of the above variable, and it is available in our sample for 1993 and all even years
between 1994-2016. Data source: The General Social Survey (Smith et al., 2015).
The GSS is a repeated cross-sectional survey of a nationally representative sample
of non-institutionalized adults who speak either English or Spanish. The surveys
has been conducted since 1972, almost every year between 1972-1993 and biennial
since 1994. While the sample size for the annual surveys was 1500, since 1994 the
GSS administers the surveys to two samples in even-numbered years, each with a
target sample size of 1500. The surveys provide detailed questionnaires on issues
such as national spending priorities, intergroup relations, and confidence in insti-
tutions. See Appendix Figure 2·12(c) for the map of the maximum survey coverage
in the final sample of CCES merged with frontier related data.
Prefers Reducing Debt by Cutting Spending. The variable is based on the CCES survey
question: “The federal budget deficit is approximately [$ year specific amount] this year. If
the Congress were to balance the budget it would have to consider cutting defense spending,
cutting domestic spending (such as Medicare and Social Security), or raising taxes to cover
the deficit. Please rank the options below from what would you most prefer that Congress
do to what you would least prefer they do: Cut Defense Spending; Cut Domestic Spending;
Raise Taxes.”. While this question varies slightly from year to year, the underlying
theme is the same. The Prefers Reducing Debt by Cutting Spending variable takes
a value of 1 if the respondent chose ”Cut Domestic Spending” as a first priority.
The data is available for 2006-2014 (excluding 2013). Data source: (Ansolabehere
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and Schaffner, 2017).
Index of Preferences for Spending Cuts. The index is the principal component of nine
dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the respondents answers ”too much”
to the following questions: “We are faced with many problems in this country, none of
which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems,
and for each one I’d like you to name some of these problems, and for each one I’d like
you to tell me whether you think we’re spending too much money on it, too little money,
or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too
little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?”. The items considered are improving
and protecting the environment, improving healthcare, solving big city problems,
halting increasing crimes, dealing with drug addictions, improving the education
system, improving conditions for blacks, military spending, foreign aid, welfare,
and roads. The variable is available in our sample for 1993 and all even years
between 1994-2016. Data source: (Smith et al., 2015).
Prefers Repealing Affordable Care Act. Based on the CCES survey question: “The
Affordable Health Care Act was passed into law in 2010. It does the following: Requires
all Americans to obtain health insurance, Prevents insurance companies from denying
coverage for pre-existing condition, Allows people to keep current health insurance and
care provider, and Sets up national health insurance option for those without coverage, but
allows states the option to implement their own insurance system. Would you have voted
for the Affordable Care Act if you were in Congress in 2010?” The Prefers Repealing
Affordable Care Act variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent answers ”Yes” and
0 if the answer is ”No”. The data is available for 2014. Data source: (Ansolabehere
and Schaffner, 2017).
Opposes Increasing Minimum Wage. Based on the survey question:“As you may know,
the federal minimum wage is currently $5.15 an hour. Do you favor or oppose raising the
minimum wage to $7.25 an hour over the next two years, or not?”. The variable Opposes
Increasing Minimum Wage takes a value of 1 if the respondent choses ”oppose”
and 0 otherwise. Available in 2007. Data source: (Ansolabehere and Schaffner,
2017).
Opposes Banning Assault Rifles. Based on the CCES survey question: “On the issue of
gun regulation, are you for or against for each of the following proposal? proposal: banning
assault rifles”. Opposes Banning Assault Rifles takes value 1 if the respondent is
against banning assault rifles and 0 otherwise. Available for 2014. Data source:
(Ansolabehere and Schaffner, 2017).
Opposes EPA Regulations of CO2 Emissions. Based on the CCES survey question “Do
you support or oppose each of the following proposals? proposal: Environmental Protection
Agency regulating Carbon Dioxide emissions.” The Opposes EPA Regulations of CO2
Emissions takes one if the respondent supports the proposal and 0 the respondent
opposes. Available for 2014. Data source: (Ansolabehere and Schaffner, 2017).
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Cooperation vs. Self-Reliance. Based on the survey question: “I am going to ask you to
choose which of two statements I read comes closer to your own opinion. You might agree to
some extent with both, but we want to know which one is closer to your views: ONE, it is
more important to be a cooperative person who works well with others; or TWO, it is more
important to be a self-reliant person able to take care of oneself”. The Cooperation vs.
Self-Reliance variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent chooses ”cooperative”
and 0 otherwise. Available in 1990. Data source: The American National Election
Studies.
Identifies As A Strong Republican. An indicator variable that takes 1 if the respondent
identifies as a ”Strong Republican.” Available for 2007, 2012, 2014 and 2016. Data
source: (Ansolabehere and Schaffner, 2017).
Other Long-run Outcomes
County Property Tax Rate. The average effective property tax rates per $100 of value,
calculated at the county level as the ratio of the average real estate tax over the
average house value. Data source: The data is obtained from the National Associ-
ation of Home Builders, which calculated the average effective property tax rates
based on the 2010-2014 American Community Survey (ACS) data from the Census
Bureau.
Republican Vote Share in Presidential Elections. Votes for a GOP candidate/total
votes, at the county level. For simplicity, we only consider the five presidential
elections since 2000. Data source: Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections
(2017).
Geographic and Agroclimatic Controls
Land productivity measures. Average of attainable yields for alfalfa, barley, buck-
wheat, cane sugar, carrot, cabbage, cotton, ax, maize, oats, onion, pasture grasses,
pasture legumes, potato, pulses, rice, rye, sorghum, sweet potato, tobacco, tomato,
and wheat. We normalize each product’s values dividing it by the maximum value
for that product in the sample. Measures of attainable yields were constructed by
the FAO’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones project v3.0 (IIASA/FAO, 2012) using cli-
matic data, including precipitation, temperature, wind speed, sunshine hours and
relative humidity (based on which they determine thermal and moisture regimes),
together with crop-specific measures of cycle length (i.e. days from sowing to har-
vest), thermal suitability, water requirements, and growth and development pa-
rameters (harvest index, maximum leaf area index, maximum rate of photosynthe-
sis, etc). Combining these data, the GAEZ model determines the maximum attain-
able yield (measured in tons per hectare per year) for each crop in each grid cell of
0.083×0.083 degrees. We use FAO’s measures of agroclimatic yields (based solely
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on climate, not on soil conditions) for intermediate levels of inputs/technology
and rain-fed conditions.
Area. The log of surface area in square miles, calculated using the 2010 county
shapefiles from NHGIS (Minnesota Population Center, 2011) using GIS software.
Temperature. County-level mean annual temperature measured in Celsius degrees.
Data source: (IIASA/FAO, 2012).
Rainfall. County-level average annual precipitation measured in mm. Data source:
(IIASA/FAO, 2012).
Elevation. County-level average terrain elevation in km. Data source: (IIASA/FAO,
2012).
Latitude. Absolute latitudinal distance from the equator in decimal degrees, calcu-
lated from the centroid of each county using GIS software and county shapefiles
from NHGIS (Minnesota Population Center, 2011).
Longitude. Absolute longitudinal distance from the Greenwich Meridian in deci-
mal degrees, calculated from the centroid of each county using GIS software and
county shapefiles from NHGIS (Minnesota Population Center, 2011).
Distance to the coastline, rivers, and lakes. Minimum distance to a point in the coast-
line, rivers, and lakes in km, calculated from the centroid of each county using GIS
software and county shapefiles from NHGIS. Data source: (Minnesota Population
Center, 2011)
Additional Variables
Annual Migration Inflow. Total number of migrants entering the United States ev-
ery year. The data for 1820–1890 is available from the Migration Policy Institute
(2016), which tabulates data from the Office of Immigration Statistics, while the
data for 1790–1819 is imputed from Tucker (1843). To construct the instrumental
variable based on annual migration inflows predicted by weather shocks in Eu-
rope, we use the annual migration inflows to the U.S. from Belgium, Denmark,
England, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rus-
sia, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Wales from 1820–1890. Data source: Willcox (1929).
Years Connected to Railroad by 1890. The number of years since the county is first
intersected by railroad to 1890. Data source: Atack et al. (2010).
Birthplace diversity, 1890. We take 1−∑o(birthplaceoc/populationc)2, which is simply
1 minus the Herfindahl concentration index for origin o birthplace diversity in
county c in 1890. Birthplaces include US or a given country or country grouping
abroad. Data source: (Minnesota Population Center, 2011)
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Ruggedness. County-level average Terrain Ruggedness Index computed using 30-
arc grid data on terrain variability. Data source: (Nunn and Puga, 2012b).
Distance to nearest portage site. Minimum distance from county centroid to the near-
est portage site, which is defined as the location where a river basin intersects the
fall line. Data source: (Bleakley and Lin, 2012).
Manufacturing Employment Share. County-level percent of employment in manu-
facturing industries in 1890. Data source: (Minnesota Population Center, 2011).
Distance to Nearest Mine. Minimum distance from county centroid to a site where
there was a mineral discovery before 1890. The data is from the Mineral Resources
Data System (MRDS) edited by the US Geological Survey. Data source: (McFaul
et al., 2000).
Distance to nearest Indian battle sites. Minimum distance from county centroid to
major Indian battle sites. The battles sites are digitized using a map from (McFaul
et al., 2000).
Immigrant share, 1890. County-level percent of foreign born population in 1890.
Data source: (Minnesota Population Center, 2011).
Scottish and Irish immigrant share, 1890. County-level percent of population born in
Scotland or Ireland in 1890. Data source: (Minnesota Population Center, 2011)
Slave population share, 1860. County-level percent of slave population in 1860. Data
source: (Minnesota Population Center, 2011).
Rainfall Risk. Following Ager and Ciccone (ming), county level rainfall risk is con-
structed as the variance of the annual average log monthly rainfall from 1895-2000.
Data source: (Oregon State University, 2018)
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Figure 2·12: Data Availability For Main Survey Data Sources
(a) ANES (b) CCES
(c) GSS
Notes: Figures (a), (b), and (c) provide the geographical distribution of the maximum number of counties available in
our baseline sample matched with the ANES, CCES, and GSS data, respectively. Coverage expands to additional coun-
ties when incorporating the West Coast sample or extending the historical frontier window to 1950 (see Section 2.5.5).
Note that not all the counties in the above map are included in every baseline regression using the corresponding
survey data.
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Chapter 3
Industrial Policy and Misallocation in the
Ethiopian Manufacturing Sector
3.1 Introduction
Why do some countries experience rapid growth in the share of the manufactur-
ing sector while others experience stagnancy? The answer may depend on the
magnitude and evolution of the productivity of the manufacturing sector. For in-
stance, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005) argue that within-firm inefficiencies
combined with slow technological diffusion can lead to large cross country differ-
ences in productivity. On the other hand, recent works by Restuccia and Rogerson
(2013) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) (HK, henceforth) have emphasized that the
misallocation of resources across firms within a sector can also have significant ef-
fects on aggregate manufacturing TFP and the overall economic development of
a country. Furthermore, the literature has highlighted that policies such as firm
size restrictions or the favoring of state owned enterprises that engender within-
sector variations in revenue productivity can have large distortionary effects on
aggregate TFP. On the other hand, the recent literature on industrial policies (e.g.
Aghion et al. (2015)) argue that well-designed policies, such as those that foster
competition, can actually engender productivity growth.
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This paper contributes to the emerging genre of the growth literature that ex-
amines the role of policy induced distortions in shaping the path and pace of eco-
nomic development. In particular, the study examines the distortionary effects of
two policies designed to support firms in prioritized sub-sectors and regions on
the aggregate productivity of the Ethiopian manufacturing sector. The first policy,
enacted in 1996, can be characterized as an activist industrial policy that favored
sectors relevant for import substitution. On the other hand, the second industrial
policy, which supplanted the per-existing policy in 2003, was an activist trade pol-
icy that aimed to support targeted sectors with emphasis on export promotion. The
eligibility criteria under both policies create variations in access to the investment
incentives both across firms within the priority sectors as well as across sectors
based on priority status.
Exploiting the within and across sector variations induced by the two policies,
this paper addresses two key questions. First, what is the extent of the misalloca-
tion and the potential gains in aggregate productivity from efficient reallocation of
factors? Second, what are the effects of the variations in access to investment incen-
tives provided under the two industrial policies on the degree and evolution of the
misallocation? The paper provides answers to these questions using a rich estab-
lishment level panel census data from 1996-2008 for the Ethiopian manufacturing
sector. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the only study that examines
the relationship between investment incentives provided under industrial policies
and misallocation in a developing country context.
In order to evaluate the extent of the misallocation, I apply HK’s accounting
procedure which uses the within-sector variations of revenue productivity as a
measure of misallocation. I find that there is a greater degree of misallocation
in Ethiopia compared to HK’s finding for the US, China or India. On the aggre-
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gate, for the Ethiopian manufacturing sector, there are large TFP gains from the
removal of idiosyncratic distortions, ranging from 90-215%. However, the sever-
ity of the misallocation has lessened over the studied period due to improvements
in efficient within-sector allocation of resource across firms of different physical
productivity.
Furthermore, I examine the effects of the industrial policies on misallocation by
employing a difference-in-difference strategy that exploits the within and across
sector, region and time variations induced by the differences in the eligibility and
magnitude of the incentives provided under the two subsequent policies. There
is within-sector variation in access to the investment incentives because not all
firms in a given priority sector have access to the benefits. Under the first policy, a
firm’s eligibility depends not just on the priority status of its sector but also on its
location, age, type of investment and minimum capital. Under the second policy,
the export capacity and location of the firm are the main eligibility criteria.
I find that both policies have had significant negative effects on firms’ physical
and revenue productivity of Ethiopian manufacturing firms. I evaluate the relative
importance of the within and across sectors distortions induced by the policies by
decomposing the variance in total revenue productivity into between and within-
sector components. I find that the within-sector variation in revenue productivity
accounts for the large share of the dispersion. In addition, comparing the distri-
bution of actual and optimal firm sizes, I find that the majority of less productive
firms are bigger in size compared to their corresponding hypothetical efficient size
while the most productive firms are smaller than optimal size.
In line with the HK model’s predictions, firms that are eligible for investment
incentives, which enjoy tax exemptions and preferential access to credit, have lower
revenue productivity. The findings on revenue productivity are consistent with the
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results that document the presence of a high share of unproductive firms that are
bigger than their optimal size. The results suggest that the industrial policies may
be sustaining or subsidizing the inefficient presence and growth of unproductive
firms. I also find that the firms that are eligible for investment incentives have
lower physical productivity. Physical productivity is taken to be exogenous in the
HK frame work. The fact that the policies have an impact on physical productivity
suggests that the policies could have implications beyond the allocative efficiency
that is examined within the HK framework.
The variations in eligibility to the incentives create larger within-sector distor-
tion of input prices for the prioritized sectors if the priority and non-priority sec-
tors are similar otherwise. Consistent with this prediction, I find that both poli-
cies exacerbate the extent of the within-sector dispersion in revenue productivity
for sectors that enjoy priority status. Furthermore, the removal of the first policy,
which resulted the transition from focus on import substitution to export promo-
tion, may have contributed to the observed improvements in allocative efficiency.
While the HK methodology is a useful approach to examine the effects of distor-
tions to input prices, the methodology has three main shortcomings that limit the
interpretations of my findings on the efficacy of industrial policies. First, one of the
objectives of both industrial policies implemented by the Ethiopian government is
to improve equity. For instance, both policies provide additional incentives for
the firms that locate in underdeveloped regions. Nonetheless, the HK framework
does not allow for the evaluation of the benefits of the industrial policies in terms
of improving equity relative to efficiency. Second, the HK methodology employed
in this paper considers the static effects of the industrial polices on the allocation
of resources. However, there could be potential gains from an intentional distor-
tion of input prices if the industrial policies create dynamic gains through learning
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spillovers and externalities from economies of scale. For instance, Bartelme et al.
(2017) show that in the presence of external economies of scale, there could be sig-
nificant gains from industrial policies that subsidize select sectors at the expense of
others. Third, the HK framework assumes that physical productivity is exogenous.
This assumption does not hold in the context studied in this paper since I find that
the investment incentives also affect physical productivity of firms. Hence, the
overall impact of the industrial policies will not be fully captured by the extent of
the allocative efficiency that is evaluated under the HK accounting methodology.
Given the aforementioned caveats, I consider the key contributions of the pa-
per to be threefold. First, it evaluates the extent and evolution of the misallocation
for the Ethiopian manufacturing sector. Second, it examines the extent to which
the within and across sector variations in firms’ access to investment incentives
contributes to the observed misallocation. Third, it provides a comparison of how
two different industrial policy regimes, different in focus and coverage, affect al-
locative efficiency. Overall, I consider the findings in this paper as informative of
the static cost of the intentional distortions to factor prices that are induced by the
industrial policies from the perspective of improving allocative efficiency.
This paper fits within a burgeoning literature that examines the relevance of
misallocation to the growth of the manufacturing sector and the overall develop-
ment of the economy. Hall and Jones (1999) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009)) have ar-
gued that most of the differences between developed and developing countries can
be explained by differences in productivity rather than the level of inputs to pro-
duction. To this end, factor distortions play a crucial role in development since, as
HK showed, misallocation can have large impact on aggregate productivity. Other
recent works, such as Hsieh and Klenow (2014) for India and Mexico, Ziebarth
(2013) for 19th century U.S., Dias et al. (2016) for Portugal and Busso et al. (2013)
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for several Latin American countries, have also emphasized the large effect that
within-industry distortions can have on aggregate productivity. See Hopenhayn
(2014) for a more detailed survey of the growing literature on firms and misalloca-
tion.
While HK’s analysis focuses on changes in resource allocation for a given distri-
bution of physical productivity, Peters et al. (2012) argues that misallocation also
has dynamic consequences as it interacts with firms innovation and entry deci-
sions, and thus affects the evolution of the distribution of physical as well as rev-
enue productivity. The results in my context suggest that physical productivity
may be endogenous and evolving over time. Firm that are eligible for the invest-
ment incentives have lower physical productivity. The removal of the first indus-
trial policy results in the improvement in the physical productivity of the formerly
eligible firms. The results suggest that the two policies may be entry and growth
of less productive firms that would not exist in the absence of the investment in-
centives. Furthermore, in line with Chen and Irarrazabal (2015) paper for Chile,
the analysis in this paper also builds upon the HK framework by evaluating the
changes in both the distribution of physical productivity and allocative efficiency.
I find that, over my study period, the improved allocation of resources between
firms of different productivity was the major factor explaining the decline in mis-
allocation.
Furthermore, this paper contributes to the reemerging literature on the effects
of industrial policies on productivity growth. Following World War II, many de-
veloping countries had adopted activist industrial policies in order to promote
their infant industries or shield local economic activities from competition from
producers in advanced economies. Nonetheless, these policies went out of fa-
vor in the 1980s as studies showed that they tended to shelter unproductive firms
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and allowed for capture of governments by rent-seeking producers. For instance,
Krueger and Tuncer (1982)’s finding undermined the infant industry arguments
for protective industrial policies since the study found no evidence that more pro-
tected industries in Turkey experienced a higher rate of cost decline than less pro-
tected industries.
However, perhaps following the recent success of the Chinese economy which
had extensive industrial policies, there has been a revival of interest in the types
of effective industrial policies. The focus of the new studies in the literature is
to identify the channels through which they affect productivity (see Lane (2018);
Liu (2018); Bartelme et al. (2017); Nunn and Trefler (2010); Rodrik (2009); Lin and
Chang (2009)). For instance, Aghion et al. (2015), using a comprehensive dataset of
all medium and large enterprises in China, show that industrial policies allocated
to competitive sectors or that foster competition in a sector increase productivity
growth. However, the evidence on the effects of industrial policies is till mixed.
Criscuolo et al. (2019) study area-specific EU policy that supports manufacturing
plants in the UK, and find positive program treatment effects on employment, in-
vestment and net entry but not on TFP.
Furthermore, Buera et al. (2013), using calibrations of a theoretical model, ar-
gue that well-intended industrial policies can have detrimental long-run effects on
aggregate output and productivity as subsidies continue to prop up formerly pro-
ductive but now unproductive firms. This paper complements Buera et al. (2013))
as it uses the variations induced by actual industrial policies in Ethiopia to provide
evidence for how well-intended policies can negatively affect the productivity and
aggregate output of an economy via the distortionary effects of investment incen-
tives.
Gebrewolde and Rockey (2019), use the same Ethiopian manufacturing data to
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examine the impact of the post 2003 direct sector support policy on labor, capital
and employment, and they show that the policy did not affect employment or pro-
ductivity. However, in their empirical analysis, Gebrewolde and Rockey (2019) do
not account for the effects of the priority sector support policies that commenced
in 1996, and their measure of policy treatment is a coarse categorization of the four
large sectors which the government has emphasized in its development policy. In
contrast to Gebrewolde and Rockey (2019), this paper focuses on the priority sector
targeting policies (tax holidays, loss carry forward, customs duty exemption) that
were specifically outlined in Regulation 7/1996 and that were repealed by Procla-
mation No. 280/2002. I also use the detailed information available in Regulation
7/1996 to get a better variables that captures a firm’s eligibility based it’s sector,
location and investment status.
Importantly, this paper differs from Gebrewolde and Rockey (2019) and Criscuolo
et al. (2019) in that, using the HK framework, it addresses the effect of the loca-
tion and sector based industrial policy through the impact they have on resource
misallocation. This study aims to contribute to the literature on misallocation by
examining the distortionary effects priority sector targeting policies on the produc-
tivity of the manufacturing sector and its contribution to the Ethiopian economy as
a whole. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the only study that evaluates
the role of priority sector policies and misallocation for a developing country in
Sub-Saharan Africa.
Ethiopia is an interesting country to study the role of misallocation on the evo-
lution of the manufacturing sector for several reasons. First, Ethiopia is one of the
least developed countries in the world with a GDP per capita of $489 in 2013 (UN,
2015). However, it has become one of the most celebrated countries because it has
achieved double digit growth most of the years in the last decade (UN, 2015). Nev-
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ertheless, as Figure 3·1 shows, the value added share of the manufacturing sector
has strikingly remained below 5%. The manufacturing sector has experienced rel-
atively modest growth while the government has provided generous incentives to
firms in prioritized sectors under subsequent industrial policies. The literature on
idiosyncratic distortions shows that the misallocation of resources across firms can
have significant impact on the growth of aggregate productivity. Hence, Ethiopia
provides an interesting context to examine the aggregate effects of policy induced
distortions across firms. In particular, the within and across sector variations in
the incentives provided to firms under the two industrial polices provide us with
a unique opportunity to examine the relationship between industrial policy and
allocative efficiency within the manufacturing sector.
The rest of the paper proceeds as following: Section 3.2 provides institutional
background on the priority sector targeting policies in Ethiopia, Section 3.3 dis-
cusses the data and the relevant summary statistics on the Ethiopian manufactur-
ing sector, Section 3.4 presents the theoretical framework and empirical approach,
Section 3.5 discusses the main results on misallocation and examines the links be-
tween priority sector targeting policies and misallocation, Section 3.6 examines
the nature and evolution of the misallocation using detailed decompositions of
the variations in revenue productivity, Section 3.7 provides robustness checks, and
Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Industrial Policy: Priority Sector Targeting
The Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) deposed the Marx-
ist Derg regime in 1991 and it has governed Ethiopia ever since. As part of the
Agriculture Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) strategy, the government
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has implemented various market-oriented reforms amongst which is the policy
of providing special incentives to priority sectors that are considered integral for
the development of the country. In particular, these priority sectors are mainly
chosen in order to develop industries that exploit the country’s comparative ad-
vantage, import substitution, and the sectors’ potential for forging linkages be-
tween the agriculture and manufacturing sector. The implementation of the ADLI
strategy has been encoded by three five-year long Poverty Reduction Strategy Pa-
pers (PRSPs): the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan (SDPRP,
2000/01-2004/05), the Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End
Poverty (PASDEP, 2005/06-2009/10) and the two subsequent Growth and Trans-
formation Plans (GTP I, 2010/11-2014/15 and GTP II, 2015/16-2019/20).
For the purpose of this study, I consider the first two industrial policies enacted
under the EPRDF regime and encoded in two major investment regulations. The
first industrial policy, implemented during 1996-2002, was an activist policy favor-
ing import substitution while the second policy, enacted 2003-2012 can be char-
acterized as a policy that emphasized export promotion. The first sector-based
industrial policy, summarized in Table 3.1 was promulgated in Proclamation No.
37/1996 and encoded into specific regulations in Council of Ministers Regulations
No. 7/1996. Regulations No. 7/1996 divides investment activities eligible for in-
centives into two priority statuses, pioneer and promoted, where the main criteria
for the distinction into promoted and pioneer is a sector’s labor intensiveness and
linkage to the agricultural sector.
Pioneer activities are the top tier of activities that are agriculture-based and
require a large outlay or have strong linkage effects. The investment activities
considered pioneer include agriculture, agro-industry, manufacturing activities in
textile, chemicals, metal and electrical electricity generation, education and health.
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On the other hand, promoted activities are of secondary priority and include rain-
fed agriculture, livestock development, non-basic industries and contracting. Reg-
ulations No. 7/1996 specifies the pioneer vs promoted schedules at the ISIC Rev
3.1 level of disaggregation of the manufacturing sector.
As shown in Table 3.1, in addition to the Pioneer or Promoted sector designa-
tion, a firm’s access to the investment incentives is also contingent on the firm’s
location, type of investment (new or expansionary) and minimum capital. The
eligibility criteria set forth under Regulations No. 7/1996, generates both within-
sector and across sector variation in access to the incentives. Thus, assuming no
other sources of distortions, the investment incentives can create distortions to in-
puts prices both across firms within the priority sectors as well as across sectors
that differ in their priority status.
In 2002, the incentives provided in Regulation No. 7/1996 were repealed by
Proclamation No. 280/2002 and the regulation was subsequently replaced by
Council of Ministers Regulations No. 84/2003. The new proclamation and the en-
suing regulation removed the pioneer vs promoted distinction. Although the new
incentives still target manufacturing and agro-industrial activities, the amendment
focused the provision of incentives based on a firm’s export capability. Thus, under
the new amendment, a broader set of firms are eligible for the investment incen-
tives based on their exporting capability. In particular, any enterprise engaged in
manufacturing and certain agro-processing activities gets 5 years income tax ex-
emption if it exports more than 50% of its product or supplies more than 75% to
an exporter while the enterprise would get 2 years of income tax exemption if it
exports less than 50% of its output. Firms located outside Addis Ababa get 1 ad-
ditional year of income tax exemption. Under the new regulation, all enterprises
engaged in the aforementioned activities are eligible to customs duty exemption
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on capital goods.
The focus of Regulation No. 84/2003 is to improve firms’ exporting capacity
and the eligibility criteria is conditional on firms’ exporting capacity than merely
their belonging into a particular sector or region. Although the 2003 amendment
still provides sector (and a location) based incentives, it has removed the distinc-
tion of pioneer vs promoted status and broadened the set and nature of poten-
tially eligible firms. While the eligibility criteria under the new policy still creates
within and across sector variation in access to the incentives, the eligibility criteria
is broader in comparison to the old incentives scheme.
In addition to getting rid of distortionary pioneer and promoted sub-sector
distinctions, the export criteria under the new policy may also force firms to be
efficient, since being able to successfully sell ones products on the world market
requires a high degree of efficiency. Hence, one could expect that Regulation No.
7/1996 and No. 84/2003 could have very different effects on the evolution of the
distribution of physical and revenue productivity. To this end, the empirical anal-
ysis presented in this paper will examine the extent to which the two different
policies may have affected the allocation of resources by exploiting the sector, re-
gional and investment type variations in eligibility to the benefits stipulated by
Regulation No. 7/1996 and the 2003 amendment.
3.3 Data
The main data used for the empirical analysis is a firm-level panel data that comes
from the annual census, the Large and Medium Manufacturing Industry Surveys
(LMMIS), conducted by the Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency (CSA) from 1995
to 2008. Although the title of the dataset says ”survey”, it is a misnomer since the
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LMMIS is a census (except for 2005 survey) that covers all establishments with 10
or more employees that use power driven machinery. 1
The LMMIS dataset provides detailed identifying information on the establish-
ment, ownership structure, employee characteristics and wages and benefits paid,
value and sources of inputs, assets, investments and sources of financing, value
and types of products, prices, quantity and value of sales, quantity and value of
exports, full capacity production, and types of problems faced by the firm such as
lack of loans, amongst many other pertinent variables.
As Table 3.2 shows, the number of firms in manufacturing sector is increasing
rapidly. The number of manufacturing firms has more than tripled from 1995 to
2008. The number of publicly owned firms has continued to decrease over time,
due to the privatization process that the current regime has adopted. Furthermore,
manufacturing sector as a whole, the average establishment size has been declin-
ing, especially in terms of the average employment as a measure of size. This could
be due to downsizing of large public enterprises and/or the large entry of small
private firms (Shiferaw, 2009; Siba, 2015).
In the Ethiopian context, informal firms (self-employed or employed in an es-
tablishment with fewer than 10 employees) play a large role. In 2012, 32% of the
urban employment in Ethiopia is estimated to be in the informal sector. Most of
these firms operate on a very small scale with a low level of organization and with
little or no access to organized markets, credit institutions, modern technology,
and many public services and amenities (Siba, 2015). Hence, one could argue that
the constraints that lead to distortions would bind even more for the firms that are
not observed in LMMIS data.
1The reported number of firms in 2005 is lower than the actual number of firms since the CSA
decided to take samples in specific sectors, such as manufacturers of articles of concrete, cement,
and plaster, bakery products, instead of the full enumeration of all the establishments.
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However, this study focuses on the formal large and medium scale industries
for two main reasons. First, unlike for small scale industries, there is detailed panel
data in the LMMIS census that allows for a comprehensive analysis. Second, this
study examines the impact of priority sector targeting policies on misallocation,
and most of the informal firms would not meet the minimum capital requirement
to be eligible of these investment incentives.
Table 3.3 provides summary statistics on the distribution of firms by the prior-
ity sectors and region status. Consistent with the priority sector support policies,
firms that are eligible for the pioneer sector incentives tend to be larger than ineligi-
ble firms, except in the underdeveloped regions. Furthermore, as expected, there
are more firms in the promoted sectors than in pioneer sectors, and most of the
firms are located in Addis and the Neighboring regions identified by Regulations
No. 7/1996.
3.4 Methodology: Theory and Empirical Approach
The main objective of this study is to examine how the two aforementioned policies
affect the allocation of resources across firms and shape the growth of aggregate
TFP. To this end, I use the methodology developed by Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
to examine the extent of misallocation and the gains from efficient reallocation of
factors in the Ethiopian manufacturing sector. I also use the HK framework to
back out firm level revenue productivity, physical productivity and measures of
distortions to output and capital (wedges) to examine their relationship with firm
and sector level eligibility to the incentives provided under the two policies.
As discussed above, part of the consideration of the two policies is to improve
regional equality in the entry of manufacturing firms and to facilitate the potential
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inter-sectoral linkages. The policymakers could be partly trading off initial alloca-
tive inefficiencies with the objective to improve equity or facilitate dynamic gains.
One of the shortcomings of the HK methodology is that it is unable to account for
the evaluation of equity considerations or the presence of inter-sectoral spillovers.
Hence, the analyses in this paper should be interpreted as evaluating the static cost
and benefit of the investment incentives through the lens of improving allocative
efficiency with the caveat that there are potential benefits of the policies that are
not accounted for in the HK framework.
The HK accounting procedure uses a model of monopolistic competition with
heterogeneous firms that differ in levels of efficiency and potentially in levels of
output and capital distortions.
There is a single final output Y, produced by a representative firm in a perfectly
competitive market, which is Cobb-Douglass aggregate of industry outputs of S
manufacturing sectors
Y =
S∏
i=s
Y θss , where
S∑
s=1
θs = 1 (3.1)
Industry output, Ys, is a CES aggregate of Ms differentiated products, where
the degree of substitution between variaties is σ > 1.
Ys =
(
Ms∑
i=1
Y
σ−1
σ
is
) σ
σ−1
(3.2)
Each firm in industry s, for s=1, ..S, produces with a standard Cobb-Douglas
aggregate of capital and labor where αs in the industry specific capital share.
Yis = AisK
αs
is L
1−αs
is (3.3)
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HK capture misallocation by defining two types of firm specific distortions:
output distortions ( τY,is), which are distortions to both the marginal product of
capital and labor, and capital distortions ( τK,is), which are distortions to marginal
product of capital relative to labor. However, as HK show, there is a way to syn-
thesize the distortions to absolute levels of labor and capital using particular com-
binations of τY,is and τk,is.
Accounting for idiosyncratic output and capital wedges, the firm’s problem can
be stated as
max
Pis,Kis,Lis
(1− τY,is)PisYis − wLis − (1 + τK,is)RKis st : Yis = Ys
[
Ps
Pis
]σ
(3.4)
One can interpret the output distortion, τY,is as a taxation or subsidy propor-
tional to output. For instance, τY,is is low for firms that benefit from government
subsidies while it is high for firms that face restrictions on size or regulatory con-
ditions proportional to output that limit a firm’s profitability. Similarly, τK,is is a
distortion to capital relative to labor that raises the marginal product of capital. For
instance, τK,is could be low for firms that have better access to credit while it is high
for firms that do not have preferential access to credit. The way the wedges are de-
fined above, output wedged corresponds to the distortions that affect the marginal
revenue product of both capital and labor in a symmetric manner and, thus, does
not distort the capital to labor ratio. On the other hand, the capital wedge makes
capital services more costly relative to labor, and thus distorts the capital to labor
ratio below the efficient level.
The HK accounting procedure builds upon the distinction stressed by Foster,
Foster et al. (2008) that when plant specific price deflators are used the conven-
tional productivity measure yields TFPQ (“physical productivity”) while if indus-
219
try price deflators are used the conventional measure of productivity yields TFPR
(“revenue productivity”). The two measures of productivity can be calculated as
following:
TFPQis = Ais =
Yis
Kαsis L
1−αs
is
(3.5)
TFPRis = PisAis =
PisYis
Kαsis L
1−αs
is
(3.6)
In fact, HK show that the measure of TFPR is proportional to the extent of the
capital and output distortions as following:
TFPRis =
σ
σ − 1
(
R
αs
)αs( w
1− αs
)1−αs (1 + τK,is)αs
1− τY,is (3.7)
where w is the wage and R is the rental price of capital.
As equation 7 shows, even if TFPQ varies across plants, TFPR should not vary
across plants within the same sector unless plants face idiosyncratic capital and/or
output distortions. In the absence of distortions, more capital and labor would
be allocated to plants with higher TFPQ to the point where their higher output
results in a lower price and the exact same TFPR as the firms with lower physical
productivity.
Hence, within-sector variations in TFPR are indicators of the presence of dis-
tortions. A higher plant TFPR is a sign that the plant confronts barriers that raise
the plant’s marginal products of capital and labor. On the other hand, below in-
dustry average TFPR suggests the firms faced smaller capital wedges (i.e. 1 + τK,is
lower perhaps due to preferential access to credit) and/or it has a lower output
wedge (i.e. 1 − τY,is is high perhaps due to subsidies or tax holidays that increase
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the fraction of income that the firm retains).
Furthermore, industry TFP is:
TFPs =
(
Ms∑
i=1
[
Ais
TFPRs
TFPRis
]σ−1) 1σ−1
(3.8)
where TFPRs is the geometric average of the average marginal product of cap-
ital and labor in sector s calculated as following:
TFPRs =
σ
σ − 1
[
R
αs
∑Ms
i=1
1−τY,is
1+τK,is
PisYis
PsYs
]αs[
w
(1− αs)
∑Ms
i=1(1− τY,is)PisYisPsYs
]αs
(3.9)
Note that if all the idiosyncratic distortions are eliminated, i.e. 1+τK,is = 1−τY,is =
1, the efficient TFP is:
TFP es = A¯s =
(
Ms∑
i=1
Aσ−1is
) 1
σ−1
(3.10)
The key to inference in the HK methodology is the variations in the capital/labor
ratio and the labor shares. As in Chari et al. (2007), the capital and output distor-
tions can be inferred from the residuals in the first oder equations. In particular,
HK show that
1+τK,is =
αs
R(1− αs)
wLis
Kis
and 1−τY,is = σ
σ − 1(
1
(1− αs))
wLis
PisYis
(3.11)
In the efficient benchmark, TFPQ naturally varies across firms in a given sec-
tor but revenue productivity (TFPR) should be constant across firms since more
capital and labor is allocated to plants with higher TFPQ to the point where their
higher output results in proportionately lower price. Hence, as the equations in
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(11) demonstrate, the variations in capital/labor ratio reveal the capital distortions
while the variations in the labor share reveal the output distortions.
Furthermore, one of the main advantages of the HK procedure is that only a
measure of the dispersion TFPR is a sufficient summary statistics to evaluate the
efficiency loses due to misallocation. In particular, in the case where logAis, log(1−
τY,is), log(1 + τK,is) are joint multivariate normals, then by the Central Limit Theo-
rem, industry productivity, TFPs is given by
logTFPs = logTFP
s
e −
σ
2
var(logTFPRis)− αs(1− αs)
2
varlog(1 + τK,is) (3.12)
Equation (12) implies that changes in aggregate manufacturing TFP come from
two sources: changes in the efficient TFP ( which is a function of physical pro-
ductivity) and changes in the allocative efficiency (captured by the variance of id-
iosyncratic distortions). The above equation illustrates the importance of consid-
ering the changes in both the distribution of physical productivity and allocative
efficiency in order to examine the evolution and extent of misallocation.
Furthermore, the above equation illustrates the importance of entry and exit
dynamics for the extent of misallocation since changes in Ms and the Ais of en-
trants and exiting firms affect aggregate TFP on the extensive margin via TFP es . In
addition, equation (12) also shows that, higher σ, i.e. less substitutability between
goods, implies a greater reduction of aggregate TFP for a given variance of TFPR.
This is intuitive since if there is less substitutability between goods it will be dif-
ficult to substitute away from unproductive firms, which exacerbates the effect of
the misallocation.
In order to implement the HK framework empirically, I need to back out sector
output shares, sector capital shares, and the firm-specific distortions from the data
222
in order to calculate the extent of the misallocation. For the measurement and
calibration of the relevant variables, I follow standard procedures in the literature,
and these steps are detailed in the Appendix.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Extent of Misallocation: Distribution of TFPQ and TFPR
As equation 12 shows, a sector’s aggregate TFP is affected by changes in the ef-
ficient TFP (which is a function of the distribution of physical productivity) and
allocative efficiency (i.e. the dispersion of revenue productivity). Thus, in this
section, I start with a preliminary discussion of the evolution of the distribution
of physical and revenue productivity in order to examine the factors that deter-
mine the extent of the misallocation. Figure 3·2 (a) and (b) plot the distribution
log scaled of TFPQ, log(AisM
1
σ−1
s /As) and log scaled TFPR, log(TFPRis/TFPRs)),
respectively, for selected years. For some of the discussions presented below, I an-
alyze the results from the Ethiopian manufacturing sector in comparison to HK’s
findings for India, China and the US. Please see their paper for the references.
In comparison to HK’s result for India, China and the US, there is a much
greater dispersion in TFPQ in Ethiopia. Furthermore, the left tail of TFPQ is far
thicker in Ethiopia suggesting the disproportionate presence of inefficient firms.
Nevertheless, the TFPQ distribution shifts to the right and becomes less dispersed
overtime. The distributions of TFPQ in 1997-2002 have fatter left tails compared
to the corresponding distributions for 2003-2008 consistent with the presence of
policies in the pre-2003 era that favored the survival of the less efficient plants.
The reduction in the dispersion of log scaled TFPQ suggest that there has been
an increase in the exit rate of inefficient plants or that they may have improved
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their physical productivity overtime faster than the industry average. Across dif-
ferent measures of dispersion of log TFPQ, the results suggest that changes in the
left tail of the TFPQ distribution may have contributed significantly to the ob-
served post-2002 improvements in aggregate TFP.
Under efficient allocation, revenue productivity will be equalized across firms
in an industry. Thus, greater dispersion of TFPR would indicate higher degree
of misallocation of resources across firms. Moreover, higher dispersions in TFPR
would suggest larger potential gains from efficient reallocation of resources. As
shown in Figure 3·2 (b), there is a much greater variation in TFPR in Ethiopia than
in India, China or USA. However, similar to the pattern for TFPQ, there have been
improvements in allocative efficiency over time in Ethiopia. Compared to 2003-
2008, the distribution of TFPR in 1997-2002 has a much fatter left tail and larger
dispersion consistent with the presence of policies (subsidies, tax holidays, or loss
carry forward privileges) in those years that lower firms’ revenue productivity.
Note that the HK model predicts that revenue productivity is less dispersed
than physical productivity since TFPRis = PisAis and there is a negative relation-
ship between physical productivity and prices. Consistent with the predictions,
Figures 2 shows that the distribution of TFPR is much less dispersed than the dis-
tribution of TFPQ.
Overall, the distribution of TFPQ and TFPR suggest that improvements in al-
locative efficiency, as well as increase physical productivity, contributed to the ob-
served improvement in efficiency over the studied period. Furthermore, the thin-
ning of the left tails of TFPQ and TFPR could both be the results of the removal of
the location-sector based benefits since the removal or amendment of these privi-
leges would incentivize unproductive firms to exit, downsize to the efficient level
or increase their productivity in order to compete with foreign producers.
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The Distribution of Actual vs Efficient Plant Size
As equation (12) shows the magnitude of efficient TFP is a function of the distribu-
tion of physical productivity. Indeed, the observations on the evolution of physical
and revenue productivity is corroborated by the patterns in the evolution of the ef-
ficient plant size. In this section, I examine the changes in the efficient and actual
plant sizes in order to provide further evidence for the role of the improvements in
efficient TFP and better allocative efficiency for the growth of the manufacturing
sector.
Combining equations (3) and (11), the firm’s output as a function of physical
productivity and distortions is:
Yis = A
σ
is
(1− τY,is)σ
(1 + τK,is)αsσ
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ(
αs
R
)αsσ(1− αs
w
)σ(1−αs)
Ys (3.13)
Then, using the firm’s demand function, I can rewrite the above and note that
firm size is a function of physical productivity and the size of the distortions:
PisYis ∝
[
Ais
1− τY,is
(1 + τK,is)αs
]σ−1
(3.14)
As equation (16) shows, the evolution of the actual size distribution and its
proximity to the efficient size distribution is affected by the changes in the distribu-
tion of physical productivity as well as the idiosyncratic distortions. Since σ > 1,
under efficient allocation, firm size is increasing in physical productivity. How-
ever, under the presence of distortions, if TFPQ and output wedge are negatively
correlated or TFPQ and capital wedges are positively correlated, more productive
firms tend to be smaller than the efficient size while less productive firms tend to
be larger than their efficient size. Hence, when there are distortions, the efficient
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size distribution is more dispersed than the actual size distribution.
Figure 3·3 shows that, for the Ethiopian manufacturing sector, more productive
firms face greater output and capital distortions. Indeed, the unweighted corre-
lation between physical productivity (measured as log scaled TFPQ ) and output
wedges (measured as log scaled 1 − τY,is) is about -0.43 where as, measured anal-
ogously, the correlation between physical productivity and capital wedges (mea-
sured as log scaled 1 + τK,is)) is about 0.41. These correlations suggest that less
productive firms benefit from subsidies or exemptions that increase the income
they retain and they also may have better and cheaper access to credit.
Hence, the signs and magnitude of the aforementioned correlation patterns pre-
dict that more productive firms tend to be smaller than the efficient size while less
productive firms tend to be larger than their efficient size. Indeed, this prediction
is supported by Figure 3·4, which shows the distribution of actual plant size and
hypothetical efficient plant size, using value added as a measure of size and pool-
ing the data for 1997-2002 and 2003-2008 separately. For all the years, the efficient
distribution is more dispersed with fewer middle sized plants and more large and
small plants. In line with the earlier discussion regarding improvements in factor
allocation, the actual distribution of plant size is closest to the efficient distribution
for 2009.
Figure 3·5 presents further evidence on the differences between the actual and
hypothetical efficient size of firms pooling the data from 1997-2008. As the figure
shows, on average firms in the lowest quintiles of physical productivity within
each sector are bigger than their efficient size while the most productive firms are
smaller than their efficient size. The pattern in the differences between actual and
efficient plant size are suggestive of the presence of distortions that constrain the
most productive firms and sustain the least productive ones.
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A detailed examination of the actual and efficient size distributions provide
further evidence that the improvements in aggregate TFP over-time is partly due
to the reduction in the number of firms that are inefficiently high sized and an
increase in the faction of firms who are close to their efficient size. In 1997, about
71.4% of the plants have efficient size less than half actual size and 10.4% of the
firms have efficient size more than twice the actual size. The corresponding figures
are 69.8% and 11.8% for 2008. There also has been an increase in the fraction of
firms whose actual size is within 50-200% of their efficient size.
Despite the observed improvements, there are still significant inefficiencies in
firm sizes. Where as there are fewer inefficiently high sized plants in 2008, the
fraction of firms who would have to downsize by at least 50% to their efficient size
is still at a high 69.8%. Hence, under an efficient reallocation, many plants of all
sizes would have to shrink.
3.5.2 Aggregate Gains from Efficient Reallocation
Before examining the relevance of industrial policies for the observed misalloca-
tion, in this section, I evaluate the aggregate gains in output if factors are reallo-
cated efficiently within each sector, i.e. under a first best scenario? In order to
answer this, I follow the approach used by HK to calculate the gross output gains
by comparing actual output with the “efficient” output under the condition where
TFPR is equalized across firms within each sector.
Then, the aggregate efficiency gains can be summarized by the ratio of actual
output and efficient output as following:
Y
Yefficient
=
S∏
s=1
(
Ms∑
i=1
[
Ais
As
TFPRs
TFPRis
]σ−1) θsσ−1
(3.15)
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Note that, as equation (15) shows, under the first best scenario where revenue
productivity is equalized across all firms within a sector (TFPRis = TFPRs), the
ratio of actual to efficient output would equal to 1.
Figure 3·6 presents the results on the percent gains from equalizing TFPR across
all plants within each industry, measured as 100(Yeffcient/Y −1). The gains from re-
allocation are increasing in the value of σ since the smaller degree of substitutabil-
ity between sectors, the higher is the impact of misallocation and the larger are the
gains from efficient reallocation. Hence, for the results presented in Figure 3·6, I
calculate the efficiency gains using a conservative measure of σ = 3 and σ = 4.
Gains from efficient reallocation are very large for Ethiopian manufacturing
sector. If idiosyncratic distortions were removed, aggregate manufacturing TFP
would more than double for most of the years. These results are consistent with
the aforementioned finding that the Ethiopian manufacturing sector exhibits very
large dispersions in physical and revenue productivity. Furthermore, as expected,
the implied gains from efficient reallocation are larger when using σ = 4.
As Figure 3·6 shows, there is an increase in the gains from efficient allocation
starting in 1997 but it is followed by strikingly sharp decline in the gains from
efficient reallocation in 2002. After 2002, the efficiency gains remains relatively
lower than the pre-2002 period until 2008. The results suggest that there has been
large improvements in allocative efficiency over the studied period, and increase
in allocative efficiency has contributed to the overall growth of the manufacturing
sector.
Overall, the observed large yearly variations in the gains from efficient reallo-
cation provide us with an opportunity to study the factors that determine the ex-
tent and evolution of the misallocation in the manufacturing sector. Interestingly,
the sharp decline in the extent of the misallocation coincides with the passing of
228
Proclamation No. 280/2002 that repealed the location and sector based priority
sector incentives of Regulation 7/1996 and amended them with the mainly export
based investment incentives encoded in Regulation 280/2003.
3.5.3 Main Results: Industrial Policy and Misallocation
The Effects of Investment Incentives on Firm Level TFPR and TFPQ
In the preceding sections, the analyses showed that there are significant yearly
variations in the gains from efficient reallocation. Furthermore, the detailed ex-
amination of the factors that affect the extent of misallocation suggested that the
severity of the dispersion is due to the presence of large fraction of firms in the
bottom quantile distribution of physical productivity that had lower capital and
output wedges. Furthermore, the results indicate that most of the improvement in
efficient TFP and efficient resource allocation is due to the exit rate of inefficient
plants or faster than average increase in the physical productivity firms in the bot-
tom of the TFPQ distribution.
All of these results on the extent of misallocation are consistent with install-
ment and subsequent removal/weakening of policies that would encourage the
entrance and survival of inefficient firms. This is especially true since the firms
that contributed to lower efficient TFP and larger dispersion in TFPR seem to ben-
efit from tax holidays (or subsidies) that would decrease their output wedges (or
face negative output wedges in the case of subsidies) and preferential access to
credit that would have lowered idiosyncratic capital wedges. In addition, the ob-
served improvements in efficient TFP and between-quantile efficient reallocations
are also consistent with the removal of policies that would have sheltered such
inefficient firms.
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The first policy, implemented during 1996-2002, was an activist industrial pol-
icy favoring import substitution while the second policy, implemented during
2003-2012 was an activist trade policy that emphasized export promotion. The
2002 investment proclamation that repealed Regulation 7/1996 had the same broad
objectives in terms of support for the manufacturing sector, but the incentives are
revised to remove the classification of sub-sectors into pioneer and promoted and
it conditioned the incentives based on export capability.
Hence, the 2002 amendment broadened the scope of the investment incen-
tives since any manufacturing or agro-industry firm was eligible for the incen-
tives based on its exporting capability. The export-based priority sector targeting
could still increase the degree of within-sector misallocation since it can also create
within-sector variations in the capital and output wedges. However, to the ex-
tent that the abandonment of the distortionary pioneer and promoted sub-sector
distinctions could have allowed for more equal eligibility to these incentives, the
second industrial policy could lessen the impact of priority sector incentives on the
severity of misallocation.
Furthermore, as Aghion et al. (2015) have argued, industrial policies that fos-
ter within-sector competition are more likely to engender productivity growth.
Hence, the export based eligibility criteria of the second policy could reduce re-
source misallocation simply by forcing firms to be efficient, since being able to
successfully sell ones products on the world market requires a high degree of effi-
ciency.
In this section, I examine the extent to which these priority sector support poli-
cies may have affected within-industry misallocation by exploiting the sectoral, re-
gional and investment type variations in eligibility to the benefits stipulated in the
two policies. First, the analysis evaluates the relationship between priority sector
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benefits and firm level TFPQ and TFPR using firm level regressions. Then, using
sector level regressions, I examine the relationship between a sector’s eligibility for
priority sector benefits and the extent of the within-sector misallocation.
The main motivation for the firm level regressions of TFPR on eligibility for
priority sector benefits is the following equation :
TFPRis =
σ
σ − 1
(
R
αs
)αs( w
1− αs
)1−αs (1 + τK,is)αs
1− τY,is (3.16)
One can think of the tax exemptions and loss carry forward incentives given
to firms in prioritized sectors as subsidies that increase the revenue retained by
the firm, and the easier credit access as measures that reduce the firm’s cost. As
the above equation shows, a firm’s TFPR is proportional to the ratio of capital
wedge and output wedge. A firm in a prioritized sector faces smaller capital and
output wedges (i.e 1 + τK,si is smaller and 1− τY,si is higher). Thus, under the HK
framework, all else equal, a firm in a prioritized sector will unambiguously have a
lower revenue productivity. Furthermore, as Buera et al. (2013) argued, at least in
the long run, priority sector support policies may shelter or encourage the entrance
unproductive firms. Hence, the incentives given to firms in priority sectors could
result in lower physical productivity.
Nevertheless, ex-ante, it is not clear as to the direction of the effect of priority
sector targeting on within-sector misallocation. Equation (12) shows that sector
level productivity is a decreasing function of the variance of TFPR, but an increas-
ing function of the number of firms in that sector. Starting from an efficient allo-
cation, the imposition of a priority sector support policy would lead to resource
misallocation since the firms that benefit from priority status would have lower
TFPRs and there will be variations in firms’ eligibility and use of the incentives
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available under the policy. The aggregate productivity of sector s, logTFPs, is
decreasing in the variance of revenue productivity (var(logTFPRs)). Thus, the
implementation of policies that favor selected firms in a given sector will lead to
higher within-industry variance in revenue productivity and lower aggregate pro-
ductivity. In addition, the presence of priority sector targeting policies may allow
for the entrance or continuing existence of low productivity firm and thus lead to
a reduction in aggregate TFP.
On the other hand, if the firms that end up benefiting from the privileges of
priority status designation were already facing tougher access to credit or more
restriction before the policy, then priority sector targeting policies could be correc-
tive mechanisms that can potentially lessen the degree of misallocation by leveling
the playing field.
Eligibility to Investment Incentive, Wedges and Revenue Productivity
In this section, I first examine the relationship eligibility for investment incentives
and firm level distortions using a differences-in-differences approach by exploit-
ing the variations in eligibility across firms and the policy changes over time. Un-
fortunately, the LMMIS dataset does not contain information on whether a firm
applied for or received the benefits provided by Regulation 7/1996. However, as
discussed in section 2, a firm’s eligibility for the priority sector or location incen-
tives are determined based on the firm’s sector status, location, minimum capital
and investment type (new enterprise or one that made expansionary/upgrading
investment).
The LMMIS data set contains all of this information, and I can determine whether
a particular firm is eligible for the benefits available to firms in the Pioneer sec-
tor, Promoted sector or neither based on whether the firm satisfied the regulations
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stipulations. Hence, one can think of the Pioneer Eligible and Promoted Eligible vari-
ables as measuring an approximation of treatment status to corresponding priority
sector benefits. In order construct the variable on eligibility for the incentives pro-
vided in the second industrial policy, i.e New Policy, I use the treatment variable
constructed in Gebrewolde and Rockey (2019). Due to the absence of data on sales
to exporters, the definition of eligibility under the new policy is constructed solely
using sector priority status.
Since I do not observe the take up of the benefits provided under the two poli-
cies, the estimates on the coefficients using the Pioneer Eligible and Promoted Eligible
and New Policy variables have intent to treat interpretations.
Table 3.4 presents the results from firm level regressions that examine the ef-
fect of the removal of the old policy and the institution of the neew policy. In
particular, I examine the coefficients on PioneerEligibleXPost2002 and PromotedEli-
gibleXPost2002 to evaluate how the removal of the old policies affected previously
eligible firms. On the other hand, the coefficient on NewPolicyXPost2002 captures
the effect of eligibility to the incentives provided under the new policy. Column 1
and 2 include sector fixed effects at the ISIC four digit level. The sector fixed effects
account for unobserved time invariant specific characteristics, such as comparative
advantage in a given sector. Columns 1 and 2 also include controls on firm owner-
ship type and age. Column 3 adds firm fixed effect to account for any firm specific
time invariant characteristics.
As Table 3.4 shows that firm that are eligible for investment incentives have
lower TFPR. In particular, firm’s TFPR increases after the removal of the first in-
dustrial policy while TFPR increases for the firms that are eligible for incentives
under the new policy. These findings are consistent with the results on the evo-
lution of the distribution of physical productivity and efficient TFP. As discussed
233
in Section 3.5.1, the left tail of the distribution of TFPQ was much fatter for the
pre-2002 period, and there is a significant thinning out of the left tail of the dis-
tribution since 2002. These are consistent with the above finding that the priority
sector privileges may encourage the entrance or shelter inefficient firms and that
the removal of the incentives has allowed for an the exit of unproductive firms or
it has given them incentives to increase their productivity faster than the industry
average.
In addition, assuming the playing field was level across firms before the polices,
firms that are Pioneer Eligible have access to more generous benefits and would
have lower TFPR compared to firms that were Promoted Eligible. As expected,
all the results in Table 3.4 show that firms that were Pioneer Eligible had a much
smaller revenue and physical productivity compared to firms that were Promoted
Eligible. And the removal of the benefits stipulated by Regulation 7/1996 lead to
an increase in the TFPR and TFPQ for formerly Pioneer Eligible firms while it had
an insignificant effect on the firms that were Promoted Eligible.
The results presented in Table 3.4 corroborate the theoretical expectation that,
all else equal, a firm that benefits from subsidies (such as the tax exemptions and
loss carry forward) and easier access to credit will have lower marginal products
and thus lower revenue productivity (TFPR). The coefficients are highly statisti-
cally significant in all the specifications and they provide a strong support to the
argument that priority sector targeting distorts firm’s revenue productivity.
In order to provide further evidence on the effects of the priority sector pol-
icy on firm level outcomes, in Table 3.5, I examine the links between eligibility
to priority benefits and output and capital wedges. For eligible firms, output
wedges should be lower (i.e. 1 − τY,is is higher) since they benefit from tax ex-
emptions/implicit subsidies and retain more of their profits, and capital wedges
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should be lower (i.e. 1 + τK,is is lower) since they have cheaper access to credit.
Hence, one would expect that after the removal of the first industrial policy would
result in a reduction in 1− τY,is and an increase in 1 + τK,is. On the other hand, for
the firms that are eligible under the new incentives, 1 − τY,is would increase and
1 + τK,is would decrease.
As predicted, Table 3.5 shows that the removal of the Pioneer Eligibility status
reduced firms’ output wedges, while the results for capital wedges are statistically
insignificant. The results for the firms that are Promoted Eligible are fairly similar.
In addition, Table 3.5 shows that for the firms that are eligible for investment in-
centives under the new policy 1− τY,is increases and 1+ τK,is decreases. The results
on the capital and output wedges are consistent with the findings on TFPR.
Overall, the findings in Table 3.4 and 3.5 show that both investment incentives
resulted in distortions to input prices and contributed to the observed misalloca-
tion. Furthermore, the reductions in distortions after the removal of the first indus-
trial policy indicate that the amendment of the first policy may have contributed
to improvements in allocative efficiency.
Eligibility to Investment Incentives and Physical Productivity
In Table 3.6, I examine whether eligibility to the investment incentives under the
two policies affects physical productivity (TFPQ) using the same data and specifi-
cation as in Table 3.4. The results in columns 1-3 demonstrate that firms that are
eligible for the investment incentives have lower TFPQ. In addition, the removal of
the first industrial policy results in improvement in physical productivity. On the
other hand, TFPQ declines for the firms that are eligible for incentives under the
new policy. These results are consistent with the aforementioned findings that the
investment incentives, particularly under the first industrial policy, may encour-
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age the entry or existence of less productive firms. However, the effects on TFPQ
also indicate that my findings crucially differ from the context studied in Hsieh
and Klenow (2009). The Hsieh and Klenow (2009) model assumes that physical
productivity is exogenous. The results in Table 3.6 suggest that the distortions in-
duced by the investment incentives may also directly affect physical productivity.
Eligibility to Investment Incentives, Entry and Exit
Furthermore, in Table 3.7, I examine the effect of the two policies on the entry and
exit of firms using the same difference-in-difference specification. I find that firms
that are eligible for incentives under both policies are more likely to enter and
exit. On the other hand, following the removal of the first industrial polices, firms
that are Pioneer Eligible are less like to enter and also less likely to exit. However,
there is a higher rate of entry and exit for the firms that become eligible to the
new benefits. These finding suggest that the benefits provided by the industrial
polices to eligible firms may encourage the entry of firms that are not able remain
competitive. In addition, before the removal of the first policy, the effect of access
to the incentives on entry is much larger than the effect on exit. Hence, on the net,
eligibility to the investment incentives under the first policy may have encouraged
the net entry of potentially less productive firms.
Priority Sector Status and Within-Sector TFPR Dispersion
The results from the preceding section showed that firms that are eligible for the
incentives provided to priority sub-sectors and regions in Regulation 7/1996 had
lower TFPR, especially the Pioneer Eligible firms. Furthermore, the removal of
the sector-location based incentives to Pioneer Eligible firms led to an increase in
236
their revenue productivity. Furthermore, the decomposition of total dispersion in
revenue productivity in Section 3.6 shows that the within-sector variation accounts
for the large share of the misallocation. These results naturally lead to ask to what
extent the variations in access to incentives induced by Regulation 7/1996 and its
repeal affected the degree of misallocation.
In particular, there is within-sector variation in firms’ eligibility to the incen-
tives provided under the pioneer and promoted designations of the first industrial
policy since the incentives are contingent on establishment year, type of invest-
ment, location and the sector within which the firm operates. Thus, to the ex-
tent that there is variation in firms’ eligibility for the priority sub-sector privileges
within a sector, the policy can lead to higher within-sector misallocation for the
sectors that have priority status. Furthermore, to the extent that the second pol-
icy makes eligibility contingent on exporting status, it may reduce the degree of
misallocation by fostering competition.
In this section, I examine the impact of sector level eligibility to incentives un-
der the two investment policies on the extent of within-sector variation in TFPR by
exploiting a policy change in how the government treated priority sectors. Specif-
ically, in Table 3.8, I examine the relationship between the priority status of the
sector and the within-sector dispersion in TFPR. The table also provides the results
with the inclusion of year fixed effect so as to control for unobserved heterogeneity
at the year level. In addition, I account for the differential investment incentives
that were provided under the second policy.
As Table 3.8 shows, the sectors that were eligible for Pioneer Sector benefits had
higher degree of within-industry misallocation, while the results are statistically
insignificant for the Promoted Sectors. Furthermore, the removal of the location
and sector based incentives lead to a large reduction in the extent of misallocation
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in the Pioneer sectors. The estimates on PioneerXPost2002, which capture the effect
of the removal of the incentives provided in the first policy, are consistent across
different specification and highly statistically significant. On the other hand, the
sectors that were eligible for the incentives provided under the new policy did not
have a significant level of misallocation.
Overall, the results from Table 3.8 suggest that the first priority sector support
policy resulted in increased level of misallocation, and that the 2002 amendment
that broadened the set of firms eligible for the investment incentives and empha-
sized export promotion lessened the degree of misallocation. All of these results
are consistent with the earlier findings on the extent and evolution of the observed
misallocation.
3.6 Evolution and Decomposition of within-sector TFPR Disper-
sion
3.6.1 Eligibility to Investment Incentives and Dispersion of TFPR - Within vs
Across Sector
As outlined in Section 3.2, the incentive schemes under both policies engender
within-sector as well as across sector variations in eligibility to the benefits. Both
policies create across sector variation in revenue product depending on the priority
status of the sector. The policies also engender within-sector variation in revenue
productivity because not all firms in the prioritized sectors will be eligible for the
incentives since eligibility and the magnitude of the benefits also depends on addi-
tional factors such as firm location, age, type of investment and minimum capital.
In order to evaluate the within and across sector dispersion in TFPR, in this
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section, I decompose the overall variations in TFPR for all manufacturing firms
in each year into within-sector and between-sector components. Each sector is
identified using ISIC four digit classification, and the decomposition is carried in
the following manner:
V ary(logTFPRisy) ≈ 1
My
S∑
s
NsV ar(logTFPRiy)s︸ ︷︷ ︸
within-sector variation in year y
+
1
My
S∑
s
Ns(logTFPRsy − logTFPRy)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
between-sector variation in year y
(3.17)
Figure 3·7 plots the total dispersion in TFPR as well as its decomposition into
the within-sector and between-sector dispersion in TFPR for 1. As the figure shows,
the within-sector variation in TFPR accounts for the large share of the dispersion
in overall TFPR dispersion. The results in Section 3.5.3 indicate sectors that enjoy
priority status have higher within-sector dispersion in revenue productivity. In
combination, the results suggest that the within-sector, across-firms variations in
distortions to input prices, perhaps due to across firm differences in eligibility to
incentives, account for the large share of the misallocation.
Given the above findings, in all the remaining section, the analyses will focus
on exploring the evolution of the within-sector variation in TFPR as it is the main
component of the overall dispersion in TFPR.
3.6.2 Priority Status and Dispersion of within-sector TFPR - Location vs Sector
The results in the preceding section demonstrated that the within-sector, rather
than the between-sector, variation largely accounts for the total variation in TFPR.
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In order to study the extent of the distortionary contributions of sector-based vs
location-based aspects of the industrial policies, in this section, I further decom-
pose the within-sector variations in TFPR into within-priority region and between-
priority region component. As before, I define a sector as an ISIC-4 digit classifica-
tion, and the decomposition is carried in the following manner:
V ars(logTFPRis) =
1
Ms
R∑
r
Nq∑
i
(logTFPRirs − logTFPRs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
total variation in sector s
≈ 1
Ms
R∑
r
NrV ar(logTFPRis)r︸ ︷︷ ︸
within-region variation in sector s
+
1
Ms
R∑
r
Nr(logTFPRrs − logTFPRs)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
between-region variation in sector s
(3.18)
where logTFPRirs is the log of TFPR for plant i that belongs in priority region r
(Addis and Neighboring, Underdeveloped or Elsewhere ) in the industry s (ag-
gregated at the ISIC 4-digit level); logTFPRs is the mean of logTFPR in industry
s while logTFPRsr is the mean of logTFPR of the over the firms in region r and
industry s.
As the decomposition of the variance of TFPR in Figure 3·7 (a) shows, the
within-priority-region variation of TFPR, rather than between-priority-regions vari-
ance, largely accounts for the extent of the dispersion in revenue productivity. The
results suggest that the sector-based variation (as opposed to location-based) of the
priority sector targeting policy is the most distortionary.
In addition, as show in Figure 3·7 (b), the decline in the within-priority region
variance (particularly the reduction in the sector level dispersion of TFPR within
Addis and Neighboring regions) is the driving force for the observed improve-
ments allocation efficiency.
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3.6.3 The Evolution of Allocative Efficiency
In the preceding sections, I examined the effects of the two industrial policies on
the extent of misallocation, and showed that the policies had significant distor-
tionary effects on the within-sector allocation of resources. In the subsequent sec-
tions, I investigate the evolution and determinants of allocative efficiency in more
detail by considering detailed decompositions of the variation in revenue produc-
tivity.
(Mis)allocation across plants of different productivity
The discussion on the extent and evolution of misallocation note that the left tail
of both the distribution of TFPQ and TFPR has thinned out significantly over time,
especially after 2002. The analysis of the firm size distribution demonstrated the
manufacturing sector experienced a significant reduction in the fraction of ineffi-
ciently over-sized firms. Furthermore, consistent with the patterns for the distribu-
tion of physical productivity, there is a significant thinning out of the left tail of the
efficient size distribution. These results suggest that there may be differences in
the changes in allocative efficiency across different levels of physical productivity.
In order to examine the reasons for the observed improvements in allocative
efficiency, in this section, I investigate the extent to which the reductions in the
dispersion of TFPR is due to improvements in allocative efficiency across plants
with different physical productivity.
As in Chen and Irarrazabal (2015), I decompose the variance of log TFPR into
between-and within-group variation by grouping firms in quintiles based on their
physical productivity.
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where logTFPRiqs is the log of TFPR for plant i in the qth TFPQ quintile in the
sector s; logTFPRs is the mean of logTFPR in sector s while logTFPRsq is the
mean of logTFPR of the qth TFPQ quintile in sector s.
The above equation demonstrates that, given the distribution of TFPQ, the evo-
lution of the variance of TFPR, both within- and between-quantiles, is a function of
the changes in the gap between actual and efficient resource allocation. The within-
quantile component of the variance of revenue productivity captures the extent
of misallocation within each quantile while the between-quantile component cap-
tures the extent of dispersion of revenue productivity across groups of plants with
different physical productivity. To the extent that the between-quantile variance
is immune to measurement error overtime or other idiosyncratic distortions not
accounted for in the HK framework, it will provide us with robust evidence on the
degree of misallocation across groups of different physical productivity.
Figure 3·9 (a) presents the decomposition of the within-sector variance of TFPR
by within- and between-quintiles. From 2002-2009, the reduction in the between-
quintile variance accounted for the large decline in the variance of revenue pro-
ductivity. The results suggest that improved allocation of resources between firms
of different productivity was the major factor for the decline the variance of TFPR.
In order to examine the extent and direction of resource reallocation, I plot the
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various components of the between-quintile variance in Figure 3·9 (b). The figure
shows that the bottom quintile of the physical productivity distribution experi-
enced the steepest decline in the average TFPR. Similarly, the average TFPR of the
top quintile experienced the second fastest convergence to the mean. The results
again suggest that the convergence of the average TFPR of the top and bottom
quintile are the main reason for the observed decline in the variance of TFPR.
To summarize, the results suggest that the improvements in allocative effi-
ciency between quintiles of TFPQ (particularly due to the convergence in the aver-
age TFPR of the bottom and top quintiles to the sector mean) was the driving force
for the observed improvements in allocative efficiency. Similarly, when I examine
the evolution of capital and output wedges, the results again indicate that the de-
cline in the between-quintile variance is the major contributor to the observed fall
in the variance of output and capital distortions.
3.7 Robustness Checks
3.7.1 Limitations of the HK Framework
The HK framework’s focus on TFPR (and TFPQ) does not give the complete pic-
ture of the effect of industrial policy on the evolution of the manufacturing sector
since TFPR is a measure only of private returns to inputs and does not capture
the social returns to the investment incentives. If a firm has low TFPR but gen-
erates large externalities to other firms (such as knowledge spillovers), then there
could be justification for the provision of incentives to such firms. One could ar-
gue that if the industrial policies successfully prioritized the firms that generated
the most spillovers, then they are effective policies even if they would be pegged
as distortionary by the HK framework. Nonetheless, the evaluation of the general
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equilibrium effects or a cost/benefit analyses of these policies is beyond the scope
of this paper.
3.7.2 Model Specification
The HK framework assumes homogeneous markup across firms, and by equation
(7) the observed dispersion of revenue productivity reflects the dispersion of id-
iosyncratic distortions. However, there could be other sources of dispersion that
can lead variation in TFPR. For instance, the observed within-industry dispersion
in TFPR could be a result of variations in markups or idiosyncratic demand shifts.
In this section, I examine the correlation of TFPR with plant exit in order to
evaluate the sources of dispersion in revenue productivity. If the dispersion in
TFPR is mainly due to variations in market power, firms with low TFPR are more
likely to exit since they have less market power. On the other hand, under the HK
framework, firms with low TFPR are less likely to exit since they enjoy the benefits
of low capital wedges (e.g. due to subsidized credit) and high output wedges (e.g.
due to tax exemptions). Thus, to distinguish the potential sources of dispersion in
TFPR, I examine the relationship between plant exit and TFPR and TFPQ in Table
3.9.
Consistent with the predictions of the HK model, the results in all the columns
Table 3.9 corroborate that lower TFPR is associated with a lower probability of
plant exit. If the variation in TFPR is solely driven by variations in market power
we would expect that the firms with lower TFPR, which have lower market power,
would have higher rate of exit . On the other hand, as expected, firms with high
physical productivity, TFPQ, are less likely to exit. These findings support the
argument that the variations in revenue productivity are due the distortions in
factor prices within the HK framework rather than due to variation in markups
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across firms.
Furthermore, the relationship between TFPR and exit rate demonstrates the
channel through which priority sector targeting affect the distribution of physical
and revenue productivity. The firms that benefit from the priority sector benefits
have lower TFPR and they are less like to exit the market even when they have
lower physical productivity. On the other hand, the results in the last two columns
show that the relationship between TFPR and exit rates declines overtime, par-
ticularly for the post-2002 period. This is again consistent with the fact that after
the removal of the more generous priority sector benefits stipulated in Regulation
7/1996, the extent to which inefficient firms are sheltered by the policy is smaller.
3.7.3 Measurement Error
Measurement error can affect the interpretation of the calculations on the gains
from efficient reallocation of resources. One can argue that the higher degree of
measurement error in the Ethiopian data compared to the India, China or US data
could be a potential explanation for the observed misallocation. If the variations
in output and input measures are due to measurement error, then the HK type
calculation will overstate the dispersion and the potential gains from efficient fac-
tor reallocation. For instance, Dong (2011) developed a method that accounts for
measurement error and argues that, on average, the measured loss of TFP from
capital misallocation using Hsieh and Klenow (2009) is overestimated by 10%. In
addition, Rotemberg and White (2017) argues that when appropriate data cleaning
procedures are undertaken there is little evidence that measured misallocation is
significantly higher in India than in the United States.
Our results showed that output could have more than tripped under efficient
reallocation. Thus, such measurement error can not fully rule out the existence
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of severe misallocation but perhaps cautions us about the exact magnitude of ef-
ficiency gains. Although I can not rule out arbitrary measurement error, in this
section, following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), I will examine if there is any system-
atic measurement error in the Ethiopian data to the extent that would affect the
results.
Removing More Outliers
All the analyses so far, particularly the TFP gain calculations from reallocation,
were under taken after trimming the top and bottom 2% tails of the distribution
of TFPQ and TFPR, which were about 11.7% of the observations. To examine the
sensitivity of the results to measurement error in the tails or outliers, I undertake
the same analysis after trimming the top and bottom 3% tails from the distribution
of log scaled TFPQ and TFPR (which constituted 14% of the observations). For
instance, as shown in Figure 3·10, with sigma equal to 3, the hypothetical TFP
gains for 2001 falls from 180% to 165% when using the 3% trimming instead of 2%.
Over all, comparing Figure 3·10 with Figure 3·6, the results on gains from ef-
ficient reallocation are very similar both in terms of magnitude and pattern over-
time. Hence, measurement error in the remaining 2% tail is not sufficiently high to
account for the high TFP gains calculated using the HK methodology.
Revenue vs Inputs
Following HK, I also undertake a check for the degree of classical measurement
error by examining the correlation between inputs and revenue for Ethiopia in
relation to China, India, and the US. If the true elasticities between revenue and
input are similar in the aforementioned countries and there is a greater classical
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measurement error in the Ethiopia data, the coefficients from the regressions using
the Ethiopia data will be much smaller.
As shown in Table 10, the results from the regression of inputs on revenue (mea-
sured as the value of output) suggest the extent of classical measurement error for
the Ethiopian data is fairly similar to the findings for China and India, and the
U.S. In fact, the extent of measurement error suggested by the regressions for the
Ethiopian data is smaller compared to India and China, while, as argued before,
the extent of misallocation and TFP gains for the Ethiopian plants are still very
large compared to both countries. Thus, measurement error is not the driving fac-
tor for the observed severe misallocation in the Ethiopian manufacturing sector,
particularly in comparison to the US, China, or India.
Overall, the various robustness checks undertaken above regarding the role
of measurement error and model misspecification suggests that disproportionate
classical measurement error in the Ethiopian data is not sufficiently high to un-
dermine the results that show the presence of significant actual misallocation of
factors in the Ethiopian manufacturing sector and the distortionary effects of the
two industrial policies examined in this paper.
3.8 Conclusion
A long list of studies in the development literature have identified productivity
differences as the key reason for the cross country divergence in living conditions.
The burgeoning literature on misallocation and growth shows that distortions that
affect productivity in the manufacturing sector can have critical implications for
the whole economy. Furthermore, the recent literature on industrial policies argue
that well-designed policies, such as those that foster competition, can engender
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productivity growth while others have argued that such well-intended policies
can have detrimental long-run effects.
In this paper, using a rich plant level census data from 1996-2008, I evaluate
the distortionary effects of two industrial policies designed to support prioritized
sub-sectors and regions on the productivity of the Ethiopian manufacturing sector
by exploiting the sectoral, regional and temporal variations induced by the two
policies. The results show that there is a severe misallocation in Ethiopia com-
pared to the US, China or India, but it has lessened over the studied period. While
improvements in resource allocation across firms of different physical productiv-
ity contributed to the observed decline in the dispersion of revenue productivity,
there are large aggregate TFP gains from the removal of idiosyncratic distortions.
Furthermore, improvements in resource allocation across firms of different phys-
ical productivity contributed to the observed decline in the dispersion of revenue
productivity.
In addition, I find that the priority sector support policies, especially the first
policy, have had significant negative effects on a firm’s physical and revenue pro-
ductivity. The results suggest that the incentives provided under the two indus-
trial policies exacerbate the extent of misallocation. Nonetheless, the removal of
these sector and location specific distortionary policies and export-based eligibil-
ity criteria under the second policy contributed to the observed improvements in
allocative efficiency over the period studied.
However, the HK accounting methodology adopted in the paper has several
shortcomings that limit the interpretation of the findings. First, as in Peters et al.
(2012), it would be relevant to account in more detail how the entry and exit dy-
namics affect the nature and severity of misallocation since there is a large de-
gree of entry and exit in manufacturing sector (Shiferaw, 2009). In addition, in the
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Ethiopian context at least, the HK approach can underestimate the extent of mis-
allocation since it does not account the reallocation of resources from agriculture
to manufacturing or across sectors. Furthermore, the HK methodology does not
account for the potential endogeneity of physical productivity and the potential
dynamic gains (due to learning spillovers or inter-sectoral linkages) from initial
input prices distortions.
In addition, while the HK methodology evaluates the role of distortions on
allocative efficiency, the industrial policies considered in Ethiopia have additional
objectives, such as reducing regional inequality, that are not accounted for in the
current paper. A richer model could potentially tease out the net effects of the
industrial policies comparing both the costs in terms of allocative efficiency and
the potential dynamic gains, inter-sectoral spillovers or equity considerations.
Given the aforementioned caveats, the empirical analyses presented in the pa-
per can be viewed as an approach that allows for the evaluation the static costs of
the distortions induced by the industrial policies with the objective of improving
allocative efficiency. The extent to which the manufacturing sector is productive
and can accommodate changes in the agriculture and service sectors is critical for a
successful structural transformation. Hence, the significant presence of distortions
in the manufacturing sector documented in the paper suggest perhaps explain why
the sector’s contribution to the overall economy has been stagnant at 5% over the
studied period.
249
3.9 Figures
Figure 3·1: Sectoral Composition of Total Value Added and Employment, levels and shares
Source: Author’s calculation using data from African Sector Database (2015)
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Figure 3·2: Distribution of TFPQ and TFPR
(a) (b)
(a): Smoothed histogram of the log of TFPQ scaled by the geometric mean of TFPQis across
all plants in an industry s, TFPQis = YisKαsis L1−αssi
, (b): Smoothed histogram of the log of TFPR
scaled by the geometric mean of TFPRis across all plants in sector s, TFPRis = PsiYisKαsis L1−αssi
Figure 3·3: Output and Capital Wedges by Physical Productivity
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Figure 3·4: Actual and Efficient Distributions of Plant Size
Figure 3·5: Actual and Efficient Distributions of Plant Size
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Figure 3·6: TFP percentage gains from equalizing TFPR within
industries, measured as 100(Yeffcient/Y − 1)
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Figure 3·7: Decomposition of Total TFPR Dispersion
The figure presents the dispersion of TFPR, and its within-sector and between-sector compo-
nents, where each sector is defined using ISIC four digit classification.
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Figure 3·8: Decomposition of Within-Sector TFPR Dispersion:
Within and Between Priority Regions
(a)
(b)
(a)The dispersion of TFPR, and its within-priority-region and between-priority-region com-
ponents , (b) The within-priority-region variations in TFPR for each of the three regions, and
together with the total within-priroity-region TFPR
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Figure 3·9: Decomposition of Within-Sector TFPR Dispersion:
Within and Between Quantiles
(a)
(b)
(a) The dispersion of within-sector TFPR, and its decompositon into within- and between-
quintiles of physical productivity, (b) The between-quintiles variations in the within sector
TFPR for each of the 5 quintile groups together with the total between-quintiles TFPR disper-
sion
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Figure 3·10: TFP percentage gains from equalizing TFPR within
industries with 3% trim
3.10 Tables
Table 3.1: Summary of Regulation 7/1996 on Priority Sector Tar-
geting
Location Priority Status Type of Investment Tax Holiday Years Loss carry forward
Addis Ababa, and Neighboring Pioneer New 3 3
Expansionary 2
Promoted New 1 3
Expansionary 1
Underdeveloped locations Pioneer New 5 5
Expansionary 2
Promoted New 3 4
Expansionary 1
All other locations Pioneer New 4 5
Expansionary 2
Promoted New 2 3
Expansionary 1
Notes: * For an investor who has incurred loss during tax holiday, the loss carry forward applies
for the specified number of years after the termination of the tax holiday.
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Table 3.2: Number of Establishments and Average Yearly Produc-
tion
No. of Firms Private Public Public/Private Ave. No. Employees Ave. Output
1995 622 465 157 0 216 10636
1996 696 555 137 4 233 9820
2000 721 607 107 7 241 12885
2001 882 751 124 7 266 11041
2002 938 804 128 6 261 10021
2007 1731 1634 40 57 145 7132
2008 1947 1843 94 10 142 6081
All monetary figures are in thousands of 2005 Ethiopian Birr
Table 3.3: Distribution of Firms Across Regions and by Priority
Status
Region Groups Sector Priority Observations Perm. Employee Capital Value Added
Addis and Neighboring Pioneer 2048 77 5912 13287
Promoted 4957 86 4217 8485
Neither 1057 153 3270 7301
Underdeveloped Regions Pioneer 59 15 2548 1672
Promoted 94 37 1681 3542
Neither 43 40 3473 25860
Elsewhere Pioneer 2156 95 12227 19911
Promoted 3079 47 2491 3874
Neither 460 356 18086 13856
All monetary figures are in thousands of 2005 Ethiopian Birr and all figures except number of
firms are averages.The results are pooled for 1996-2008
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Table 3.4: Eligibility to Priority Benefits and Plant Revenue Pro-
ductivity (TFPR)
(1) (2) (3)
Log TFPR Log TFPR Log TFPR
Pioneer Eligible -0.560∗∗∗ -0.585∗∗∗ -0.317∗
(0.182) (0.185) (0.161)
Promoted Eligible -0.154∗∗ -0.131∗ 0.041
(0.067) (0.068) (0.053)
Pioneer EligibleXPost 2002 0.312∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.215
(0.131) (0.145) (0.179)
Promoted EligibleXPost 2002 0.118 0.070 0.048
(0.094) (0.089) (0.071)
NewPolicyXPost2002 -0.226∗∗ -0.335∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.109)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Sector (ISIC-4 Digit) FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes
Observations 10777 10777 9490
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The results are for the regressions of log TFPR on indicators for eligibility to pioneer
and promoted priority sector status (based on the sub-sector and location of the firm) with the
1996 policy, New Policy (from Gebrewolde and Rockey (2019)). The regressions also include
ownership dummies and age, but these variables are not included in the table for presentation
sake. The regressions are weighted by the sector value-added shares (at the ISIC four digit
disaggregation). The standard errors are two way clustered at the sector and region level.
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Table 3.5: Regression of Output and Capital Wedges on Eligibility to Priority Benefits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(1− τ Y, is) log(1− τ Y, is) log(1− τ Y, is) log(1 + τ K, is) log(1 + τ K, is) log(1 + τ K, is)
Pioneer Eligible 0.143 0.155 0.085 -0.466∗∗ -0.491∗∗ -0.320∗
(0.124) (0.120) (0.135) (0.190) (0.193) (0.193)
Promoted Eligible -0.114 -0.125 -0.052 -0.396∗∗∗ -0.372∗∗∗ -0.028
(0.085) (0.083) (0.053) (0.112) (0.121) (0.071)
Pioneer EligibleXPost 2002 -0.259∗∗ -0.293∗∗∗ -0.142 0.036 0.107 0.092
(0.107) (0.100) (0.101) (0.112) (0.133) (0.150)
Promoted EligibleXPost 2002 0.135 0.157∗∗ 0.022 0.396∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗ 0.106
(0.083) (0.077) (0.073) (0.136) (0.137) (0.096)
NewPolicyXPost 2002 0.104 0.237∗∗ -0.222 -0.172
(0.087) (0.101) (0.140) (0.131)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector (ISIC-4 Digit) FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10777 10777 9490 10777 10777 9490
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The results are for the regressions of log output and capital wedges from on indicators for eligibility to pioneer and promoted
priority sector status (based on the sub-sector and location of the firm) with the 1996 policy, New Policy (2003), ownership dummies and
age. Output wedges are defined here as log(1 − τY,is) while capital wedges are defined as log(1 + τK,is). The regressions are weighted
by the sector value-added shares (at the ISIC four digit disaggregation). The standard errors are clustered at the sector-region level.
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Table 3.6: Eligibility to Priority Benefits and Plant Physical Pro-
ductivity (TFPQ)
(1) (2) (3)
Log TFPQ Log TFPQ Log TFPQ
Pioneer Eligible -0.985∗∗∗ -1.042∗∗∗ -0.418∗
(0.314) (0.339) (0.219)
Promoted Eligible -0.114 -0.046 0.018
(0.118) (0.117) (0.075)
Pioneer EligibleXPost 2002 0.675∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗ 0.352
(0.230) (0.258) (0.213)
Promoted EligibleXPost 2002 0.055 -0.010 0.077
(0.125) (0.120) (0.095)
NewPolicyXPost2002 -0.374∗∗ -0.568∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.141)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Sector (ISIC-4 Digit) FE Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Observations 10776 10777 9490
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The results are for the regressions of log TFPQ on indicators for eligibility to pioneer
and promoted priority sector status (based on the sub-sector and location of the firm) with the
1996 policy, New Policy (from Gebrewolde and Rockey (2019)). The regressions also include
ownership dummies and age, but these variables are not included in the table for presentation
sake. The regressions are weighted by the sector value-added shares (at the ISIC four digit
disaggregation). The standard errors are clustered at the sector-region level.
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Table 3.7: Eligibility to Priority Benefits and Plant Entry and Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entry Entry Entry Exit Exit Exit
Pioneer Eligible 0.189∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.071∗∗ -0.017
(0.050) (0.049) (0.045) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031)
Promoted Eligible 0.043∗∗ 0.040∗ 0.022 0.004 -0.001 -0.011
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014)
Pioneer EligibleXPost 2002 -0.063 -0.074∗ -0.086∗ -0.055∗ -0.073∗∗ -0.014
(0.041) (0.040) (0.046) (0.032) (0.035) (0.030)
Promoted EligibleXPost 2002 0.048∗∗ 0.055∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ 0.007 0.019 0.021
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.018) (0.020)
NewPolicyXPost2002 0.033∗ -0.007 0.056∗∗ 0.043∗
(0.018) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector (ISIC-4 Digit) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Observations 10777 10777 9490 9215 9215 8258
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The results are for the regressions of indicators for entry (exit) on indicators for eligibility to pioneer and promoted priority
sector status (based on the sub-sector and location of the firm) with the 1996 policy, New Policy (from Gebrewolde and Rockey (2019)).
The regressions also include ownership dummies and age, but these variables are not included in the table for presentation sake. The
regressions are weighted by the sector value-added shares (at the ISIC four digit disaggregation). The standard errors are two way
clustered at the sector and region level.
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Table 3.8: Within sector variance of log TFPR and Sector Priority
Status
Within sector-year variance of logscaled TFPR
No FE Year FE No FE Year FE
Pioneer 0.638∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗
(0.200) (0.190) (0.200) (0.191)
Promoted 0.133 0.127 0.199 0.184
(0.208) (0.199) (0.210) (0.201)
Post2002 -0.119 -0.005
(0.267) (0.293)
PioneerXPost2002 -0.499∗ -0.502∗ -0.493∗ -0.505∗
(0.289) (0.276) (0.291) (0.278)
PromotedXPost2002 -0.154 -0.112 -0.192 -0.139
(0.301) (0.287) (0.303) (0.289)
NewPolicy 0.280∗∗ 0.233∗
(0.134) (0.128)
NewPolicyXPost2002 -0.131 -0.081
(0.192) (0.183)
Observations 524 524 524 524
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The table reports results from the sector level regression of within-sector variance of
TFPR on indicators for sector’s elgibility for investment incentives. Pioneed and Promoted are
dummy variables indicatring sector priority status under the the 1996 policy while New Policy
variable designates prioritized sectors under the new policy. The regressions are weighted by
the sector value-added shares (at the ISIC four digit disaggregation).
Table 3.9: Regression of Exit on TFPR and TFPQ
(1) (2)
Exit Exit
Log TFPR 0.076∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.031)
Log TFPQ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.023)
Year FE Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes
Firm FE Yes
Observations 9221 8260
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The table present the results from the regressions of indicators for entry (exit) on log
TFPR and TFPQ. The regressions are weighted by the sector value-added shares (at the ISIC
four digit disaggregation). The standard errors are clustered at the region-sector level.
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Table 3.10: Regression of inputs on revenue and revenue on in-
puts following HK.
Ethiopia China India United States
Inputs on Revenue 0.97 0.98 0.96 1.01
(0.002)
Revenue on Inputs 0.96 0.82 0.90 0.82
(0.002)
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors for regressions using the Ethiopian data. The
regression estimates for China, India, and the U.S. are taken from Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
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3.10.1 Appendix: Measurement/Calibration
As in Hsieh and Klenow (2009), I need to back out sector output shares, sector
capital shares, and the firm-specific distortions from the data in order to calculate
the extent of the misallocation.
In line with other studies (see Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Ziebarth (2013) and
Dias et al. (2016)), I measure capital using the book value of the total capital stock.
In particular, I take capital as the average of the book value of total fixed assets at
the beginning and end of the year. Furthermore, although there is data on employ-
ment, I use the total wage bill instead as a measure of labor input so as to control
for unobserved differences in labor quality or time use. This approach assumes
that the wages per worker adjust for firm differences in worker’s skills as well as
hours worked per worker.
Following HK, I calibrate certain parameters using external sources. In partic-
ular, I set the rental price of capital(excluding distortions) to R=0.20, with a 15%
real interest rate and a 5% depreciation rate. This figure is based on the findings of
Siba (2015) who, using the same data set as the one used in this paper, calculates
that the median return to capital for the Ethiopian formal manufacturing sector
to be 15-21%. Nonetheless, as HK argue, incorrect specification of R affects only
the average capital distortions and not the gains from the efficient reallocation. As
expected, the main results of this paper are also fairly similar when R=0.10 was
used.
In addition, I set the elasticity of substitution between plant value added to
σ = 3 as in HK. The results regarding the gains from efficient reallocation of re-
sources vary depending on the value of σ. This is expected since, as demonstrated
in equation (12), the extent to which consumers can substitute between goods will
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affect the impact of inefficient deviation of TFPR on aggregate TFP. Since the gains
from efficient reallocation are increasing in σ, the value σ = 3 is a conservative
measure. As a robustness check, I also undertake all the analysis using a value of
σ = 4. As expected, the extent of misallocation and the implied gains from efficient
reallocation are larger when using σ = 4.
I also calibrate the elasticity of output with respect to capital for each industry
using the data from the NBER Productivity Database for the US manufacturing
sector. I calculate the implied labor shares for each industry using the NBER data.
I set the elasticity of the output with respect to capital for each of the sectors as
3/2 times 1 minus the labor share of the corresponding industry from the NBER
database. In order to make the analysis presented here compatible with the subse-
quent analysis of priority sector targeting policies, henceforth, all the sector level
calculations are undertaken treating the ISIC four digit disaggregation as a sector.
Furthermore, this disaggregation allows for a more accurate comparison of firms
since their peers would belong to a sector within a finer disaggregation.
As in HK, I followed the above calibration for the elasticity of output with re-
spect to capital for two main reasons. First, I use the data from the US manufactur-
ing sector for the elasticities because the labor shares calculated with the Ethiopian
manufacturing sector could be particularly affected by the distortions and I can not
separately identify capital distortions and capital production elasticities. Second,
as HK point out, I weigh the US labor share for each industry by 3/2 because the
NBER database, which uses the CM/ASM data sources, underestimates the labor
share of the manufacturing sector by 2/3 compared to what is implied by the Na-
tional Income and Product Accounts for the US. Of course, this approach assumes
that the US capital shares form the efficient benchmark and that under the absence
of distortions the observed capital shares (and the production function) are iden-
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tical for the US and the Ethiopian manufacturing sectors. These are indeed strong
assumptions, but they are necessary for the empirical implementation of the HK
procedure using the Ethiopian manufacturing data.
For the analysis on summary statistics and regression results presented in this
section, I follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Ziebarth (2013) in using the indus-
try value-added shares as weights. Other studies (such as Stiroh (2002)) that use
industry data argue that the variance of residuals is inversely related to industry
size since the data from small industries may be more noisy, and thus, weighted
least squares is the appropriate approach.
Furthermore, as in HK, I undertake all the subsequent analyses after removing
the bottom and top 2% tails of the distribution of log scaled TFPQ, log(AisM
1
σ−1
s /As),
and log scaled TFPR, log(TFPRis/TFPRs). The trimming is intended to keep the
analysis robust to extreme outliers and to control for possible measurement error.
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